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ABSTRACT 
The thesis deals with the rebellion of 1857 – variously described as the Sepoy 
Mutiny or the First Indian War of Independence – in an area generally stereotyped as 
the periphery in the context of the rebellion. The geographical area covered in the 
thesis includes the lower province of the Bengal Presidency, which at present 
roughly incorporates the states of West Bengal and Assam in India, and Bangladesh. 
Using the hitherto underutilized sources this dissertation seeks to venture into the 
task of constructing a narrative of sequential events related to the rebellion in this 
region, while simultaneously analysing the moments of crises that the colonial 
administration had encountered during this time. The dissertation argues that in spite 
of the regional specificities that determined the nature, character and outcome of the 
movement, the rebellion was a multifaceted and multi-layered one, and the events of 
varying multitudes in the region were interconnected with the broader conflagration 
of 1857, together which brought about a crisis of the colonial rule in Indian 
subcontinent. While doing so, the thesis looks at the action of the rebels, the 
networks of communication, and the role and significance of non-traditional modes 
of communication, with specific focus on the circulation of rumours and panic in 
shaping the character of the rebellion in the region. It argues that during a moment of 
social and political upheaval, such as the rebellion of 1857, rumours and their 
consequent effect have the potential to be a source of historical analysis. As a 
corollary to the present study, the thesis also revisits the question of ‗loyalism‘ of the 
middle class intelligentsia of Bengal during the rebellion, arguing for a more nuanced 
understanding of such terminologies.  
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GLOSSARY 
All the references, unless otherwise specified, have been consulted from Hobson 
Jobson’s Anglo-Indian Glossary or the Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Assar: The third month of the Hindu calendar. 
Bania/Baniya: A trader or merchant belonging to the Indian business class. 
Barkandaz: An armed retainer or policeman. 
Barua/Baruah: An officer of rank having superintendence over a department.  
Bazar/Bazaar: A permanent market or street of shops.   
Bhadralok: Bengali gentlemen, generally belonging to the upper caste 
Budmash: One following evil courses for the means of livelihood.    
Bungalow: The most usual class of house occupied by Europeans in the interior of 
India; being on one story, and covered by a pyramidal roof, which in the normal 
bungalow is of thatch, but may be of tiles without impairing its title to be called a 
bungalow. Most of the houses of officers in Indian cantonments are of this character. 
Chapati: Hand-made flattened wheat bread. 
Cutchery/Kutchery: An office of administration; Court of Justice.  
Dacoit/Dacoity: A robber belonging to an armed gang. The term, being current in 
Bengal, got into the Penal Code. By law, to constitute dacoity, there must be five or 
more in the gang committing the crime. 
Daroga: Superintendent of Police. 
Dewan/Diwan: Chief Minister of a state. 
Diwani: Revenue collecting rights. 
Doab: Tract of land lying between two confluent rivers. 
Fakir/Fakeer: Properly an indigent person, but specially applied to a Mahommedan 
religious mendicant, also, loosely and inaccurately, to Hindu devotees and naked 
ascetics. 
Firangi/Firingee/Feringhi: In Bengal Proper, this term implied native born/converted 
Christians and also in general referred to the Europeans of Portuguese origin.  
Ghat/Ghaut: A path of descent on the bank of a river. 
Ghuddee: Seat/throne. 
Gohain: A title usually given to the descendants of the Ahom Kings.  
Gora: A native word for white man, usually referred to the European soldiers. 
Haat: Weekly local market 
Havildar: A sepoy non-commissioned officer, corresponding to a sergeant. 
Hazaree: Supervisor 
Hindustan/Hindoostan: Originally the region of the river Indus; in the colonial period 
it denoted upper India (the plain of the Ganges, except Bengal) 
Hindustani: Used substantively in two senses (a) a native of Hindustan, and (b) the 
language of that country. 
Jahazi: Sea-men; detachment of a Naval Brigade. 
Jemadar/Jamadar/Jemautdar: the word indicates generally, a leader of a body of 
individuals. Technically, in the Indian army, it is the title of the second rank of native 
officer in a company of Sepoys, the Subadar/Subedar being the first. In this sense the 
word dates from the reorganization of the army in 1768. 
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Jihad: In Islam, it refers to the spiritual struggle within oneself against sin; often used 
to denote religious war or struggle against the non-believers. 
Kafir/Kaffir: Infidel. 
Khel: An organisation of paiks having to perform specific services to the Ahom 
government. 
Kutbah/Khutbah: Religious sermon delivered to the public according to Islamic 
tradition.  
Lota: The small spheroidal brass pot which Hindus used for drinking, and sometimes 
for cooking. This is the exclusive Anglo-Indian application, but natives also extend it 
to spherical pipkins of earthenware. 
Mahajan: Money-lender.  
Maidan: An open space or park used for meetings, sports and other activities.  
Mofussil: The country stations and districts, as contra-distinguished from the 
Presidency; or, relatively, the rural localities of a district as contra-distinguished from 
the Sudder or chief station, which is the residence of the district authorities. 
Mohur: Coins made up of valuable metals, mainly gold. 
Muktear: An Agent or a spokesman.  
Naik: Native non-commissioned officer, equivalent to corporal 
Najib/Nujeeb: A kind of half-disciplined infantry soldiers under some of the native 
governments; and also at one time a kind of militia under the British. 
Native: a person born in a specified place or associated with a place by birth.  
Nawab/Nabob: A native governor of a province during the time of the Mughal 
Empire and early British colonial rule. From this use it became a title of rank without 
necessarily having any office attached. 
Pagri: Usually referred to the turban or a head band. The term being often used in 
Anglo-Indian colloquial for a scarf of cotton or silk -wound round the hat in turban-
form. 
Paik: A footman, an armed attendant, or inferior police and revenue officer, a 
messenger, a couiier, a village watchman. 
Peshwa: A leader, a guide. The word refers to the Chief Minister of the Maratha 
power.  
Pultun: Native translation of the word Platoon. It is the usual native word for a 
regiment or battalion. 
Purbia/Purbiya: Inhabitant of the north Indian region that included Oudh, Bihar and 
Benares. 
Risaladar: A native officer commanding a troop of irregular horse. 
Russud/Rasad: The provision of grain, forage, and other necessaries got ready by the 
local officers at the camping ground of a, military force or official cortege.  
Sadar: Literal meaning is Chief or Head, used as a prefix for denoting words like 
Head Quarters, Chief Station or Chief Court (Sadar-Station, Sadar-Adawlat). 
Sahib: The title by which, all over India, European gentlemen, and it may be said 
Europeans generally, are addressed, and spoken of, when no disrespect is intended, 
by natives. It is also the general title (at least where Hindustani or Persian is used) 
which is affixed to the name or office of a European. 
Sahukar: Moneylender.  
Sarkar: Government; regime. 
Sati: A religious funeral practice among some Indian communities in which a 
recently widowed woman would have immolated herself on her husband‘s funeral 
pyre. 
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Sepoy/Sepoys: In Anglo-Indian use, a native soldier disciplined and dressed in 
European style.  
Seristadar: A keeper of records. 
Taluk/Talook: Holder of a ‗Taluk‘; In Bengal Presidency it is applied to tracts of 
proprietary, sometimes not easily distinguished from zamindaries, and sometimes 
subordinate to, or dependent on zamindars. 
Talukdar/Talookdar: A person in charge of a Taluk.  
Thagis/Thugs/Thuggees: In the colonial period the term applied to a robber or 
assassin of a peculiar class, who sallying forth in gang and in the character of 
wayfarers, either on business or pilgrimage, fall in with other travellers on road, and 
having gained their confidence, take a favourable opportunity of strangling them by 
throwing their turbans or handkerchiefs round their necks and then plundering them 
and burying their bodies. 
Thana/Thannah: A police station. 
Zamindar/Zemindar: Literally refers to a land-holder. One holding land on which he 
pays revenue to the government directly, and not to any intermediate superior. In 
Bengal Proper the zamindars hold generally considerable tracts, on a permanent 
settlement of the amount to be paid to government. In the N. W. Provinces there are 
often a great many zamindars in a village, holding by a common settlement, 
periodically renewable. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
BLOC: British Library Online Collections 
N.I.: Native Infantry 
GOGG: General Order of the Governor General 
GOB: Government of Bengal 
HCPP: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
IOR: India Office Records 
MSS EUR: European Manuscripts Collection (Private Papers) 
NAB: National Archives of Bangladesh 
NAI: National Archives of India 
OIOC: Oriental and India Office Collections 
WBSA: West Bengal State Archives 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
In the course of the thesis the term ‗Uprising‘ or ‗Rebellion‘ has been chosen 
alternatively, unless quoted otherwise, in order to avoid the somewhat cliché debate 
of whether it was the ‗First War of Indian Independence‘ or a mere ‗Sepoy War‘. 
Also, the term ‗native‘ has been used in a purely descriptive manner while referring 
to Indians. I have used the contemporary spellings of the places mentioned in the 
thesis, unless quoted otherwise. 
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Map One: The Bengal Presidency 
 
 
Page | 19  
 
Map Two: The Lower Province of Bengal 
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Map Three: Eastern Bengal and Assam 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about the socio-political and intellectual history of the rebellion of 1857 
in an area which has for long been considered peripheral in the context of the 
uprising. Taking the case study of the lower province of the Bengal Presidency and 
the north-east frontier of Assam, the dissertation draws out local responses in the 
region, proceeding to show their significance for our understanding of the nature of 
the uprising and its implications. It is an attempt to study some of the moments of 
crises that the colonial government had to encounter in the region. While doing so 
the thesis extends the geographical parameter of the uprising, the study of which has 
hitherto remained confined mostly to the north central Gangetic area, beyond the 
north-central Gangetic heartland, transcending the regional/national boundaries 
stressing that the notion of a ‗centre‘ and a ‗periphery‘ is not appropriate since most 
events, with all their regional specificities, ran into each other to create a larger 
phenomenon.  
The dissertation shows that unlike the events unfolding in the Gangetic 
heartland, where rebel action and the counter-insurgency of the colonial state were 
starkly visible, the region covered in the study presents a sequence of chronological 
events that has been hitherto understated but which requires to be integrated into the 
account of the rebellion as a whole since they flowed into it. The links and 
connections here indicate important aspects of the crisis of the colonial state at the 
time of the uprising. In the process of doing so this dissertation evaluates the role and 
significance of non-traditional modes of communication, with specific focus on the 
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circulation of rumours in and around the region and the response of the colonial 
government towards them.  
In presenting such a picture, the dissertation analyses the cumulative effects of 
events in the north-central Gangetic heartland and the resultant effect of those events 
in the region under study, showing how specificities of an area might determine the 
nature and character of events (as in the case of Assam, for instance), but that these 
were far from isolated acts and were connected to the processes that made up the 
rebellion of 1857. In this way, the dissertation will also show the various modes and 
networks of communications that the rebels of the region had established with their 
brethren of the Gangetic heartland.  
The other intervention that this dissertation seeks to make is to revisit the 
question of ‗loyalism‘ amongst the middle class intelligentsia of Bengal during the 
rebellion of 1857. As C. A. Bayly and Clare Anderson have noted, the distinction 
between the collaborators and the rebels cannot be explained simply in terms of 
causative factors, for there were many exceptions to apparent social, economic, 
cultural or religious connections.
1
 To Anderson this is what makes the question of 
loyalty and rebellion perplexing.
2
 This dissertation shares this concern and argues 
with the help of contemporary reports and reactions that the uprising of 1857 had 
more subtle and nuanced reflections. The patterns and trajectories of response from 
the actors involved went beyond simplistic categorisations. In Bengal, ‗loyalism‘ of 
the intelligentsia contained internal dilemmas and contradictions, thus opening a 
                                                          
1
 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, The New Cambridge History of 
India, II, 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 170. 
2
 Clare Anderson, The Indian Uprising of 1857-8: Prisons, Prisoners and Rebellion, Anthem South 
Asian Studies, London; New York: Anthem Press, 2007, p. 11. 
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space for moving beyond terminologies of ‗loyalist‘ or ‗rebel‘. Opposition towards 
the Company rule in Bengal were articulated in a rhetoric that was different from 
those of the ‗rebel‘ leaders of 1857. The forms were different, but it was connected 
by a common feeling of discontent and dissent. 
In the introduction, I have firstly outlined the major trends in the literature on 
1857, in order to situate this dissertation within the larger framework of the 
historiography and also to show the point of departure. Secondly, I show the nature 
of recent studies that have dealt with similar themes. Thirdly, I discuss the more 
important aspects of the methodology that I have followed and the chapterisation of 
the thesis. 
 
THE LITERATURE – GENERAL TRENDS 
It has been said that ‗no military revolt in the world has produced so much literature 
as the uprising of 1857 in India, commonly known as the Sepoy Mutiny.‘3 In the last 
one hundred and fifty years almost every aspect of this history has been discussed, 
contested, re-imagined, re-invented, appropriated and memorialised over time and 
across the social spectrum.
4
 Innumerable memoirs, journals, reminiscences, 
narratives, and histories followed the uprising, almost immediately. The 
contemporary newspapers, both in India as well as in England, had their columns 
filled with the news and stories relating to the event that shook the foundation of the 
                                                          
3
 Sashi Bhusan Chaudhuri, English Historical Writings on the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859, Calcutta: 
World Press, 1979, p. 7. 
4
 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, ―Eighteen-Fifty-Seven and Its Many Histories‖, in Biswamoy Pati (ed.), 
1857: Essays from Economic and Political Weekly, Hyderabad: Orient Longman Private Limited, 
2008: 1-22, p. 1. 
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colonial power in the Indian subcontinent. Asa Briggs has suggested that ‗no single 
event more powerfully affected the mind of that generation than the ―Indian Mutiny‖ 
of 1857.‘5 
Among historians writing in the aftermath of the uprising, a tremendous 
reaction moved all who were interested in the preservation of the legitimacy of the 
British Empire. Initially, it was the self appointed task of the British historians to 
relieve the Empire from the psychological shock of the mutiny. Therefore a British 
historiography on the ‗Indian Mutiny‘ developed which showed some definite trends 
of interpretations. Charles Ball published a two-volume account of the happenings in 
1858-59 and a spate of writings followed almost immediately.
6
 The most important 
of these was the magnum opus written by Sir John William Kaye, most certainly ‗the 
chief historian of the Mutiny‘, as Eric Stokes called him.7 Others like Colonel G.B. 
Malleson set the trend with his ‗conspiracy theory‘ and explained the entire outburst 
as an outcome of the premeditated designs of a handful of leaders, the so-called 
‗conspirators‘.8 Even an otherwise liberal writer like Charles Dickens did not hesitate 
to give call for a retaliatory race war.
9
 The rebellion of 1857 was thus placed within 
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the British imperial history of India. By means of a deliberate process of selection 
and elimination, the unity of the narrative and its central consistency – the crisis of 
British rule in India and the process of overcoming of that crisis – was ensured by 
these early historians. The uprising of 1857 tended to appear as an interlude in the 
process of transition from the rule of the Company to the rule of the Crown. The 
significant importance they attached to the British counter-insurgency across the 
country in comparison to the account of the rebels, quite evidently reflected their 
objective. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the uprising attracted and inspired the first 
generation of Indian nationalists. Almost like a straightforward act of inversion, the 
rebels who were scoundrels to the imperialists became icons to the nationalists. ‗The 
Volcano or The First War of Indian Independence‘ by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar 
may be cited as the perfect illustration of how the colonialist narrative structure was 
appropriated by Indians and reproduced with the help of a different rhetoric.
10
 His 
pro-nationalist stances made Savarkar look with contempt and reject the British 
assertion that attributed the ‗war‘ to the issue of greased cartridges only. Savarkar 
connected the rebellion with British atrocities and argued that the people rose up in 
arms against the British for safeguarding their swadharma (own religion) and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
manner: ‗I wish I were Commander-in-Chief over there! I would address that Oriental character 
which must be powerfully spoken to, in something like the following placard, which should be 
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swarajya (homeland). In the process, Malleson‘s ‗conspirators‘ were turned into 
‗heroes‘ and the underlying unity of the empire was replaced by the unity of the 
nation.  
The access to official records and archival sources in the post-independence era 
revealed many interesting developments related to the debates on the nature of the 
uprising of 1857. There seemed to be a more objective, nevertheless nationalist, 
assessment of the uprising. Most notable amongst these were the writings of Ramesh 
Chandra Majumdar, Surendranath Sen, Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya and Sashi 
Bhusan Chaudhury.
11
 These historians attempted to write a total history of the entire 
rebellion within the parameters of a single work, constructing an overarching unity 
that would cover up all the fissures, incongruities and incompatible moments of 
popular action. But in retrospect it seems quite obvious that in its manifest form, the 
uprising failed to match up to the nationalist historian‘s notion of an anti-colonial 
struggle. In a way this is paradoxical because they themselves had foreclosed many 
alternative avenues of enquiry, ignored the multiple layers of the uprising and had 
instead imposed on many ambiguous episodes a fixed meaning of their own. In the 
uprising of 1857, the rebellion of the sepoys in the towns of Gangetic heartland of 
northern India seemed to be the only layer that fell into this structured pattern, 
probably because this was where the rebels could be seen as at least attempting to 
construct an alternative state power. 
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The nationalist interpretation of the rebellion of 1857 was not accepted by the 
majority of the professional historians of the time. By 1960, as Thomas Metcalf has 
argued, there was a greater consensus among historians that it was ‗something more 
than a sepoy mutiny, but something less than a national revolt.‘12 However, it was 
Eric Stokes who for the first time tried to look beyond this conventional 
interpretation of the nature of uprising of 1857.
13
 Dealing with the popular dimension 
of this uprising in the rural areas of the upper and central doab, he went on to argue 
that the uprising was not one movement, be it a peasant revolt, a mutiny of sepoys or 
a war of national independence, it was many.
14
 The nature and scope of the 
movement varied vastly from one district to another and even between villages of the 
districts and was determined by a set of complex factors including ecology, culture, 
tenurial forms and the variable impact of the colonial state. Stokes stressed the role 
of the new magnates because it was they who were able to protect the British 
interests in the districts when the sepoys had mutinied and the police disintegrated. 
Where no such magnate elements existed, groups of rebellious villages almost 
always tried to create an over-arching structure of authority. On the other hand in 
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places like Awadh the pressure of village opinion drove otherwise cautious magnates 
into the rebellion. 
This was the central theme of the argument of Rudrangshu Mukherjee.
15
 
Evaluating the popular content of the uprising of 1857 in Awadh he explored the 
interaction between the material environment affected by colonial policy and the 
events of the revolt. Mukherjee quite convincingly has argued in his work that the 
rebellion in Awadh ‗pertained to the people as a whole and was carried on by the 
people‘ and the choice of the word ‗popular‘ was thus deliberate.16 The central 
arguments of Rudrangshu Mukherjee were first that the popular content of the revolt 
was characterized by the protest of the talukdars and peasants fighting together 
against the colonial state, second that they fought together and not against each other 
because of their shared traditions of commonality and mutual dependence, third the 
British revenue policy tended to disrupt the erstwhile existence of talukdars and 
peasants and their world of mutuality and interdependence, fourth the soldiers, 
themselves the product of the same agrarian world, shared much of the grievances of 
the talukdars and peasants, and finally, that it was eventually the mutiny of the 
soldiers that precipitated the moment when the wide-spread rural disaffection was 
transformed into active civil rebellion. Mukherjee‘s description and analysis of the 
Mutiny is one of the best accounts on the subject written so far. Placing the mutiny in 
Lucknow in the wider perspective of an all-India movement, he traced the connection 
between uprisings as they spread from one station to another. Drawing a parallel with 
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the ‗Great Fear‘ during the French Revolution, he convincingly touched upon the 
way rumours ‗often acted as a springboard for sepoy action‘.17  
The interpretation put forward by Stokes and Mukherjee was taken to an 
altogether new height by the scholarly intervention of Ranajit Guha. All the great 
issues of interpretation of 1857, as Stokes had argued, turned on the assessment of 
peasant action, since the peasantry formed the crucial link between the military 
mutiny and the civil uprising. However, as mentioned before, to Stokes, this 
assignation of a central role to the peasants was not matched by any gestures towards 
making peasants the masters of their own destiny. It was precisely in this regard that 
Guha intervened with his seminal work, Elementary Aspects of the Peasant 
Insurgency in Colonial India, and came up with an entirely novel approach about the 
role of the peasants in revolt.
18
 Guha located the peasantry in colonial India within a 
relationship of power – a relation of dominance and subordination – which derived 
its material sustenance from the pre-capitalist conditions of production and its 
legitimacy from a traditional culture still paramount in the superstructure.
19
 He 
rejected the earlier understanding of the peasant mobilisation and the notion that the 
peasant actions were ‗spontaneous‘ and were launched in a fit of ‗absent-
mindedness‘. In fact Guha‘s main objective was not to depict the struggle of peasants 
as a series of specific encounters but in its general form.
20
 He sought to identify some 
of these ‗general forms‘ in rebel consciousness – ‗elementary aspects‘ as he preferred 
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to called them – and classified these as negation, ambiguity, modality, solidarity, 
transmission and territoriality.  
In order to illustrate these categories, Guha drew upon an enormous amount of 
historical material, which inevitably included the events of the rebellion of 1857. As 
Guha noted, the peasants could form their own identity through an act of ‗negation‘ 
of their superiors and, therefore, knew exactly what they were doing when they rose 
in rebellion. This was the common pattern that was found almost everywhere during 
the uprising of 1857, whereby the rebels had selectively destroyed and plundered the 
properties of the Europeans and also the symbols that were associated with the 
‗dominators‘. In this way the prisons, record rooms, factories, telegraphic posts and 
offices, amongst others, became the objects of attack. This was followed by the act of 
‗inversion‘ whereby the peasants asserted their resistance by appropriating for 
themselves the signs of authority that belonged to the dominator.
21
 Guha also 
analysed the ambiguity of the rulers who were unable to distinguish between a 
‗rebellion‘ and ‗dacoity‘ and classified all the ‗rebels‘ as ‗dacoits‘.22 But what the 
colonial administration failed to grasp was that unlike the ‗crime‘, a ‗rebellion‘ was 
by nature an open and public event, whereby the affirmation of the intent of the 
rebels was explicitly manifested.
23
 In Kanpur for instance, the rebels met before the 
uprising to discuss the proceedings, and General Wheeler in the entrenchment was 
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actually informed that the attack was about to begin.
24
 Likewise, as we shall see in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4, animated conversations between the sepoys of the cantonments 
took place in Barrackpore, Dhaka, Chittagong and also in Assam regarding the plan 
of action to be taken during the uprising. The other factor that differentiated the 
rebellion from a crime was ‗destruction‘. Guha classified four different forms of 
destruction: wrecking, burning, eating and looting.
25
 In the course of the rebellion 
however these four categories of destruction often lose their separate identities and 
function as ‗mutually connected elements of one single complex‘.26 As Mukherjee 
had pointed out and as has been illustrated in the course of this thesis, there were 
multiple instances where it was reported that the rebels used fire arrows in order to 
burn down the bungalows of the European residents and destroyed the telegraph 
offices in Raniganj, Barrackpore, Chittagong and other places. 
The other interesting feature noticeable during the rebellion was the remarkable 
similarity that was noticed on the part of the rebel actions. Popular resistance 
inspired by a common faith was a feature of the anti-British mobilisation during the 
conflagration. And it was not just religion alone, according to Guha, which brought 
the people together, for there were many instances whereby this solidarity was 
expressed transcending the religious barriers.
27
 This expression of solidarity derived 
its strength from the speed with which the messages of rebellion were transmitted 
and left the colonial administration completely clueless. C.A. Bayly has convincingly 
argued that just as the colonial rule had established a network of intelligence and 
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information gathering system for the imperial surveillance, the rebels too had shown 
a remarkable degree of awareness about the importance of communication during the 
rebellion.
28
 During the uprising of 1857 almost everywhere across the northern India, 
and also the areas covered by this thesis, the rebels had systematically targeted and 
destroyed most of the formal agencies of communications including the telegraph 
lines, railway and postal communication and even the Grand Trunk road was under 
threat. While on the other hand, the rebels had the options of informal modes of 
communications to fall back on, which included both the verbal and nonverbal 
means. Guha‘s analysis of the rebel actions is one of the most significant 
contributions in understanding the complex nature of the uprising of 1857. 
Throughout the course of his study Guha emphasised the ‗actions‘ of the rebels than 
the ‗context‘ of their actions; ‗how‘ the rebels had acted the way they did was more 
significant to him than ‗why‘ they had acted in such manner. Guha saw them as 
‗conscious agents‘ working towards overturning a power structure that they had 
considered alien, exploitative and oppressive. 
This emphasis on the ‗actions‘ of the rebels were taken up by Tapti Roy in her 
study of Bundelkhand region during the rebellion.
29
 In her carefully constructed 
monograph, Roy attempted to show that in the region of Bundelkhand there were 
several layers of action operating at the same time and that each needs to be 
considered in its own terms if we are to understand the wider pattern of revolt. She 
singled out for this purpose four groups of actors in the uprising: the sepoys, the 
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rajas, the thakurs (the local lords) and the people. Roy noted the remarkable unity 
amongst the sepoys and maintained that, far from being anarchic, the sepoys 
sanctioned government; they simply wanted to be a part of the governing process. 
She also emphasized religion as the unifying factor for the sepoys, claiming that 
Hindus and Muslims put aside their differences in a joint effort to drive the 
Christians out of India. 
From the 1990s there has been a further shift in the historical interpretation of 
1857. There was a greater recognition that although the concept of modern nation 
was in its embryonic form, the rebel‘s sense of space was certainly larger than their 
village or region. Together they shared a common agenda: rejecting the British rule 
in India, which threatened their existence as a whole. The rebels of 1857 fought to 
restore a moral order that had been polluted by the colonial rule. As Gautam Bhadra 
wrote, the rebels‘ actions were determined by their day-to-day experience of the 
authority of the alien state.
30
 C.A.Bayly saw in the events of 1857 a set of ‗patriotic 
revolts‘.31 This perception has been further developed by Rajat Kanta Ray. He has 
emphasised that in the uprising of 1857 the rebels constantly referred to the people of 
India as the ‗Hindus and Mussulmans of Hindustan‘.32 To Ray, this was a war of 
races that was not a race war because the subject race conceived it as a war of 
religion; a religious war that was not purely a war of religion as what was being 
opposed was not the creed of the master race but their political domination. It was 
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not modern day nationalism and yet a patriotic war of the Hindu-Muslim 
brotherhood. As Ray puts it, ‗[I]t signified a confederation of two separate peoples 
bound together as one political unit by the shared perception of Hindustan as one 
land‘.33 
In the recent years there has been a fresh initiative to revisit the events of 1857 
in a new light. As Sabyasachi Bhattachrya has pointed out, ‗the way we interrogate 
the past differs from generation to generation.‘34 The questions we ask today are 
moulded by the concerns of our times, which may be different from those of the past. 
In the aftermath of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in the early 1990s and the 
subsequent resurgence of communal violence in Gujarat and elsewhere in India led 
many to reassess the question of religion in the formulation of India‘s identity as a 
secular state.
35
 One of the central devices in the colonial historiography of the second 
half of the nineteenth century was to heavily underline the religious sentiment as a 
trigger cause for the uprising of 1857. Though this interpretation is not altogether 
new, it has recently attracted attention due to the interpretative stance taken by 
William Dalrymple in his much hyped work ‗The Last Mughal‘.36 He has 
persuasively argued that the call for ‗Jihad‘ was no more than a desperate attempt on 
the part of the Muslims to reclaim their lost power and positions. Hence, it would be 
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fictitious to say that there was anything close to nationalism associated with this. 
Dalrymple portrayed the uprisings as primarily a ‗war of religion‘ between Islam and 
Christianity.
37
 While acknowledging that the ‗great majority‘ of the Sepoys were 
Hindus, he placed unprecedented emphasis on the presence in Delhi of ‗insurgents 
(who) described themselves as mujahedin, ghazis and jihadis‘ and who, towards the 
end of the siege, came to constitute ‗about a quarter of the total fighting force‘ in the 
city. 
Rajat Kanta Ray has described how, in the case of 1857, people sharing a 
syncretic culture but identifying with distinct religions consciously united to fight the 
British colonizers. It was, in their view, ‗a struggle of the Hindus and Muslims 
against the Nazarenes – not so much because the latter were supposed to be 
determined to impose the false doctrine of the Trinity, but because the identity of ‗the 
Hindus and Muslims of Hindustan‘ was being threatened by the moral and material 
aggrandizement of the arrogant imperial power.‘ 38 As Seema Alavi has argued, ‗both 
jihadis and Hindu rebel leaders and sepoys unproblematically used religious idioms 
and symbols to whip up anti-British support‘ during the rebellion.39 Farhat Hasan, in 
his critique of William Dalrymple‘s study The Last Mughal, which he describes as an 
attempt to impose a ‗rival fundamentalisms‘ scenario thesis onto 1857, has sought to 
refine the argument about the role of religion in the uprising. Hassan asserted that 
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‗jihad‘, in the context of those events, did not connote ‗religious war‘; rather the term 
was used by both Hindus and Muslims to infer a fight against injustice.
40
 Dalrymple 
dismissed these more complex understandings of the anti-imperialist mass 
movements, which pre-dated the emergence of bourgeois nationalism in India in 
favour of the notion of a ‗clash of rival fundamentalisms‘.41 Crispin Bates has 
pointed out that it would thus be fallacious to label the rebellion as a ‗war of religion‘ 
since we are still lacking detailed knowledge of who joined the ranks of the Ghazis 
and more importantly what was their motivation in doing so.
42
  
In spite of several shortcomings in Dalrymple‘s work, it is difficult however to 
dismiss one of his later claims. Dalrymple argues that ‗religion is not the only force 
at work, nor perhaps the primary one; but to ignore its power and importance, at least 
in the rhetoric used to justify the Uprising, seems to go against the huge weight of 
emphasis on this factor given in the rebels‘ own documents‘43. The role of religion 
during the conflagration of 1857 has in fact continued to remain a sensitive issue and 
has not received as much attention as it deserves. Crispin Bates and Marina Carter 
have noted that for a whole range of scholars of Indian history, to acknowledge the 
role of religion in 1857 was to see ‗evidence of weakness of national 
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consciousness‘.44 Analyses of the causes of the rebellion of 1857 and of the rapid 
spread of disaffected groups across northern and eastern India, both at the time of the 
conflict and in succeeding years, stressed the very real importance of religious beliefs 
both as a reason for widespread feelings of alienation in regard to British rule and as 
a means of mobilisation of a variety of individuals and groups who felt compelled to 
take up arms in defence of their faith. From the rebel perspective the leaders found 
religion as a mobilising strategy could appeal to both Hindus and Muslims and 
adjusted their recruitment strategies accordingly. Fath-i-Islam (Victory to Islam), for 
example, called upon Hindus and Muslims to unite to drive out the English as the 
only effective means of preserving both their faiths. While doing so the rebels made 
use of the emotive language of religion to mobilise support. To cite one example, 
The Azamgarh Proclamation, which is attributed to Firoz Shah, asserted that both 
Hindus and Muslims were being ‗ruined‘ by the ‗infidel and treacherous English‘ 
and declared that it was his intention to ‗extirpate the infidels‘ and to bring Hindus 
and Muslims together.
45
 However, Bates and Carter noted that religion was not of 
significance solely to Indian belligerents. The British soldiers also acted upon and 
were inspired by perceptions of themselves as holy warriors, fighting an equally 
desperate battle, in which they envisaged themselves as the military wing of a 
civilising mission and believed that it was practically a religious duty to combat and 
crush the heathen.
46
 To put it simply, for those in battle religion was an inspiration 
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for men on both sides to risk their lives. While rebellious sepoys fought for a new 
order founded upon faith, so the British envisaged themselves as the military wing of 
a global civilising mission, bent upon the extirpation of heathen savagery. 
This posits another set of question in front of us. If the primary motive of the 
rebels was not merely religious, then what was the alternative polity envisaged by the 
rebels and what was the system with which they intended to replace that was created 
by the British? Tapti Roy in one of her recent essays tried to draw attention to the 
various tracts from the rebel side written in 1857 which were in the nature of 
chapbooks written in ‗kissa‘ style, often containing tales about real life figures.47 One 
may infer from Roy‘s exposition that tracts like these presented a political agenda 
that were part of contemporary discourse. This dissertation partly draws upon this 
understanding of Roy and explores the extent to which the rebels operating in the 
lower province of Bengal and the regions further east attempted to establish an 
alternative polity and governmental order. The contents of the letters that were being 
circulated in Assam during the time of the rebellion clearly indicated that the rebels 
were trying to replace the colonial state and thus the question of alternative structure 
was an important element in the discussions. 
The uprising of 1857 was indeed a multi-layered movement in a complex 
hierarchy. Rebellion meant different things to different people. Socially dominant 
groups tended to use the marginal members of society for their own purposes as a 
rule, but occasionally the latter acquired a measure of agency-hood and autonomy. 
Thus the history of interface between the struggles of dalits and tribal communities‘ 
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and the campaign landed magnates undertook on the rebel side is of great 
significance. Only recently scholars in their own different way have tried to address 
this issue. L. N. Rana in his essay provided a detailed narrative of the disturbances in 
the Jharkhand region highlighting the active participation on the part of Cheros, 
Bhogta-Kharwar and Birjia tribes in the district of Palamau, while Sanjukta Dasgupta 
tried to show that the rebellion brought some of the tribal groups and the ‗erstwhile 
ruling class in a united act of defiance against foreign rule‘ in Singhbhum.48 
Dasgupta in her essay questioned the subaltern historian‘s assertion of subaltern 
autonomy in the Ho rebellion and concluded that there were linkages between the 
elite ruling class and the tribal subjects. This multidimensional nature of the uprising 
and what it meant to the dalits has also been touched upon by Badri Narayan. An 
additional element that he brought into the analysis was the dalit memory and the 
transformation of the dalit participants in the 1857 uprising into objects of ritual 
worship by fellow dalits.
49
 In a similar way, Shashank Sinha in his essay tried to 
focus on a predominantly tribal tract in Chotanagpur. Sinha especially explored the 
gender angle aspects that have hardly been touched upon as yet, although his 
exploration still tended to depict women involved in the uprising more as victims 
than as active participants.  
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Instead of confining themselves only to the colonial archives, many of these 
recent contributors to the historiography of 1857 have tried to reconstruct their past 
using works from local oral traditions thereby interrogating both the conventional 
and historical writings on 1857 and mainstream portrayals of dalit men and women 
and dalit writings on the subject. Taken together these new efforts have attempted to 
question the existing understanding of centre-periphery relations during the rebellion 
of 1857. This objective has been best explained in a recent essay by Gautam Bhadra. 
Writing in the context of the insurrection in Singhbhum during 1857 Bhadra has 
argued how the notion of the ‗margin‘ was explicitly or implicitly present in the 
fashioning and perceiving of local insurgency in the context of an uprising covering a 
large part of India.
50
   
 
REGIONS BEYOND THE GANGETIC HEARTLAND – THE SITUATION IN BENGAL 
Recovering lost voices was but one part of the agenda. The other was to recover the 
lost regions. In the course of understanding various complexities related to the 
rebellion of 1857, there was one common pattern that ran through all these works in 
spite of their differences in perception. Almost all of these works primarily centred 
their geographical parameters within the north-central Gangetic plains of northern 
India. In a way this was understandable since most of these writings tried to 
understand and analyse history in terms of acts of violence that were unfolding rather 
than the responses. From the colonial perspective, it was a ‗victor‘s narrative‘ that 
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celebrated the victors and defamed the vanquished. Where else to celebrate the innate 
superiority of the English character other than in the archetypal ‗mutiny countries‘ as 
Edward Thompson has dubbed them?
51
 After all, Meerut, Delhi, Kanpur, Awadh, 
Rohilkhand and adjoining regions were the areas where the fate of the Company‘s 
government was decided and which, therefore, provided the testing ground for 
heroism and other virtues of British character, as also the treachery and villainy of 
Indian behaviour. Following a similar pattern, albeit in a different approach, even the 
revisionist historians continued to focus primarily on these regions since it provided 
them with adequate evidences to showcase the bravado of the Indian actors or the 
participation of the civilians in the rebellion. But what they failed to appreciate was 
the fact that the acts of violence were not the only acts of resistance. As a result, we 
have come to know far more about Meerut, Delhi, Jhansi, Kanpur and Lucknow and 
precious little about other regions. It seemed as if it was assumed that except for 
parts of northern and parts of central India, other regions continued to remain firmly 
ensconced in the loyalist fold. According to the canonical version of the story, even 
tenor of life in Bengal or quietude of Madras was hardly disturbed. Thus, even the 
revisionist historiography of the rebellion remained virtually a prisoner to some of 
the shibboleths of traditional understanding. There were, of course a few notable 
exceptions.
52
 However, by and large the constricted framework of analysis remained 
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valid. The cumulative outcome of this tradition is a somewhat lopsided view that 
limits the geographical spread and analysis of the rebellion.  
The present dissertation seeks to intervene in this context. As we examine the 
nature and character of the events of 1857 in the lower province of the Bengal 
Presidency it will be clear that the movement was far more complicated and 
multifaceted than has been acknowledged. The area that has roughly been covered in 
this study includes the present-day states of West Bengal and Assam in the north-east 
of India, Bangladesh, and touches upon the borders of Nepal and Bhutan. There are 
multiple reasons behind the selection of this region as the area of present research. 
Bengal was the initial ‗British bridgehead‘ into the Indian subcontinent.53 It was in 
this region that the East India Company had first established its base and had to 
encounter some serious challenges from the erstwhile ruling establishment in the 
province. The grant of Diwani in 1765 by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II had 
provided the necessary impetus to the Company to extend its political control over 
other parts of India. During the period under review, the city of Calcutta was the 
capital and seat of the British Empire in the whole of South Asia. It was in Bengal 
that first signs of serious mutinous tendencies amongst the native army of the 
Company were noticed as early as in 1824.
54
 When the rebellion broke out in 1857 
the military cantonments of the lower province of the Bengal Presidency first set the 
ball rolling. The region witnessed a series of episodes of political unrest throughout 
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the course of the nineteenth century and was one of the prime centres during the 
later-day national movement against the colonial government. As we explore the 
course of events in and around Calcutta it will be clear from the official and 
unofficial correspondences that securing Calcutta from falling into the hands of the 
rebels of 1857 was considered in every respect an imperative for the continuation of 
the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent. In fact, considering the importance of 
Calcutta as the seat of the British Empire in south Asia, it might not be an 
exaggeration to say that the history of the rebellion of 1857 would perhaps have been 
altogether different had the rebels turned their attention towards Calcutta instead of 
Delhi.  
The obvious question that comes to one‘s mind is why then does the study of 
this region in the context of the rebellion of 1857 continued to be omitted 
by historians from the grand narrative of events? The answer partly lies to the 
reasons already stated above. The rebellion has so far been studied and measured in 
terms of acts of violence and the counter insurgency and not so much so from the 
perspectives of the actors. It is thus unfortunate that in spite of Eric Stokes‘ 
pioneering intervention, even the revisionist historiography continues to remain 
constrained by the conventional understanding of the uprising. What they failed to 
comprehend is the fact that the issues that underlay the outburst in Delhi were 
arguably different from those in Awadh, just as the social basis of the grievances in 
Awadh were different from those in the lower province of Bengal or Assam or 
Madras Presidency. Each of the regions lying in the Gangetic heartland of India had 
their own regional specificities that determined the nature and character of the 
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rebellion. And yet all of these regions, with all their regional specificities, were 
interconnected to each other during the course of the rebellion of 1857. 
What then was the situation prevailing in the lower province of the Bengal 
Presidency when the rebellion broke out in 1857? Was the act committed by sepoy 
Mangal Pandey of the 34
th
 Bengal Native Infantry in the cantonment of Barrackpore 
an isolated act of individual bravado? Was it neither preceded by any agitational run-
up nor followed by any radical alteration in eastern India‘s relationship with the 
Company‘s government? How far were these incidents connected with the grand 
narrative of the events that were unfolding in the Gangetic heartland of India? What 
was the nature and extent of the network of communication that the rebels had 
established within the region and to what extent were these linked to the events 
unfolding in the other regions? Was there any precise trajectory that was being 
followed by the rebels or were mere manifestations of some sporadic local outbursts? 
What was the nature and response of the colonial state and to what extent did they 
manage to overcome this crisis? These are some of the fundamental questions that 
have been dealt throughout the course of this project. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
To answer the questions posed above one needs to tread carefully through a very 
problematic terrain. Unlike the events unfolding in the Gangetic heartland, whereby 
the ‗actions‘ of the rebels and the counter-insurgency of the colonial state were 
starkly visible, the region covered in the present study looks more at the responses 
and reactions of the actors from a different perspective. The attempt is made not just 
to construct a narrative of events that was hitherto uncharted, but also to look at some 
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of the moments of crisis that the colonial state had to encounter in the period under 
review. It needs to be acknowledged that the sources are mostly based on the official 
correspondences and government reports preserved in the libraries and archives. The 
paucity of Indian accounts poses a real problem, and historians have access to only a 
very limited range of sources representing, with greater or less accuracy, the voice of 
a mere handful of either rebel or loyal Indians. Any conclusions based on such a 
limited amount of material obviously cannot make any claims to be comprehensive. 
This entails, at times, a disproportionate focus on the British experience. In the thesis 
I have endeavoured to supplement and make the best use, wherever possible, of non-
governmental sources, such as the memoirs, contemporary accounts, personal letters, 
diaries and newspaper reports to provide a glimpse into a variety of perceptions 
related to the rebellion. Nevertheless, even these sources were not always unbiased. 
Many a times, these were written under ‗official guidance‘ or had to be passed 
through the government censorships before getting published, thereby making the 
task further complicated. Yet within the given constraints, using unexplored and 
often overlooked sources, it seems possible to offer a different construction that 
would help to clarify and rethink some of the conventional notions about the 
uprising.  
Central to my approach is the idea that rumour and panic, when studied in a 
particular situation, such as the crisis of 1857, is a potent source of historical tool of 
analysis. My study draws on the methodologies adopted by Guha, Homi Bhaba and 
others as discussed below. However it must be mentioned at the very outset that most 
of the available literature on this theme have focussed on a pre-modern, pre-
capitalist, and most importantly, traditional rural settings where the formal modes of 
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communications were not much in operation and therefore the chance of the spread 
of rumour and subsequent panic was much more plausible. However, as I will show 
in the present study, and this is where this dissertation takes the scope of the existing 
literatures a step further: the effect of rumour during a moment of social and political 
upheaval, such as the rebellion of 1857, could be equally compelling even in the 
urban centres where all the formal modes of communications were present. The 
cumulative effect of actual outburst of events taking place elsewhere followed by 
circulations of rumours through various informal networks of communication 
invalidated most of these modern communication technologies of the colonial 
government.  
Rumours are loosely described as an anonymously generated, unverifiable 
speech which flourishes in contingent situations where there is a lack of information. 
They can be a potent source of historical representation.
55
 They explain ambivalent 
circumstances, especially when these have ramifications upon many and are 
considered significant in historical situations. Ralph Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine 
have defined rumour as ‗a process of information dispersion as well as the product of 
that process‘.56 In one of their earlier works on rumour, Gordon Williard Allport and 
Leo Postman had also drew a connection between the content of rumours and their 
manner of dissemination, concluding that messages will be spread as rumours if their 
subject matter is both significant and ambiguous within a particular society.
57
 In 
other words, the strength of the rumour would vary with the importance of the 
                                                          
55
 Anjan Ghosh, ―The Role of Rumour in History Writing,‖ History Compass, 5, no. 6, 2008: 1235–
43. 
56
 Ralph Leon Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine, Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay, 
New York; Oxford: Elsevier, 1976. 
57
 Gordon Willard Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor, New York: Holt, 1947. 
Page | 47  
 
subject to the individual concerned and the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining to 
the topic at hand. Tamotsu Shibutani too had given importance to the ambiguity of 
situations in which rumours arise. He explained rumouring as a problem-solving 
strategy in which people try to create meaning and find consensus about 
uncertainties.
58
 Also, as Homi Bhabha has argued, in specifically political contexts, 
rumours have been identified as a phenomenon of crisis, often related to violence and 
terror.
59
 
One of the most significant aspects about rumours according to Jean-Noel 
Kapferer, President of the Foundation for the Study and Information on Rumours in 
Paris, is not the question whether they are right or wrong, but that people deem them 
important enough to tell other people about them.
60
 This draws our attention to the 
manner in which rumours spread in a society. Although rumours are certainly told 
and retold it appears that they disseminate by themselves, like contagious diseases. 
Accordingly, some scholars have employed disease metaphors to describe the life-
cycle of rumours.
61
 Rumours do not depend on authorial positions but roam about in 
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a network-like fashion. Because of this decentralized manner of their dispersal, 
rumours are difficult to control – if at all.62 
Homi Bhabha maintained that the indeterminacy of rumour constituted its 
importance as a social discourse. Its intersubjective, communal adhesiveness lies in 
its enunciative aspect. Its performative power of circulation results in a contagious 
spreading ‗an almost uncontrollable impulse to pass it on to another person.‘63 
Further, once a rumour has started, it is very probable that other, related rumours 
start too because rumours are frequently constructed in response to other rumours. 
Rumour travels when events have importance in the lives of individuals and when 
the news received about them is either lacking or subjectively ambiguous. The 
ambiguity may arise from the fact that the news is not clearly reported, or from the 
fact that conflicting versions of the news have reached the individual, or from his 
incapacity to comprehend the news he receives under certain circumstances. The 
more prominence the press gives the news – especially momentous news – the more 
numerous and serious are the rumoured distortions this news will undergo. 
Writing on rumours preceding the Indian uprising against the British in 1857, 
Homi Bhabha linked rumours via their iterative qualities of circulation and contagion 
with panic and thereby draws attention to the affective quality of rumour.
64
 He 
discussed the sudden circulation of chapatis in northern Indian villages, chapatis that 
were imbued with some mysterious and inexplicable foreshadowing of violence and 
insurgency. The panic of the Indian subalterns was paralleled by panic among the 
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British colonizers who were unable to make a reassuring sense out of the stories of 
circulating flat-bread.
65
 
Ranajit Guha has argued that since rumours by nature were ambiguous and 
could not be pinned down, it was therefore ‗a mobile and explosive agent of 
insurgency‘.66 Guha also pointed out the socialising process – the comradeship 
response – which the rumour generates and contributes to its phenomenal speed.67 
The speed, with which the rumours about the impending fall of the British Empire in 
India were circulated during the rebellion of 1857, not only left the administration 
clueless, but also made the rebels the agents of forces outside and independent of 
themselves. Mention may also be made in this context the importance of rumours 
and panics during the course of the uprising described by Rudrangshu Mukherjee and 
Kim Wagner.
68
 Drawing a parallel with the ‗Great Fear‘ during the French 
Revolution, Mukherjee has convincingly touched upon the way rumours often acted 
as a ‗springboard for sepoy action.‘69 Rumour, fear and panic, for all their 
irrationality, brought men together, stoked their hatred and spurred them to violent 
action. In a similar way Wagner too has argued that the important aspect in the 
circulation of rumours was not the ‗objective truth‘ it carried but what the people 
‗believed‘ it was carrying. In other words, the accuracy of rumours, with all its 
ambiguities, was essentially immaterial since whether or not they were true, they had 
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very real consequences.
70
 It was this ‗belief‘ about what was being done and the 
consequent panic that stirred men into feverish activity. As I argue in the course of 
this dissertation, this ‗belief‘ not just stirred the common people into ‗action‘, but 
was responsible for creating an atmosphere of panic among the colonial government 
that acted as a catalyst in bringing about a crisis in the colonial state during this time.  
 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
The thesis is roughly organized into two main themes. Chapter one will set the basic 
context within which the rebellion needs to be analysed. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 follow a 
spatial and chronological sequence that looks at some of the moments of crisis as it 
unfolded in the area under the present purview. This would not only allow us to 
construct a narrative (to the extent that the sources permit us) hitherto unexplored, 
but more importantly would help us look more closely at the various nuances and 
themes that has been discussed within this narrative. The second theme has been 
discussed in Chapter 5, which moves away from the political history to a more 
intellectual domain. This chapter deals with the contemporary response of the middle 
class intelligentsia of Bengal and revisits the question of ‗loyalism‘ during the 
rebellion of 1857.  
Chapter 1 opens by looking at the formation, composition and the recruitment 
pattern of the Bengal Native Infantry in a historical perspective. The purpose of the 
chapter is to highlight some of the key facts through which it would be possible to 
understand the regional specificities in the lower province of Bengal. It is by looking 
at the structural organization, the social origins of the army and the pattern of 
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recruitment that would explain the differential impact and character of the rebellion. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 would follow a chronological and spatial sequence that looks at 
some of the moments of crisis that the colonial government had to encounter in this 
period. This narrative suggests, contrary to the conventional perception, that the 
rebels of 1857, operating at different levels, were involved in a fight for power, 
attempting to capture nothing less than the apparatus of the state. Chapter 2 primarily 
focuses on the role of rumour as a historical tool of analysis and how the cumulative 
effects of rumour and actual events unfolding in the region determined the actions of 
the people and the colonial state. Drawing a parallel to the Straits Settlements, the 
chapter highlights the efficacy of rumours transcending the regional/national 
boundaries. The exigency of the situation can be determined either by the acts of 
violence committed by the actors involved, as was the case in Awadh or in Delhi, or 
by the preventive measures adopted by the colonial government, as was the case in 
the lower province of Bengal and Assam in the north-east. The chapter would show 
that under a given situation the effects of rumour and panic could be as compelling as 
the actual events and incidents. In a way, the objective of this chapter would thus be 
to interrogate rumours, panics and their consequences as an object of study in their 
own right.  
Chapter three follows the logic of argument from chapter two but goes on a 
step further. This chapter would look at the resultant effects of rumour leading to the 
‗actual‘ outbreak of rebellion in the cantonments and its repercussions in the 
surrounding regions. In this context the chapter also deals with the role of the various 
actors involved either in the ‗mutinous conspiracies‘ or in open acts of rebellion. 
Attempts have been made to situate the rebellion within the wider socio-political 
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condition of the time. In addition, focus has been given to the role of the European 
sailors who were hastily recruited by the colonial government in the region to bring 
down the spirit of rebellion. 
Chapter four moves from the lower province of the Bengal Presidency to the 
north-east frontier of India in Assam. This chapter presents a contrasting study and 
makes a departure from the previous two in the sense that unlike the lower province 
of Bengal, Assam and the north-east region came under the direct control of the 
colonial government only about two decades before the rebellion broke out in 1857. 
The specificities of this region determined the nature, character and the eventual 
suppression of the intended rebellion. Assam was under the dynastic rule of the 
Ahom kings for the preceding six centuries. The chapter opens with a brief 
discussion of the situation that was prevailing in Assam prior to the outbreak of the 
rebellion. The introduction of colonial government necessitated certain significant 
and far-reaching changes in the socio-economic and political life of Assam that to a 
large extent played a determining role during the rebellion of 1857. The second half 
of the chapter will explore the ways in which the existing dissatisfaction of the 
region got intertwined with the wider conflagration of 1857 and the network of 
communication that was established between the ‗rebels‘ in the region with their 
fellows in the Gangetic heartland. Finally, the chapter would examine the ways in 
which the colonial state eventually managed to curb out the rebellious elements of 
the region and brought an abrupt end to the intended uprising and the alternative 
polity in Assam.  
The differential responses and reactions towards the rebellion were also 
reflected in the writings of the intelligentsia of Bengal. Chapter 5 argues that as a 
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product of the colonial rule, the Calcutta intelligentsia never openly supported the 
outbursts of rebellion since they believed that the rebellion would put the country in 
a total chaos. Nonetheless, they were sympathetic to the cause of the rebels and 
connected them with the broader issues of disaffection towards the colonial rule. The 
chapter would thus argue that the usage of the terminologies such as ‗loyal‘ or ‗rebel‘ 
towards the middle class intelligentsia of Bengal is problematic. From the writings of 
the contemporary intellectuals during the time of the rebellion it would argue that the 
nature of opposition towards the colonial rule was reflected through writings in a 
rhetoric that was certainly different from that of rebel leaders of 1857. But even 
though the forms of opposition were different, they emanated from the similar sets of 
discontents. The rebellion of 1857 was in this context a watershed event that not only 
evoked the contemporary thinkers to revisit the ill effects of the colonial rule in 
India, but would play a pivotal role in shaping the later day discourse of nationalism. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
THE ARMY IN BENGAL AND THE REBELLION OF 1857 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1857, the British East India Company controlled more than 1.6 million square 
miles of territory on the subcontinent, including the newly annexed states of Sind 
(1843) and Punjab (1849). This vast area was controlled and protected by an equally 
vast military force, composed of three distinct armies centred on the Presidencies of 
Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. By the year 1852, the total strength of the Bengal 
army had surpassed 50,000, and, by the time the rebellion broke out in 1857, the total 
strength of the native Indian army was 232,224 out of which the Bengal army was by 
far the largest with 135,767 troops.
1
 Of this army it had often been said that ‗an army 
was built up from the people of India themselves, which in the end brought its own 
country under the sway of its foreign masters‘.2 In 1856, the combined native troops 
alone numbered 280,000 men and, along with the European forces numbering about 
40,000 made it the largest all-volunteer mercenary army in the world and a powerful 
strategic tool for British world dominance.
3
 Yet just one year later its strongest 
military arm – the Bengal Army – looked as though it might also prove to be the 
downfall of British rule in India.  
                                                          
1
 ‗Return showing the number of the troops, regular and irregular, which were serving in the three 
Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny‘, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (HCPP), 
1859, Vol.: V, Appendix 17, p.: 379. 
2
 Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army: p. 264. 
3
 Peter Stanley, White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India, 1825-1875, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 
9; T.A. Heathcote, ―The Army of British India,‖ in David Chandler (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated 
History of the British Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994: p. 381. 
Page | 55  
 
Viewed in this light it becomes an imperative to acknowledge that the rebellion 
of 1857 was first and foremost a military uprising centred on the army in Bengal. 
The mutiny or disbandment of sixty-nine out of the seventy-four regiments of the 
Bengal army stood at the core of all the occurrences.
4
 A mutinous army represents a 
case of curious anomaly whereby the instrument of legitimate force itself questions 
the very source of its legitimacy, the very embodiment of order becoming a body of 
rebellious men. As Tapti Roy has argued ‗when an army rebels it marks, in the most 
immediate and palpable sense, a crisis of the state.‘5 The purpose of this chapter is to 
establish the fact that in the course of the uprising, it was the socio-cultural ties, 
composition and the recruitment pattern of the Bengal army that would eventually 
determine the areas that would be most affected by the conflagration of 1857. As 
Hurrish Chandra Mukherji, the editor of Hindoo Patriot, noted, ‗the Indian army has 
a discipline peculiarly its own. It has been kept together as much by the usual modes 
of military organisation as by the peculiar composition of its elements which 
determines its fidelity to the region he originates from‘.6 The composition and 
recruitment of the Bengal army, which established it as mainly a peasant force from 
the Indo-Gangetic area, points to the areas where it would find common ground of 
disaffection with the civil population. It is these same features, which would also 
determine the differential nature of their participation in the areas beyond the 
Gangetic heartland. Despite having instances of open mutinies in various 
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cantonments in the lower provinces of the Bengal presidency, as we shall see in the 
course of this thesis, it remained limited in its scope and character.  
In order to elucidate the point further, it will be interesting to first have a brief 
outline of the rebellion as it unfolded in the Gangetic heartland. As we shall notice in 
the discussion, in every instances of the rebellion, it was first and foremost the 
mutiny of the native sepoys in the cantonments that set the ball rolling, followed by 
the participation of civilians in certain areas. The underlying purpose of this section 
is also to have a comparative framework for the analysis of the rebellion in the north-
central Gangetic heartland and the lower province of the Bengal presidency.  
 
1.2 THE CENTRALITY OF THE ARMY IN BENGAL: THE OUTLINE OF THE REBELLION 
The rebellion of 1857 was initially sparked off by the sepoys belonging to the Bengal 
Artillery in the school of Musketry in Dumdum located on the outskirts of Calcutta. 
Despite repeated attempts by the colonial authorities to diffuse the already tensed 
situation, what appeared to be a minor crisis escalated and led to more serious 
incidents at Barrackpore, the headquarters of the Presidency Division of the Bengal 
Native Infantry.
7
 The initial mutual distrust between the colonial government and the 
sepoys of the Bengal army eventually culminated in an open rebellion of the army 
belonging to the 34
th
 regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry in the cantonment of 
Barrackpore on 29 March 1857 and the subsequent disbandment of the seven 
companies of sepoys belonging to the regiment. The news of the rebellion spread 
from Barrackpore to Meerut, the head-quarters of the Bengal Artillery at that time. 
On 10 May 1857, the sepoys stationed at Meerut belonging to the 3
rd
 Bengal light 
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Cavalry, and the 20
th
 and 11
th
 regiments of Native Infantry mutinied, killed the 
officers and some other Europeans, plundered the bungalows of the cantonment and 
proceeded to Delhi.
8
 On 11 May 1857, Delhi was under siege by the mutineers that 
now consisted of, apart from the division from Meerut, sepoys belonging to the 5
th
 
Light Field Battery, Foot Artillery, 3
rd
 Battalion 2
nd
 Company, and the 38
th
 and 54
th
 
Native Infantry.
9
 With the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar taking up the 
nominal leadership of the rebels sepoys, Delhi became the springboard of the sepoy 
operations.
10
  
After the fall of Delhi, the mutiny of the sepoys spread like wild fire across the 
various cantonments of northern India. By the end of May 1857, the whole of the 
Gangetic heartland was in ferment. A handful of British officials looked in vain for 
support and fresh reinforcements from outside. Station after station fell to the 
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mutiny.
11
 As the message of the rebellion spread to small stations and cantonments, 
attention turned towards the bigger stations. On 30 May 1857, the sepoy regiments of 
the 7
th
 light Cavalry, 13
th
, 48
th
 and 71
st
 Native Infantry mutinied in Lucknow.
12
 This 
was immediately followed by the mutiny of the sepoys belonging to the 18
th
, 68
th
 
Native Infantry, 15
th
 Light Field battery and 8
th 
irregular Cavalry in Bareilly.
13
 As 
Hindoo Patriot noted, ‗Lucknow was in many respects entitled to be considered the 
central seat of Sepoy disaffection. It is the capital of a province from which the 
native army is principally recruited, and where therefore the Sepoy feeling of the day 
must prevail with the greatest force‘.14 Once the Lucknow garrison had mutinied the 
out stations followed in quick succession: Sitapur, Faizabad, Gonda-Bahraich, 
Sultanpur and Salon.
15
 The fall of one station contributed to a rising of sepoys in 
another garrison. Each successful mutiny was seen as the growing weakness – or the 
fall – of British power. The cantonments at Kanpur were the next in line to fall. On 4 
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June 1857, four sepoy regiments belonging to 2
nd
 Light Cavalry, 1
st
, 74
th
 and 56
th
 
Native Infantry rose in arms.
16
 Likewise, in Bundelkhand, Jhansi took the initial 
lead.
17
 On 6 June 1857, the entire cantonment was up in arms against the British.
18
 
The uprising in Jhansi was soon followed by mutinies in four other towns of 
Bundelkhand. All the sepoys belonging to the 12
th
 Bengal Native Infantry assembled 
and then split themselves up in smaller groups, after which they broke open the 
prisons, released all the prisoners, and set fire to the officer‘s bungalows.19 
Once the rebellion of the sepoys in the cantonments of the provinces in the 
Gangetic heartland was met with initial success and the prospect of the overthrow of 
the colonial rule was seemingly visible, support now came from various quarters of 
the civil population. For instance, in Awadh some of the talukdars and members of 
the Nawabi bureaucracy had joined the rebellion. As Rudrangshu Mukherjee had 
noted, it was only when the mutinies in each and every station had succeeded and 
British administration in Awadh had collapsed ‗like a house made of cards‘ did the 
Talukdars and their men decided to act.
20
 Before this almost every Talukdar looked 
                                                          
16
 Letter sent from Henry Lawrence to Canning dated 6 June 1857, Judicial Proceedings Number 478, 
10 August 1857, Government of India, WBSA. Also see: ―The Mutinies‖, Hindoo Patriot, 11 June 
1857, in Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, Vol. 4: p. 84. 
17
 Bundelkhand refers to a part of the United Provinces, which included the districts of Jalaun, Jhansi, 
Hamirpur, Banda and parts of Allahabad that lies south of the rivers Jamuna and the Ganges. The 
region derived its name from the Bundela Thakurs, the most important clan inhibiting it. Sir 
William Wilson Hunter, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. 9, Oxford: Claredon Press, 1908, p. 
68.  
18
 ―The Mutinies‖, Hindoo Patriot, 18 June 1857, in Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, Vol. 
4: p. 94. For a detailed study see: Roy, The Politics of a Popular Uprising: Bundelkhand in 1857. 
19
 ―Written deposition of a native in Bengal‖ in Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi and Moti Lal Bhargava, 
eds., Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh: Source-Material, vol. 3, Lucknow: Publications Bureau, 
Information Dept. Uttar Pradesh, 1957, pp. 29-46. 
20
 Mukherjee, Awadh in Revolt: p. 80. 
Page | 60  
 
on while the sepoys raised the banner of mutiny. Similarly, the Rajah of 
Mahmudabad provided the leadership to the rebel sepoys of Sitapur in the battle of 
Chinhat.
21
 The news of the British defeat at Chinhat spread quickly and it became an 
accepted fact that the Company‘s rule had indeed come to an end and the ‗Nawabi‘ 
rule has been restored.
22
 The news of this defeat augmented the efforts of the 
talukdars and their peasants to join the rebellion wholeheartedly. As a result, in the 
countryside the rebellion of the sepoys acquired a popular character. This was also 
visible in the district of Unao, to the south of Lucknow, where the rebels were 
inseparable from the rural populace.
23
 The city of Lucknow in fact witnessed the 
most prominent instances of the transformation of the mutiny of the sepoys into a 
civil uprising. By the end of September 1857 when the imperial city of Delhi was 
recaptured by the British forces and the colonial authority was re-established, the 
rebel forces turned to their other seat of power in northern India, Lucknow. These 
forces were soon reinforced by the Awadh talukdars like Man Singh, Hanwant 
Singh, the Rajah of Amethi and their entourage.
24
 Given the networks of loyalty in 
the rural countryside of Awadh, these talukdars could supply the forces with tenants, 
peasants and clansmen who lived on their land. In addition, small magnates who 
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could provide a few hundred men were also prepared to throw in their lot. In fact, as 
Mukherjee pointed out, almost sixty per cent of the rebel forces were drawn from the 
general rural populace.
25
 It was only after the mutinous sepoys had returned to their 
respective localities from where they were recruited, and extended their support to 
the disaffected landed elites, as was the case in Awadh and elsewhere, that the 
conditions were fulfilled and the rebellion of the army was transformed into a civil 
rebellion. 
 
1.3 THE ORIGIN AND RECRUITMENT PATTERN OF THE BENGAL ARMY 
The preceding section discussed in brief the outline of the rebellion, emphasising that 
in every instances of mutiny in 1857, it was the sepoys that raised the banner of 
rebellion, which was then followed by the participation of different sections of civil 
population. More importantly, we could determine the areas where the conflagration 
was taking place. Following this as we move on to the present section it will be clear 
that the areas where the rebellion had metamorphosed into a wide-scale mass 
participation, corresponded with the regions from where the sepoys were principally 
recruited. The underlying argument being that from the Bengal army‘s origin till the 
outbreak of the rebellion in 1857, lower province of Bengal presidency (primarily the 
regions covered by present-day state of West Bengal and Bangladesh) were never 
considered ideal for the recruitment of sepoys by the colonial government. As a 
consequence when the rebellion broke out in 1857, the mutinies of the sepoys were 
limited in its scope. Although there were quite a few instances of open outbreak of 
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mutiny of the sepoys in the cantonments of the lower province of Bengal, these were 
mostly limited within the cantonments.  
With the ascendency of the British in Bengal from around the mid-eighteenth 
centuries, with its increased territorial control and higher political and military 
position, the East India Company needed to have a regular force of military was 
urgent in Bengal. But considering the paucity of the available English troops in 
Bengal Robert Clive, following the existing system of recruitment in Madras 
presidency, decided to raise a few hundred natives ‗with due regard to their physical 
and other military qualifications‘.26 These men were not the native inhabitants of 
Calcutta or the lower province of Bengal, but were chosen from the agricultural 
classes of northern India and the military adventurers who had come to Bengal in the 
service of the Afghans and the Mughals. Most of these men came from Bihar, 
Awadh, the Doab, Rohilkhand, and even from beyond the Indus, which included the 
Pathans, Rohillas, Jats and some Rajputs.
27
 The British army‘s definite preference for 
recruitment was the agricultural labourers, highlanders and men from the 
countryside. Thus, right from its very inception, the Company officials in India too 
were of the view that the agricultural classes of India made the best soldiers and 
accordingly differentiated the agrarian zones from which the recruitment were to take 
place. They were of the view that, as was the practice in nineteenth century Britain, 
the agricultural classes were best suited for military recruitment. According to Robert 
Orme, the Company ideologue of the 1750s, the inhabitants of the wheat-producing 
zones of northern India were better built and thus more ‗martial‘ than the shorter 
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people in the rice-producing areas of south and east.
28
 In practice this meant that the 
recruitment was to be guided by two main considerations: the Company would only 
consider peasants with a well-built physique and an average height of 5 feet 7 inches; 
secondly, at this stage, at least, it confined recruitment to the Company‘s territories 
and established direct contact with the recruiting villages in wheat-growing areas.
29
  
It is interesting to note in this context that although sepoys were easily 
available by recruiting the former members of the Nawab of Bengal‘s army, the 
English deemed them ill-equipped since these sepoys did not conform to the 
Company‘s image of a ‗good soldier‘.30 The ex-Nawab‘s army was composed mainly 
of urban-based Afghan and Pathan risaladars and were supplemented by a force of 
about 10,000 Bengal musketeers stationed in different parts of the province. In 
Alavi‘s opinion, it was possibly the political considerations that lay behind the 
decision to dispense with the predominantly Muslim soldiers associated with the 
former regime.
31
 The Bengal government observed that ‗the Moors were bound by 
no ties of gratitude and every day‘s experience convinced us that Mussalmans would 
remain firm to the engagements no longer than while they were actuated by 
principles of fear, always ripe for a change wherever there was the smallest prospect 
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of success.‘32 Dirk Kolff had also pointed out that the Company‘s gradual reliance on 
recruits from outside Bengal proper stemmed partly from the fact that the majority of 
the two thousand sepoys who fought with Clive in the battle of Plassey were brought 
from Madras, but had names that indicated a Rajput or North Indian origin.
33
 These 
new recruits were clothed by the Company, armed with firelocks rather than 
matchlocks, commanded by European officers and ‗drilled and disciplined according 
to the methods first tried out in the south in the decades preceding Plassey.‘34 They 
came to be known by the old name of Purbia and were simply ‗new incarnations of 
the same old soldiering tradition of Hindustan‘ in which Rajputs and pseudo-Rajputs 
from Purab – a term that describes Awadh, Bihar and Benares region – had travelled 
far and wide to find employers. These men from the ‗Purab‘ in general, and 
especially so in Awadh, would supply the majority of the recruits for the Bengal 
Native Infantry right up until the outbreak of the rebellion in 1857. 
Historians have admitted difficulties in finding more specific quantitative 
statements about the exact number of sepoys recruited from in and around Awadh.
35
 
Some of them did attempt some rough estimates of the number of recruits that came 
from Awadh. Major-General Sir Jasper Nicholls in a report to the Select Committee 
in 1831 stated that ‗the whole sepoy army of Bengal is drawn from the Company‘s 
provinces of Bihar and Oudh, with very few exceptions.‘36 A few years later William 
Sleeman, a noted administrator and also a soldier, too had observed that ‗the three-
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fourth of the recruits of our Bengal Native Infantry are drawn from the Rajput 
peasantry of the kingdom of Oudh.‘37 According to Sleeman‘s estimate, Baiswara in 
southern Awadh, had by 1825 supplied approximately 30,000 men to the Company‘s 
army and almost every village had at least a member in the Company‘s service.38 
Colonel Keith Young, in his testimony before the Commission for the 
Reorganisation of the Indian Army in 1859, also remarked that ‗Oude and the 
adjacent districts that were formerly under the Oude Government furnish about three-
fourths of the recruits for the Bengal Infantry.‘39 Even General Sir Patrick Grant, a 
former Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, informed the Peel Commission that the 
recruits for the Bengal army were drawn ‗chiefly from Oude, a few from the 
Punjaub, and the rest from Bhajepoor (in Bihar) and the Doab.‘40 In spite of the 
difficulties in procuring the estimates of the recruits from Awadh, Rudrangshu 
Mukherjee in his study has referred to one such document which offered a fairly 
detailed account of the extent of the non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the 
22nd Native Infantry.
41
 This document provided names, castes, villages and parganas 
of 280 men, of whom only five percentages were from outside Awadh. The 
remainder came mainly from the southern districts of Awadh, i.e., the districts of 
Sultanpur, Pratapgarh and Rae Barelli, the area corresponding roughly to Baiswara 
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and its neighbourhood. William Howard Russell too had noted in his diary that the 
Baiswara district in Awadh furnished about 40,000 of the finest of sepoys to the 
Bengal army.
42
 Also, the fact that out of the 279 Non-Commissioned Officers and 
sepoys of the 22
nd
 Native Infantry, who deserted in 1824 while on their march from 
Lucknow, 263 (about 94%) came from Awadh, gives us a clear indication of the vast 
majority of the recruits that came from that region.
43
 Viewed in this context it is 
therefore not surprising that Awadh and its countryside became one of the central 
bases of rebel sepoys during the conflagration of 1857. 
Apart from the Awadh countryside, permanent recruitment centres were 
established in Budgepur, Patna, Buxar in Bihar, and Jaunpur and Ghazipur in 
Benares. Pratapgarh and Azamgarh in the Rajput zamindaries of eastern Awadh were 
also developed as important recruitment centres.
44
 Recruits in large numbers were 
also raised from the districts of Dinajepur, and also from the Shahabad and 
Bhagalpur regions.
45
 Kolff has also highlighted the importance of the Bhojpur 
region, which included the districts of eastern Awadh, Shahabad, Champaran and 
Saran districts of northern Bihar as a major catchment area in the recruiting of the 
Company‘s army.46 Interestingly all these recruits were from outside the lower 
province of Bengal and were high caste Hindu peasants, mostly the Rajputs, who 
were the traditional warrior caste of North and North-West India, or Bhumihars, the 
military wing of the priestly caste of Brahmins, or Brahmins themselves. This 
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reliance on high caste recruits was partly because of the fact that they were the most 
physically imposing, and partly because the Company assumed that these ‗traditional 
high caste warriors‘ would prove to be the most loyal. The high caste overtones of 
the army suited the interests of the Company probably because it also provided the 
requisite legitimacy to the Company rule since they were also planning to put up 
various civil and military institutions across north India. Furthermore, this reliance 
on the high-caste recruits from the rural areas, and the great care taken by the 
Company not to compromise the caste principles, made the military service attractive 
in the eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bhojpur and also in the Awadh-Benaras region. 
According to the memoir of Durgadas Bandopadhyay the sepoys even carried their 
own cooking pots and every individual cooked food for themselves in a place that 
was washed with fresh cow-dung.
47
 The general diet of the sepoys included ‗dal‘ and 
‗roti‘; while any kind of meat, fish and alcohol were strictly prohibited.48 Thus in a 
sense, as Alavi has pointed out, the Company was promoting ‗sanskritization of the 
military‘.49 
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  As a consequence therefore, the Company‘s service became very popular 
amongst these ‗Purbias‘. In addition to the protection of their caste status, what 
appealed to these newly recruited men was the improved rewards and security that 
the Company offered to its soldiers. Although the difference in terms of pay by the 
native rulers and the Company was not much, the latter‘s service offered better 
conditions. The sepoys in the Company‘s service enjoyed a regular payment of 
wages, pension benefits and rations while in the field and at times received extra 
allowances either in cash or in kind.
 50
 Besides, whenever they were sent outside the 
Bengal Presidency, they could secure a family certificate by which a certain portion 
of their salary was paid to their family every month. Apart from these advantages the 
sepoys found the Company‘s pension benefits novel and attractive, promising him 
and his family a great deal of security even after he had left the service.
51
 And 
finally, the Company had also instituted a system of honours and rewards for its 
soldiers for the meritorious services. Medals were awarded to commemorate 
participation in important battles and to recognise the part played by the sepoys in 
securing victories.
52
 
This preference towards the high caste recruits by the Company aroused 
enthusiastic responses from many of the Rajput and Brahmin zamindaries of Awadh, 
Benares as well as the predominantly Hindu peasant population of Pratapgarh, Rae 
Bareli, Faizabad and Gorakhpur to enlist themselves as sepoys. Besides Awadh, a 
large proportion of the sepoys were also raised by the Company from the districts of 
Bihar. The Company‘s military service was most popular amongst the zamindars of 
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north and south Bihar. In north Bihar there was a large concentration of Bhumihar 
Brahmins, which included, amongst others, the zamindars of Saran and the ‗babus‘ 
of Manjha, Parsa and Khaira. This apart, Darbhanga and Tirhut too had large 
Bhumihar settlements. It is to be noted in this context that around this time the 
Bhumihar Brahmins were being denied their high caste status by all the other 
Brahmins and rural high castes of the region because of their interest towards 
agriculture.
53
 Under such a circumstance, the Company‘s claim to preserve the high 
caste customs of its sepoys received admiration from these Bhumihar Brahmins and 
they began to use the opportunity to emphasize their own status. In addition, the 
Company through its military commandments and commercial contacts reached out 
to a wider section of the rural elite and made deals with the powerful zamindars for 
military recruits. Anand Yang has shown a variety of political and administrative 
ways in which the colonial state delineated its ‗collaborators‘ and established 
political alliances with the rural magnates of Saran for strengthening its rule in 
northern India.
54
 As a consequence therefore, the Company received large number of 
recruits from all of these districts. Contracts were signed between the Company and 
the zamindars of Saran, the Raja of Bettiah and Raja Chutter Singh of Darbhanga and 
obtained their clan levies for the Bengal army.
55
  
One may pause here briefly in order to bring out a few points from the 
discussion so far. It is evident that the colonial government administration had a 
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definite preference towards the recruitment of its Bengal army. Most of these recruits 
came from the ‗mutiny countries‘ as Edward Thompson dubbed them.56 The 
principle areas of recruitment were Bihar, Awadh, Rohilkhand, the Doab, Bhojpur 
and other wheat producing zones of northern India. The English officials firmly 
believed the inhabitants of wheat producing zones of northern India to be better built 
than those of the rice producing zones of eastern India, a belief that fitted into their 
martial race theory. According to this theory, communities were divided into martial 
and non-martial races. A martial race was a particular ethnic group from a particular 
region which produced men who were both loyal and had war-like ethos.
57
 This 
theory was to take a more well-defined form in notions of social Darwinism, but 
many of its elements were common in the perspectives of the early-mid nineteenth 
century. The notions held that acquired characteristics might be thus inherited and a 
hierarchy of human beings could be constructed on the basis of their superior or 
inferior qualities.
58
 Since martiality was an inherited trait, it was an aspect of race. 
Blood was regarded as the substance responsible for the transmission of hereditary 
features. Also, as Crispin Bates has argued, the emergence of the science of 
anthropometry from around the middle of the nineteenth century added further grist 
to the mills of the racial biologists. Measurements of human skulls and noses were 
undertaken by the colonial anthropologists in order to establish the typology of the 
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various races.
59
 Following this understanding, the colonial officials thus came to the 
opinion that while the cold bracing climate of the mountainous region produced well-
built muscular hardy warriors, the rice growing inhabitants of the south and the east 
of India, living in a hot and humid climate, were cowardly races incapable of bearing 
arms.
60
 Also, as DeWitt C. Ellinwood had opined, in the British view masculinity 
overlapped with martiality.
61
 Since the Rajputs of western India considered 
themselves as manly and martial, they received appreciation from the British 
perspective. Masculinity and martiality in both Rajput and British societies 
emphasised honour, courage, vigour, loyalty and warfare. Subsequently British 
officials accepted the Rajputs as a martial race, owing mainly to the writings of 
James Tod and others.
62
 Conversely, available recruits in the lower province of 
Bengal did not conform to the military standards of the English Company. The 
inhabitants of Bengal, especially the Bengali babus, were regarded as weak since 
they lacked strong, robust and healthy constitutions.
63
 Thomas Babington Macaulay 
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in one of his writings had cited the reasons as to why the recruits from Bengal, and 
more specifically the Bengalis, were never considered worthy by the Company. He 
wrote: ‗The physical organisation of the Bengalee is feeble even to effeminacy. He 
lives in a constant vapour bath. His pursuits are sedentary, his limbs delicate, his 
movement languid. Courage, independence, veracity are qualities to which his 
constitution and his situation are equally unfavourable.‘64 These physical attributes as 
the main hindrance of the people of lower Bengal from joining the army had also 
been time and again pointed out in the autobiography of Durgadas Bandopadhyay, a 
Bengali clerk who was attached with the Company‘s native regiments during the 
1850s.
65
 The babus‘ supposedly cowardly response to the tough and manly task of 
war also formed the core of many jokes which surfaced in different literary genres. 
To cite one example, Kaliprasanna Sinha made a caricature of the Bengali self-image 
in one of the meeting held at the Hindu Metropolitan College in May 1857 to 
condemn the rebellion and express loyalty to the British government. Sinha wrote:  
Sniffing danger, the Bengali Babus organised a meeting…to convince 
the Saheb that although a hundred years have passed, they are 
still…ill-fated chicken-hearted Bengalis – even after years of 
hobnobbing with the British and imbibing British education…they 
have failed to become like the Americans…most of them are so scared 
of storms that they don‘t even take a boat ride in the Ganges, in order 
to urinate in the night, they need to be accompanied by their wives or 
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servants, their arms are pen-knives, and are even scared of their own 
shadows…it is not surprising that these people are utterly incompetent 
for fights and wars.
66
  
 
In order to sum up the present discussion, one may safely draw a few 
inferences. The section discussed in details the origin and principle areas of 
recruitment of the Bengal army since the days of its inception. Much of the 
Company‘s legitimacy as a state power was in fact derived through the continuation 
of pre-colonial practices, which included the establishment of an army of high-caste 
Hindu sepoys, comprising mainly of the Brahmins, Bhumihars and Rajputs. As a 
result the Company in Bengal tapped in to the military labour market of the north-
central Gangetic heartland and used the existing networks of patronage and clan-ties 
by recruiting peasant regiments directly from the zamindars and landholders of 
Bihar, Benaras and Awadh. By employing the rhetoric of high-caste status and 
accommodating high-caste sepoys within the regiments provided the colonial 
government a loyal base of recruitment by becoming an attractive and legitimate 
military employer in the Gangetic heartland. In the process of following the pre-
colonial modes of recruitment, as we witnessed, the regions around the lower 
provinces of Bengal was not considered by the Company to be an ideal recruitment 
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ground for its regiments. The incompetency of the people inhabiting this region for 
the military service was further augmented by the martial race theory of the colonial 
ideologues. 
 
1.4 CHANGES IN THE RECRUITMENT PATTERN AND ITS CONSEQUENT EFFECT 
The high caste Hindus from northern India dominated the composition of the Bengal 
army, and would supply the majority of the recruits right till the outbreak of the 
rebellion of 1857, although their overwhelming majority of the early years were 
under threat. Ironically, during the 1820s, the gravest political and social threat to the 
Company came from within the army itself, especially from the very high-caste 
peasant sepoys it had hitherto encouraged in its regiments. The 1820s was in fact a 
decade of mutinies and desertions, the Barrackpore mutiny of 1824-25 being one of 
the most prominent manifestations of the sepoys‘ attempt to shield the high-caste 
status within the army.
67
 Even the Bengal government observed in 1830 that ‗an 
unusually large number of Brahmins from northern India has of late entered the 
service, it would be desirable, to follow the proportion which formerly prevailed by 
giving a decided preference to the Rajputs and to the Mahomedans.‘68 Lord William 
Bentinck, Governor-General of India from 1828to 1835 (and Commander-in-Chief 
of Bengal from 1833 to 1835) tried to address this problem by issuing a General 
Order in 1834, which stated that ‗all objections to men belonging to the respectable 
classes of native community, or preferences among such classes on account of caste 
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and religion, shall cease to operate in respect to their admission into the ranks of the 
Bengal Army.‘69 Ten years later in 1844 Henry Lawrence had shown his 
apprehension in an article entitled ‗Military Defence and our Indian Empire‘ 
whereby he declared his belief that the British deceived themselves if they thought 
that their government was ‗maintained otherwise than by the sword‘ and that the 
greatest threat to the British rule ‗is from our own troops‘ for which the recruitment 
policy of the Bengal army was partly to blame. He wrote: 
Our sepoys come too much from the same parts of the country, Oude, 
the lower Dooab, and upper Behar. There is too much of clanship 
among them, and the evil should be remedied by enlisting in the 
Saharunpoor and Delhi districts, in the hill regions, and the Malay and 
Burmah States… We would go further, and would encourage the now 
despised Eurasians to enter our ranks, either into sepoys‘ corps where 
one or two here and there would be useful or as detached companies or 
corps…70 
Subsequently, Lawrence came out with an alternative plan that he thought, if 
implemented, would be best for the future of the Company‘s army: 
Oude should no longer supply the mass of our infantry and regular 
cavalry; indeed, twenty years hence, it will be unable to do so. The 
Punjab, Nepaul, and the Delhi territory should be more largely indented 
on; as should the whole North-West Provinces, and the military classes 
of Bombay and Madras… The plan to be followed, to get and to keep 
the best soldiers throughout India, and to quietly oppose class against 
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class, and tribe against tribe, is to have separate regiments of each creed 
or class, filling up half, three-fourths, or even more of the 
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks from their own numbers 
… We have not a doubt that, thus organized, the low-caste man, who, 
under present influences, is the mere creature of the Brahmin, would as 
readily meet him with the bayonet, as he would a Mahommedan.
71
  
 
Lawrence‘s early apprehensions were initially not considered serious enough 
by the authorities. But the two Sikh wars of the 1840s forced the Company to rethink 
its recruitment policy. After the successful conclusion of the first Sikh war (1845-
46), two local regiments of Sikh infantry – the Ferozepore and Ludhiana – were 
raised followed by four more regiments of Sikh Infantry during the year 1846-47. 
The necessity for such an alternate source of recruits became noticeably visible 
during the years 1849-50 when a number of sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry 
reacted against the news that the foreign-service batta would no longer be applicable 
in Punjab since it has become a British territory.
72
 As a consequence, Sir Charles 
Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, following the similar recommendation made by 
Henry Lawrence, decided to recruit more number of the hill-men, especially the 
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Gurkhas, into the army.
73
 Already around that time there were three irregular Gurkha 
battalions, raised in the wake of the Nepal war of 1814-15.
74
 According to Napier, 
they were the ‗bravest of Native troops‘ and ‗at the battles on the Sutledge (river 
Sutlej in the 1
st
 Sikh War) displayed such conspicuous gallantry as to place them for 
courage on a level with our Europeans.‘75 This move was formally sanctioned by the 
issue of a General order by the Governor-General in March 1850.
76
 In the course of 
the rebellion of 1857 these new recruits, along with the Scottish Highlanders, would 
eventually prove to be decisive in determining the outcome for the British 
government.
77
  
The high-caste composition of the Bengal army received a further blow in the 
summer of 1856 when the new Governor-general, Lord Canning, ordered that all the 
enlistment to the Indian Army would henceforth be for general service.
78
 This move 
was a significant departure from the initial methods adopted by the Company. 
Hitherto it had been the practice in Bengal to ask for volunteers when troops were 
needed for overseas service. But under the regulation introduced by Canning, all the 
new recruits would be taken on the basis of general enlistment. To the high-caste 
sepoys, this new regulation was highly deplorable since they thought this would 
discourage their brethren from enlisting thereby undermining their monopoly and 
unity within the regiments. Hidayat Ali, an officer of the Sikh Police Battalion, later 
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recalled that ‗any new order issued by the Government is looked upon with much 
suspicion by the Native Army, and is much canvassed in every regiment‘.79 Stokes 
had suggested, ‗this unity of action could be seriously affected by any dilution of the 
high-caste element‘ and this might have been the reason ‗why Mangal Pandey was 
not supported by his comrades when he sought to raise the 34
th
 regiment at 
Barrackpore on 29 March 1857.‘80 Thus, to Stokes, one of the major causes of the 
mutiny of 1857 was the determination by the high-caste Bengal sepoys to retain their 
stranglehold over the recruitment. As he argued, ‗the closed shop of the Purbias 
(easterners) of the middle Ganges was under obvious threat, and with it all those 
privileges of home service and a certain independent negotiating power 
characteristic of mercenary armies. Hence, solid material fears underlay the 
apprehension over any infringement of caste rules by British authority‘.    
 
TABLE 1  
Ethnic Composition of a New Battalion of Bengal Native Infantry in 181581 
 
Brahmins Rajputs Hindus of Inferior Castes Muslims Total 
392 
(43.9%) 
304 
(34.1%) 
108 
(12.1%) 
92 
(10.3%) 
892 
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TABLE 2 
Ethnic Composition of the Bengal Native Infantry in 184282 
 
Rajputs Brahmins Hindus of Inferior 
Caste 
Muslims Christians Total 
27,993 
(34.9%) 
24,840 
(31.0%) 
13,920 
(17.3%) 
12,411 
(15.4%) 
1,076 
(1.3%) 
80,240 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Ethnic Composition of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry on 21 April 185783 
 
Brahmins Rajputs Hindus Of Inferior 
Caste 
Muslims Sikhs Christians Total 
335 
(30.8%) 
237 
(21.8%) 
231 
(21.2%) 
237 
(21.8%) 
74 
(6.8%) 
12 
(1.1%) 
1,089 
 
From the tables above, it is evident that the Hindu high-caste orientation of the 
Bengal army had definitely changed by 1857, although they still had the numerical 
majority. This obviously had an adverse effect on the hitherto monopoly of the 
recruits. As Kim Wagner noted, by 1850s the relationship between the sepoys and 
the British officers was characterised by increasing distance and growing 
resentment.
84
 Loss of high-caste status within the army, fear of religious conversion, 
grievances over inadequate pay, the removal of privileges, lack of opportunity for 
promotion, and a corps of British officers with a poor understanding of the native 
culture did nothing to improve the sepoy‘s loyalty to the Company. The final blow to 
the already exasperated situation, in addition to the General Service Enlistment 
Order, was the annexation of Awadh in 1856 that had a significant impact on the 
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sepoys of the Bengal army.
85
 On the pretext of alleged despotic misrule, the Nawab 
of Awadh was summarily deposed in 1856 that caused immense disruption. In his 
place the Company placed a British chief commissioner who by introducing new 
laws concerning the ownership of land dispossessed many influential zamindars and 
taluqdars who previously had held leading positions in the society. Moreover, the 
transfer of Awadh to Company rule also caused extreme hardship on the bulk of the 
population through serious over-assessments of property for tax purposes in many 
districts, through unemployment and dislocations caused by the removal of the 
Nawab of Awadh‘s court, and through a rise in prices of essential commodities.86 
From the sepoys perspective the state they were serving had taken over their home 
region, by what they perceived as a deceitful and treacherous means. According to 
Moinodin Hasan Khan, a native police officer well acquainted with the sepoys, 
‗Oude was the birthplace of the Purbeah race and these feelings of dissatisfaction 
affected the whole Purbeah race in the service of the British Government. To the 
native mind the act of annexation was one of gross injustice, and provoked a 
universal desire for resistance‘.87  
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In order to sum up the main points discussed in the present chapter, one may safely 
draw a few inferences that were significant in shaping the nature and character of the 
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rebellion of 1857. As the chapter argued, in the entire conflagration of 1857, it was 
the mutinies of the Bengal army that dictated the initial course of action. It was only 
after the rebellion of sepoys in the cantonments had met with initial success that the 
character of the movement transformed into a wider phenomenon, involving civil 
population. But the fact that the transformation of the mutiny of sepoys in the 
cantonments to a broader civil uprising was mainly limited within the north-central 
Gangetic heartland can be explained in terms of socio-cultural ties, composition and 
recruitment pattern of the Bengal army. It is evident from the present discussion that 
the principal areas of recruitment of the Bengal army, right from its inception had 
been from the various districts of Awadh, Bihar, Rohilkhand, and the Doab. It seems 
reasonable to infer that the Company - whether deliberately or out of lack of choice – 
preferred to tap in the existing military labour market, maintaining the existing high 
caste orientation of the recruitment in the army. The reliance on the existing pattern 
of recruitment of high-caste Hindu peasants from the wheat producing zones of 
northern and central India conversely meant that the regions lying in the lower 
province of the Bengal presidency were not considered to be an ‗ideal‘ recruitment 
ground for the Company army. This idea was furthered augmented by the idea of 
masculinity and martial race theory of the Company ideologues, which categorised 
the inhabitants of the lower province of the Bengal presidency as weak, feeble and 
‗effeminate‘ and thus incompetent for the army service. From around 1830s onwards 
the Company, finding it alarming to have such a homogenous army composition, 
introduced certain changes in the recruitment pattern of the army, and began to look 
to the areas beyond the Gangetic heartland. Curiously, though the Company extended 
its geographical parametres for the army recruitment quite far and wide, 
incorporating among others, a few battalions of Sikh regiments after the Anglo-Sikh 
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wars in the 1840s, the logic behind the absence of sepoy recruitment from the lower 
province of Bengal presidency remained very much the same.  
On the other hand, while bringing in the changes in recruitment pattern of its 
army, the Company could no longer defend its non-intervention policy or the need to 
perpetuate pre-colonial practices and customs. The passing of the General Order of 
1834 allowed for the recruitment of a wider range of Hindu and Muslim groups, 
thereby breaking the high-caste monopoly of the army and undermining the very 
identity and ritual purity of the sepoys. Wagner has argued that the Hindu sepoys of 
the Bengal army were not simply high-caste – being in that army was to a large 
extent what made them high-caste.
88
 The subsequent changes brought in by the 
Colonial government – the most significant being the General Service Enlistment and 
the annexation of Awadh in 1856 – convinced the sepoys that the state they had 
loyally served had turned their back against them. A deep sense of resentment that 
had been brewing amongst the sepoys finally sparked off, as the rumour of the 
greased cartridge began to take hold in the early months of 1857. But with regards to 
the provinces in lower Bengal, the sepoys – having no formal socio-cultural ties with 
the region or the people – after the open outbreak of mutinies in various cantonments 
attempted to get back to their own districts in the Gangetic heartland, from where 
they were recruited, carrying with them the messages of the rebellion. As a 
consequence, the rebellion in the region under study remained confined mostly to the 
cantonment areas. However, as we move on to subsequent chapters, it will be evident 
that the rebellion in the lower province of Bengal, with its differential nature and 
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character, produced certain moments of crises having a much wider impact in the 
region. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
RUMOUR, PANIC AND ‘THE GREAT FEAR’ OF CALCUTTA 1857-58 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter looked at the origin, composition and the recruitment pattern of the 
Bengal army and the socio-economic changes that were brought in the process. We 
also had a brief survey of the grievances of the sepoys that originated out of the 
process of recruitment. The chapter also brought out the context within which the 
rebellion needs to be analysed. The present chapter addresses one of the prevailing 
assumptions in the existing literature on the rebellion of 1857 in the lower province 
of the Bengal Presidency. Contrary to received wisdom, this chapter shows that the 
capital of the British East India Company, and the regions in and around Calcutta, 
were far from quiet and at peace during this period of crisis. The Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Fredrick J. Halliday, in one of his later reports dated 30 
September 1858, had admitted that there was hardly a district in the neighbourhood 
of Calcutta, including the Presidency itself, which had escaped either actual danger 
or the serious apprehension of danger.
1
 However, as we will see in the course of this 
chapter, it was not just the events of different multitude occurring in and around 
Calcutta that were the causes of concern for the government and the residents both in 
and around the city. Rather it was the cumulative effect of the rumours and panic that 
                                                          
1
 Frederick James Halliday, ―The Mutinies as they affected the Lower Provinces under the 
Government of Bengal, 1858‖ in C. E. Buckland, Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors: Being a 
Narrative of the Principal Events and Public Measures During Their Periods of Office, from 1854 
to 1898, 2 vols., Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri & Co., 1901, p. 68. 
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accompanied these events that had put the colonial government and the European 
population of the city in a state of shock and anxiety for several months.  
As outlined in the methodology section of the introduction, I argue in this 
chapter that rumour played a significant role in the circulation of information in and 
around the city of Calcutta during this period of unrest.
2
 A study of rumour and its 
consequent effect during a moment of social and political upheaval, such as the 
rebellion of 1857, has the potential to reveal much about peoples‘ perceptions than 
the official reports allows us to. As the chapter gradually unfolds, it will be clear, in 
the words of Kim Wagner that the accuracy of the rumours was not always the most 
essential component, and whether or not they were true, they had some real 
consequences.
3
 This chapter is a study of the colonial paranoia during the rebellion 
of 1857 in Bengal, and also the fear of the civil population residing in the city of 
Calcutta and its vicinity. It seeks to reconstruct the narrative of events during this 
period of crisis in a region that has hitherto been uncharted as well as attempts to 
look at a moment of crisis to study the popular perceptions in the lower province of 
Bengal of the time. The central point of this chapter will be to analyse the cumulative 
effects of actual events that were unfolding in the north-central Gangetic heartland of 
India during the rebellion of 1857 and the unverified rumours that were coming 
along with these reports in the seat of the British Empire, i.e., Calcutta, and its 
immediate vicinities. The purpose will be to study the role of the rumours as a 
historical tool of analysis and to situate the rumours that were unfolding in and 
                                                          
2
 Georges Lefebvre, The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France, trans. Joan White, 
London: New Left Books, 1973. 
3
 Kim A. Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857: Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the Indian 
Uprising, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010, p. 23. 
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around Calcutta within the broader conflagration of the rebellion of 1857. In doing 
so, the chapter will look at the response and reactions of the European officials and 
civilians as well as the indigenous population of the city with regards to the resultant 
panic. It also examines the role of the actors, especially the colonial government, in 
response to the crisis they had to face and the various measures that they had to 
undertake in order overcome the crisis at the heart of their Empire. In a broader 
perspective, the underlining purpose of this chapter is to highlight the fact that the 
rebellion of 1857, with all its regional specificities, was a networked event, the 
ramification of which was far and wide with varying consequences. As a corollary to 
the argument, the chapters has also made an attempt to draw a parallel to the 
situation in the Straits Settlements, arguing that the impact of the cumulative effect 
of rumour and panic that accompanied the rebellion was not confined to the seat of 
the British empire but had its impact that transcended the regional/national 
boundaries.  
 
2.2 THE GATHERING STORM 
The purpose of this section is to study the chronology of the events in a narrative 
sequence in order to analyse how the rebellion had been sparked off by the prevailing 
rumours in Dumdum, Berhampore and Barrackpore, the three most important 
military cantonments situated around the city of Calcutta. The following section also 
looks at the initial vacillation on the part of the colonial government regarding the 
authenticity and importance of the rumours that were floating across and the kind of 
measures they should take in order to bring down the excitements and apprehensions 
from the mind of the native sepoys. In other words, this section sets the scene of the 
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prevailing situation in and around the city of Calcutta on the eve of the outbreak of 
the actual rebellion that followed soon after the open act of rebellion by Mangal 
Pandey, a sepoy belonging to the 34
th
 regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry in the 
military cantonment of Barrackpore. This section will attempt to dispel the notion 
that the mutiny of Mangal Pandey was not an isolated act of individual bravado but 
was a direct outcome of a series of events in and around Calcutta that preceded the 
formal outbreak of the rebellion. The uprising, as Wagner noted, did not simply erupt 
or spread like a wildfire; it was smouldering for months and only gradually got under 
way in the most faltering manner.
4
 
The earliest signs of disquiet among the sepoys were evident in Dumdum in 
January 1857. Dumdum had earlier been the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery. 
When this headquarters was shifted to Meerut, Dumdum had to be satisfied with a 
School of Musketry designed to impart training of the newly-introduced Enfield 
Rifle. In January, the cantonment at Dumdum was agog with all sorts of rumours 
about the ‗nefarious designs‘ of the government.5 Major John Bontein, the 
Commanding Officer of the Depot of Musketry at Dumdum, reported as early as 23 
January 1857 about the prevailing rumours and uneasiness in his cantonment to the 
higher authority.6 From Dumdum, rumours reached Barrackpore, the Headquarters of 
the Presidency Division of the army. In late January Major General John Hearsey, 
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 Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857: p. 26. 
5
 For further details see: George W. Forrest, Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State 
Papers Preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India : 1857-58, 4 vols., 
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6
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who was in charge of the Division, noticed a growing ‗ill-feeling‘ in the minds of the 
sepoys of the regiments at Barrackpore.7 Initially Hearsey dismissed these reports as 
being baseless rumours. However, subsequent reports of occurrences of the burning 
down of a Sergeant‘s Bungalow in Ranigunj, about 120 miles from Calcutta, by 
sepoys belonging to the 2
nd
 Grenadiers, followed by a similar incident within a week 
in Barrackpore, where the telegraph office and some empty Bungalows were put on 
fire, convinced Hearsay that these acts were being caused by ill-affected men, who 
wished to spread a ‗spirit of discontent.‘8 According to an Indian police officer, 
Moinoddin Hasan Khan, it was furthermore calculated that the burning of a telegraph 
office would immediately be communicated along the line from Calcutta to Punjab, 
rapidly spreading the news of the arson attacks to other sepoy regiments stationed 
across northern India.
9
 John William Kaye, ‗the chief historian of the Mutiny‘ as Eric 
Stokes called him, wrote that it was a trick learnt by the 2
nd
 Grenadiers from the 
Santhals, among whom they had served.
10
 In fact, this linkage between a distinctly 
tribal custom and its appropriation by the mutinous sepoys in the cantonment was not 
a figment of Kaye‘s imagination. After all, the Santhal uprising had taken place only 
a couple of years previously and its memory was still fresh in popular mind. More 
importantly, the British authorities deciphered a kind of pattern, in that the troops 
                                                          
7
 Enclosure 18 in Number 1, Appendix to Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies Presented 
to Both the Houses of Parliament by Command of her Majesty, 1857, BLOC. 
8
 Enclosure 18 in Number 1, Major General J.B. Hearsey to the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, 
Barrackpore, 28 January 1857, Appendix to Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies 
Presented to Both the Houses of Parliament by Command of her Majesty, 1857, BLOC. 
9
 Cited in Kim A. Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857:  pp. 45-46. 
10
 Sir John William Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858, 3 vols., London: Allen, 
1865. John William Kaye (1814-1876) was a British military historian and also an Officer of the 
Bengal Artillery. He later succeeded John Stuart Mill as the Secretary of the Political and Secret 
Department of the India office. 
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from the 2
nd
 Native Infantry were posted at both Raniganj and Barrackpore. Strong 
guards were accordingly posted in the officer‘s lines and there were constant patrols, 
while the thatched roofs of verandas were removed to avoid the risk of further arson 
attacks.
11
  
Accordingly, this regiment came under the suspicion as the British officers 
began to speculate that something more serious than mere idle rumours might be 
brewing.
12
 There were also reports of animated discussions among the sepoys, 
generally held at night. A. Stewart Allen, Lieutenant of the 34
th
 Native Infantry, was 
informed by one of his messenger about an elaborate plot which was being hatched 
by men of the different regiments in the cantonment at Barrackpore.
13
 According to 
the information provided by the messenger, the sepoys of various regiments of the 
station in Barrackpore were feeling apprehensive that they would be forced to give 
up their caste and be made Christians. As a consequence, in order to prevent this 
from happening, the sepoys were determined ‗to rise up against their officers, and 
commence by either plundering or burning down the bungalows at Barrackpore; they 
next proposed to proceed to Calcutta and attempt to seize the Fort William, or, 
failing that, to take possession of the treasury.‘14 Furthermore, the messenger also 
informed Allen that the delegates from various other regiments were to assemble on 
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 Letter from Major General Hearsay to Military Secretary Colonel Birch dated 5 February 1857, 
Judicial Department Proceedings Number 31, 24 March 1857, Government of Bengal, WBSA. 
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 Hearsey to Sanders dated 11 February 1857, Judicial Proceedings 10 August 1857, Government of 
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 Statement of A. Stewart Allen, Lieutenant 34th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, 8 February 1857, 
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the evening of 6 February 1857 in order to discuss their future course of action. Part 
of the plan consisted in mobilising sepoys outside of Barrackpore, where ‗the men of 
other regiments were to be informed of what is going on here, and that they are to be 
called upon to cooperate with their comrades, the affair being one which concerned 
them all equally‘.15 These delegates were being informed by some sources of the 
arrival of a European regiment near Dinapur along with artilleries in order to prevent 
the outbreak of any disturbances. Thus they deemed it necessary to take immediate 
action before it was too late. The subsequent burning down of the electric telegraph 
office in early February was, according to the informant, part of a ‗concerted plan to 
prevent the government receiving speedy information of what was going on. It also 
becomes evident from the aforesaid information provided by Allen‘s messenger that 
even before the first fire of the mutiny was shot, the rebels had thought of a 
concerted course of action to oust the government. As it happened, no outbreak took 
place in Barrackpore, and the sepoys‘ plan came to nothing.16 It was significant 
however that large numbers of sepoys from all four regiments at the station took part 
in the plotting, and that they intended to contact other regiments. This was not the 
only time the sepoys at Barrackpore met at night. From the deposition of Jemadar 
Durriow there appear to have been several such occasions, during which men met in 
the lines after dark, with their face covered, to discuss the course of actions.
17
    
                                                          
15
 Statement of A. Stewart Allen, Lieutenant 34th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, 8 February 1857, 
Enclosure 14 in Number 3 Appendix to Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies; Presented 
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 Letter sent from C. Grant, Commanding at Barrackpore to Major Ross, Assistant Adjutant-General 
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To make things further disturbing for the government, at about this time the so-
called ‗Lota incident‘ happened.18 Captain Wright of the 70th Native Infantry 
informed the details of this incident to Major Bontein, commanding the depot of 
musketry at Dumdum. We may not need to go into the details. Suffice it to say that 
when a person possibly belonging to a low-caste community wanted to drink from 
the ‗lota‘ of a sepoy belonging to the 2nd Grenadiers, the latter refused since he was 
not aware of the former‘s caste. To this the low-caste person immediately responded 
that the sepoys should not be bothered anymore about losing their caste status since 
they would all soon be converted to Christianity.
19
 Rumours of this kind were 
already in circulation in the military cantonments and added to the suspicions in the 
minds of the sepoys. The extent of the sepoys‘ fear and apprehension is best reflected 
in one of the anonymous petition addressed to Major Matthews of the 43
rd
 Bengal 
native infantry in Barrackpore: ‗…we will not give up our religion. We serve for 
honour and religion; if we loose our religion, the Hindoo and Mahomeddan religion 
will be destroyed‘.20 In the petition all the different rumours that had troubled the 
sepoys for months came together and gave form and substance to the idea of a 
colonial conspiracy to ruin the religion of all Indians. The petition further stated that 
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 ‗Lota‘, the small spheroidal brass pot which Hindus used for drinking, and sometimes for cooking. 
This is the exclusive Anglo-Indian application, but natives also extend it to spherical pipkins of 
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it was evident the British council had decided to distribute greased cartridges to the 
sepoys in order to destroy their caste.  
Major-General Hearsey commanding at Dumdum on hearing these reports 
from his subordinates realised the potential danger that the government were about to 
face. He connected the floating rumours with the nightly acts of incendiarism that 
had already begun to take place in various quarters.
21
 Apart from the strengthened 
guards patrolling the cantonment, a reward was also offered for any information on 
the arson attacks. In addition, camp-followers were now being registered to keep 
‗bad characters‘ out of the cantonment.22 Hearsey wrote, ‗it will be hard, most 
difficult to eradicate this impression from the minds of the native soldiers, who are 
always suspiciously disposed when any change of this sort affecting themselves is 
introduced.‘23 In February 1857 Hearsey reported to the Secretary to the Government 
of India that the English at Barrackpore had been ‗dwelling upon a mine ready for 
explosion‘ and unless this was immediately responded with great caution, he was 
afraid that Sir Charles Metcalfe‘s apprehension about waking up in one fine morning 
to find India had been lost to the English Crown might indeed come true.24  
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What was still a suspicion at Barrackpore, turned into a belief at Berhampur, 
approximately two hundred kilometres north of Calcutta. The association of 
Berhampur with the revolt of 1857 has been consigned to collective oblivion as a 
result of the more active theatres of action in the Gangetic heartland. In a way this is 
unfortunate since Berhampur was the site of the first recorded instance of the mutiny 
of the sepoys in 1857 that was to destroy the hitherto trusted army of Bengal. To this 
military station was posted a regiment of the 19
th
 Native Infantry and a corps of 
Irregular Cavalry.
25
 From early February there were reports of disquiet among the 
sepoys. These revolved round the rumour about the new cartridges and their 
apprehended impact on their caste. Initially the authorities did not take the discontent 
seriously. They expected, perhaps not without reason, that given some time, these 
would die down. This time, however, their precocious expectations vanished like 
sunset glow. Colonel Mitchell, who was in charge of Berhampur, was informed 
about excitement in the Lines on 27 February 1857.
26
 His intemperate handling of 
the situation and reported threat to send the errant sepoys to Burma exacerbated an 
already volatile situation resulting in the mutiny of the 19
th
 regiment. The sepoys 
broke open the storeroom where the weapons were kept and loaded their muskets, 
refusing initially to surrender them.
27
 The situation was partially diffused by the 
intervention of their Indian officers. According to the Havildar-Major of the 19
th
 
regiment, ‗there was already a rumour that the cavalry were about to seize the kotes‘ 
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and thus the sepoys armed themselves before they were being disarmed. Kim 
Wagner mentioned about a petition that was later written by the sepoys in Berhampur 
which brings into light the general state of panic that was prevailing amongst the 
sepoys in Berhampur:  
The same night…shouts of various kinds were heard; some said there 
is a fire; others that they were surrounded by the Europeans; some said 
that the guns had arrived; others that the cavalry had appeared. In the 
midst of this row the alarm sounded on a drum, then from fear of our 
lives the greater number seized their arms from kotes…11th regiment, 
Irregular Cavalry, and the guns with torches arrived on the parade 
with the commanding officer, which still more confirmed our 
suspicions of the cartidges being greased, inasmuch as the 
commanding officer appeared to be about to carry his threats into 
execution by force. We had been hearing of this sort of thing for the 
last two months or more, and here appeared to be the realisation of 
it.
28
   
 
Two things about Berhampur made the administration particularly anxious. 
One was its proximity to Murshidabad, the residence of the Nawab Nazim whose 
support, it was apprehended, could turn the scale in favour of the rebels. J.W. Kaye 
wrote ‗It was not difficult to see that if these troops were to rise against their English 
officers, and the people of Moorshedabad were to fraternise with them, in the name 
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 Translation of the petition from the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and 
sepoys of the 19
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 regiment, Native Infantry, to Major-General J.B. Hearsay, C.B., commanding the 
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of the Newab, all Bengal would soon be in a blaze.‘29 The other cause was the 
absence of any European troops in the town or in its vicinity. To make matters worse 
for the administration, routine movement of a detachment of the 34
th
 Native Infantry 
from Barrackpore to Berhampur in February enabled the disquiet shared by sepoys in 
the former to be transmitted to the latter. The mutiny at Berhampur was brought 
under control, and it was decided that it had to be punished. According to the order 
read out to the rebellious sepoys on the day of the punishment, ‗the men of this 
Regiment had refused obedience to their European officers. They had seized arms 
with violence. They had assembled in a body to resist the authority of their 
commander. The regiment had been guilty of open and defiant mutiny.‘30 The 
punishment decided upon was to disband the 19
th
 Regiment of the Native Infantry. 
On 27 March Lord Canning ordered that the 19
th
 regiment be marched to 
Barrackpore and there disbanded in front of the other native regiments: ‗mutiny so 
open and defiant cannot be excused by any sensitiveness of religion or caste, by fear 
of coercion, or by the seduction and deception of others‘. 31 
It was easy to take the decision but difficult to implement it. In view of the 
paucity of European soldiers at Berhampur, disbanding them there was ruled out 
almost immediately. The solution the authorities had worked upon was to bring the 
sepoys from Berhampur to Barrackpore without in any way letting them know the 
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purpose of this movement. The regiment arrived at Barrackpore on 31 March.
32
 In 
anticipation of its arrival, fresh reinforcement was brought to Barrackpore. H.M.‘s 
84
th
 was rushed from Burma and a wing of H.M.‘s 53rd was brought from Calcutta. A 
troop of the Madras artillery, on the way to its own Presidency was detained there, 
while a second troop had been called from Dumdum. The body guard of the 
Governor General was on the spot and every soldier that was available from the 
presidency appeared on the parade. These preparations being over, the task was 
carried out and the punishment of the Berhampur rebels was formally announced:  
 
It is, therefore, the order of the Governor General in Council, that the 
19
th
 Regiment N.I. be now disbanded.; that the native commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers and privates be discharged from the 
army of Bengal; that this be done at the headquarters of the 
presidency division in the presence of every available corps within 
two days‘ march to the station; that the regiment be paraded for the 
purpose, and that each man, after being deprived of his arms, shall 
receive his arrears of pay and be required to withdraw from the 
cantonment.33  
 
However, considering the behaviour of the regiment in question, Hearsey allowed 
them to leave the parade ground in their uniform. In addition, he also allowed 
them to go to worship at the temples where their forefathers had worshipped, and 
also to go on a pilgrimage if they wished to. Hearsey thought that by giving them 
                                                          
32
 Letter from Major-General J.B. Hearsay to R.J.H. Birch, Secretary to the Government of India in 
the Military Department, in Forrest, Selections from the Letters, Vol. 1, p. 103. 
33
 Judicial Proceedings, 27 March 1857, Government of Bengal, WBSA; also, General Orders by the 
Governor-General of India in Council, Enclosure 23 in Number 5, Appendix to Papers relative to 
the Mutinies in the East Indies Presented to Both the Houses of Parliament, 1857, BLOC. 
Page | 97  
 
this permission he would be negating the report that the government wished to 
force Christianity on the sepoys. But to others it sounded more like ‗the address of 
a master discharging his servant with the words ―here you rascals are your wages, 
and now you may go to the Devil if you like.‖‘34 In other words, it was 
punishment as a spectacle.  
In March, the locus shifted from Berhampur back again to Barrackpore. 
Hearsey had already noticed that there was adequate tension in the cantonment. What 
he failed to appreciate was the depth of the grievances. Hence, he took recourse to 
the conspiracy theory, which eventually turned into a shibboleth of colonial analyses 
of popular movements in India. Hearsey ascribed the restiveness in the sepoy lines to 
some ‗designing scoundrels‘, such as ‗the Dharma Sabha people in Calcutta, who 
poisoned the minds of the gullible sepoys.‘35 To him, these ‗agents of the religious 
Hindoo Party of Calcutta‘ who were opposed to the remarriage of widows were using 
under-hand means to thwart the government by trying to persuade the ignorant 
sepoys that their religion were soon to be abolished by force and all of them would 
soon be converted to Christians.
36
 It is this optical illusion that saw nothing beyond 
blind religious fury,
37
 which blinded Hearsey and his folk from the ground level 
realities and that then took them somewhat by surprise on 29 March, 1857. The story 
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of Mangal Pandey‘s defiance has been retold so many times and in so many different 
versions that it might well form the subject matter of a separate historiographical 
exercise.
38
 Suffice it to say that sepoy Mangal Pandey belonged to the 34
th
 regiment 
of the Bengal Native Infantry. On 29 March 1857, Pandey refused to comply with 
the orders of his authorities, seized his musket and rushed upon the parade ground in 
Barrackpore, calling upon his comrades to come forward and join him in the fight for 
their religion.
39
 When the Sergeant-Major came forward to disarm him, Pandey shot 
at him but missed. It was only with the timely intervention of Major-General Hearsey 
that the situation was brought under control. But although Pandey‘s call was not 
readily responded to by very many of his comrades, and his act of defiance was put 
down by Hearsey without much bloodshed, it was provocative enough to send the 
administration scurrying for cover. The first thing that the government did was to 
execute Pandey after a court martial and to disband the seven companies of the 
Thirty-fourth stationed at Barrackpore.40  
It is thus evident from the above discussion that even before the first gunfire of 
the rebellion was shot, rumours and unverified reports of various kinds related to the 
greased cartridges and the fear of forceful religious conversion of the sepoys played a 
crucial role in the unfolding of subsequent events, and eventually provided the spark 
that led to the open act of rebellion by sepoy Mangal Pandey. Although the colonial 
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government was warned of the circulation of the rumours and their possible 
repercussions among the sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry by some of their own 
officers, the colonial government failed to estimate the authenticity and significance 
of these rumours. By the time the authorities realised the gravity of the situation, it 
was too late for them. 
 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION 
While the preceding section highlighted the situation that was prevailing in and 
around the city of Calcutta on the eve of the actual outbreak of the rebellion, the 
present section moves a step further and looks at the events and actors that were 
involved in the rebellion once it had commenced with the mutinous act of Mangal 
Pandey. The section situates the events that were unfolding in the various parts of the 
Gangetic heartland and the various unverified sources of rumour that were coming 
along with them down to the seat of the colonial government, and connect them with 
the various incidents in Calcutta that made the government as well as the civil 
population seriously concerned of the situation. It also examines how in a specific 
moment of crisis the rumours, followed by the incidents of panics, which would 
otherwise have made not much of an impact, created an atmosphere of paranoia in 
Calcutta. It shows how the colonial government as well as the civil population of the 
city saw these developments as an imminent threat to the continuation of colonial 
rule in India and analyses the various precautionary measures adopted by the 
government. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the 19
th
 regiment of the Bengal Native 
Infantry were brought from Berhampur to Barrackpore and were disbanded and 
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dismissed on 31 March.
41
 The disbandment of the seven companies of 34
th
 Native 
Infantry, stationed in Barrackpore, was implemented on 6 May 1857.42 Lest these 
drastic steps affect the morale of other cantonments in Bengal, the government issued 
a proclamation on 16 May 1857 disavowing any intention to tamper with the 
observances of religion and caste of the sepoys and advising them to shun company 
of ‗false guides and traitors‘.43 Quite clearly the conspiracy theory was at work and 
outside agencies were held responsible for tampering with the ‗habitual loyalty and 
orderly conduct of the sepoys‘.44 To Canning, they were ‗ignorant and childish, but 
excitable sepoys‘.45 
While the government was busy regrouping its strength, rumours of various 
kinds were afloat that some of these soldiers who were out of employment did not 
return to their own districts in western Bihar or U.P., but hovered around the vicinity 
of Barrackpore.
46
 This was coupled with the fact that at the time there were very 
strong Indian contingents stationed at Barrackpore, Dinapore, Benares, Allahabad, 
Kanpur, and in Awadh, while there were only five English regiments in the whole 
area – the 53rd and 84th near Calcutta, the 10th at Dinapore, the 32nd at Lucknow, and 
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the 3
rd, one of the Company‘s European regiments, at Agra.47 In addition, there were 
in Barrackpore itself three Indian regiments, at least one of which had been affected 
earlier in the year. To disband the Barrackpore regiments was to reinforce the rebels 
with trained soldiers and to part with a single English soldier was to further weaken 
the hold over the province for the government. With this slender resource to rely on, 
Governor General Canning and his government had to preserve the peace along the 
entire course of the Ganges. However, fortunately for the government, the 84
th
 
Queen‘s Regiment had not returned to Pegu, and the Treaty with Persia had been 
ratified in Baghdad on 2 May 1857 which allowed Sir James Outram‘s forces to 
return to India.
48
 Canning, under the present situation, had no other option but to 
expedite the return of the troops from Persia. He also ordered Lord Harris 
commanding the 43
rd
 Queen‘s Regiment and the 1st Madras Fusiliers to be prepared 
for embarkation.
49
 In addition, under Canning‘s instruction, the government 
despatched a steamer to Pegu to transport the 35
th, another Queen‘s Regiment, 
stationed there.
50
 
What had particularly unnerved the colonial government in Calcutta as well as 
the European and Christian residents of the city was the information regarding the 
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events unfolding in Meerut and Delhi, which had already begun trickling back to 
Calcutta. On 12 May 1857, the government in Calcutta received from Agra the 
following telegram from Meerut: ‗The Cavalry have risen setting fire to their own 
houses and several officers‘ houses, besides having killed and wounded all European 
officers and soldiers they could find near the lines.‘51 This kind of news seemed 
almost incredible in Calcutta. Meerut at the time had the strongest European force in 
India. The 60
th
 Rifles, a Dragoon Regiment and large bodies of horse and foot 
artilleries made this station unusually powerful in terms of its European troops. And 
yet the incredible had happened. On 10 May 1857 the regiments at Meerut, 
consisting of the 3
rd
 Bengal Light Cavalry and the 20
th
 and 11
th
 Regiments of Native 
Infantry, rose in rebellion, killed many of their officers, set fire to the station and 
rode off to Delhi. As William Pinch noted, the military uprising at Meerut on 10 May 
was a key factor in sparking off the wider rebellion that soon followed. The military 
mutiny and civil rebellion then fed off each other as the weeks and months passed.
52
 
Likewise, in Delhi, no one was prepared. The Indian regiments there included the 
38
th, a corps which in Dalhousie‘s time had refused to cross the ‗black water‘ for 
service in Burma, at once joined the rebel sepoys.
53
 To these were soon added the 
men of the 54
th
 and later of the 74
th
 Native Infantry. In a telegraphic despatch dated 
12 May 1857 it was revealed that Delhi was already in the hands of the insurgents. 
On 14
 
May 1857 it was heard that the King of Delhi had been proclaimed as the 
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supreme leader and that he was already in possession of the town and fort, 
massacring the European population.
54
 
The news of the fall of Delhi at the hands of the rebels was interpreted by the 
colonial government as the actual breakdown of the British authority in India and 
acted as a catalyst for the outburst of rebellion in the other parts of the country. The 
interesting thing to notice in this regard was the way the dates of the mutinies after 
the massacre of Delhi indicated a definite pattern. The rebellion in north India first 
broke out in Meerut followed by the siege of Delhi on 14
 
May, Aligarh on the 20 
May, Etawah and Mainpuri on the 23 May, Lucknow on the 30 May, Kanpur on the 
6 June. It seemed as if the rebellion was travelling down the Ganges valley with a 
time gap between the various stations required for the news to travel from one place 
to the other.
55
 During the next few weeks the detailed reports of the massacres and 
disasters from all across were coming through as well. All these news along with 
some other related vague reports were slowly filtering down to Calcutta. Charles 
Ball, one of the contemporary chronicler as well as the earliest historians to write on 
the rebellion of 1857, wrote in this context, 
The continuous arrival of disastrous intelligence from all quarters of 
the presidency of Bengal was received at the seat of the government… 
and the fact could no longer be ignored that a vast and formidable 
insurrectionary movement was progressing, and daily acquiring 
strength and organisation. The panic that had seized the European 
society at the distant stations began at last to roll, with hourly 
increasing eagerness, towards the capital. In every quarter, a sense of 
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some undefined, but imminent and immediate danger oppressed the 
people.
56
  
 
Corroboration of Balls‘ description is provided by Colonel Orfeur Cavanagh, the 
Town Major. Cavanaugh in his private correspondence to Canning, stated in a 
similar fashion: ‗…the climate of opinion among the Europeans in Calcutta (is) that 
the present insurrection has taken a proportion that is unprecedented…the disastrous 
news of massacres from the north pouring in the city everyday is of genuine 
concern‘.57 The breakdown of the telegraph network and the Grand Trunk road made 
it difficult for the official reports to reach Calcutta. As the native daily newspaper 
Sambad Prabhakar reported:  
The news from the north-west of the country is horrible to say the 
least. The reports that were previously coming from the up-country 
have been disrupted because of the lack of communication network. In 
spite of the government‘s trying effort in Calcutta to restore the postal 
and telegraph service, authentic news are hard to avail. Under this 
situation, whatever news has reached us is of deep concern. The rebel 
forces have been joined by other sepoys in Delhi and carnage has 
followed thereafter. They have looted the government treasury, 
gathered arms and ammunition from the depots and are now marching 
towards Calcutta.
58
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In a similar article, Hindoo Patriot noted that ‗the horrible details of mutiny and 
massacre of which rumours and reports have reached the town during the last few 
days have fallen upon a state of public feeling utterly unprepared to receive them 
even after the seditious misconduct and disbandment of two regiments of the line‘.59 
The government now apprehended that in the event of the disbanded sepoys 
descending on the city, the Indian police would be of no avail. But keeping in mind 
with the severe scarcity of European soldiers around the city, Canning also realised 
at the same time that the government must not display any signs of alarm under the 
present circumstances.
60
 Any symptoms of fear and panic in Calcutta would be 
magnified and make the situation even worse in the other parts of Bengal, and in 
Awadh, it might lead to a real disaster. Thus, he recommended that the routine of the 
Government House should proceed as usual and he himself endeavoured to set an 
example by remaining calm with every new instalment of disaster, actual or 
potential.
61
 Canning even held a State Ball which was arranged for the 25 May to 
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celebrate the Queen‘s birthday, while Lady Canning refused to abandon her regular 
evening drives around the city of Calcutta.
62
  
Unfortunately however, most of the European population of the city was 
unable to put up this cool image and composure of the Governor General. Even the 
meagre sounds of fireworks that accompanied following the wedding of a Mysore 
princess was enough for them to bring out weapons for their own protections.
63
 
These acts were coupled with the numerous rumours that were already afloat in the 
bazars in and around the city.
64
 Lord Canning in his private letter to Vernon Smith 
acknowledged the fact that never before did he come across ‗such a set of old women 
with swords by their sides carrying the news of this town among the clubs and 
gossiping tiffin rooms of their acquaintances.‘65 Perhaps in deep anguish he added 
that hitherto the merchants and the non-official communities of the city had shown 
sense and calmness under similar circumstances, but under the present situation ‗how 
long this will last if our officers and officials crawl about with their tails between 
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their legs frightening themselves and everybody else with their whining I will not 
say.‘66  
It was not that Canning was unable to read the actual situation. In fact in one of 
his extracts he admitted the stupidity on the part of the British government to have 
annexed Pegu, Nagpore and Awadh without adding a single English soldier to their 
strength. He wrote: 
 
Although there is no lack of European regiments, there is no lack of 
Native ones, who have it all their own way. If this disaffection should 
spread and burst out into such violence as has been exhibited in 
Meerut and Delhi, you may imagine the plunder, slaughter, 
consternation and ruin which would ensue. The flame would spread 
without a check straight on end for 700 or 800 miles, over the richest 
tracts of India. And, literally, I could not under many weeks collect a 
force at any one spot on that line which would be strong enough to 
give any confidence to the Europeans… Whether the infection of the 
Mutiny will spread or not, no mortal man can say… and I have lost 
entirely all confidence in the commanding officers of the regiments.67  
 
Unfortunately for Canning and the colonial government, the above mentioned 
apprehensions were soon to be realised, especially in the province of Awadh.
68
 To 
make the situation further complicated, the government in Calcutta feared that the 
followers of Wajid Ali Khan, the deposed Nawab of Awadh, who, along with his 
entourage was then living in Garden Reach in the south-western suburb of the city, 
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would join hands with the rebellious sepoys. He and his visitors were kept under 
close surveillance.  
Wajid Ali Khan and his followers seem to have caused considerable 
consternation for the colonial government at this time. The deposed King of Awadh, 
Wajid Ali Khan and his followers were then living in exile at Garden Reach in the 
southern part of Calcutta, and as sepoys of 34
th
 Bengal Native Infantry were 
routinely deployed on guard duties in the city, there were numerous opportunities for 
communications. It is to be noted that both the 19
th
 and the 34
th
 regiment of the BNI 
had earlier been stationed in Awadh during the time of its annexation in 1856. As 
early as in Jnauary 1857, groups of sepoys belonging to the 34
th
 BNI had already 
decided that they would no longer be serving under the British.
69
 According to the 
native police officer Moinodin Hasan Khan, who had communicated with a number 
of sepoys from these two regiments, the annexation of Awadh had made a deep 
impression on these sepoys:  
Both these regiments were full of bitterness towards the English 
Government, and from them letters were written to other Purbeah 
regiments…the letters reminded every regiment of the ancient 
dynasties of Hindustan and pointed out that the annexation of Oude 
had been followed by the disbandment of the Oude army…and 
showed that their place was being filled by the enlistment of Punjabis 
and Sikhs…the very bread had been torn out of the mouths of men 
who knew no other profession than that of the sword…Thus it was 
pressed upon the sepoys that they must rebel to reseat the ancient 
kings on their thrones, and drive the trespassers away. The welfare of 
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the soldier caste required this; the honour of their chiefs was at 
stake.
70
 
Some of the native officers of the 34
th
 Bengal Native Infantry made contact with 
Raja Man Singh, one of the most powerful landowners of Awadh, and a desperate 
plot was hatched to seize the fort at Calcutta and reinstate Wajid Ali Khan.71 The 
plan was to take advantage of the presence of three companies of the 34
th
 Native 
Infantry that would make a stop at Calcutta on their way to Chittagong. With their 
numbers thus augmented, the various units of the 34
th
 Native Infantry on guard duties 
in Calcutta were to seize the fort with the assistance of the King of Awadh‘s men as 
well as the Calcutta Native Militia.72 The affair, however, was completely spoiled 
when the officer in charge of the plot was relieved and sent back to Barrackpore on 
the very day the rebellion was to happen. The ringleaders had furthermore failed to 
secure the assistance of their comrades in key positions and to inform them of the 
details of the plan. The attempt went ahead on the night of 26 January, but the 
running back and forth of the sepoy guards put the British at Fort William on guard, 
and the whole thing was eventually aborted.
73
 There was a similar attempt in early 
March, involving the guards of both the regiments of 34
th
 and the 2
nd
 Bengal Native 
Infantry but the details of this affair were vague. However, what can be said with 
certainty was the fact that the sepoys guards posted in various locations in Calcutta 
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were to varying degrees involved in mutinous attempts during the early months of 
1857.  
It is thus significant that, as early as in January, the initial response of the 
frustrated sepoys was to seek to re-establish the old order, when being a soldier 
entailed a high social status, and to negotiate wages and terms of employment. The 
extent of the former king of Awadh‘s actual involvement in these plots remained 
obscure, but it seems unlikely that the rumours of the greased cartridges alone should 
have incited the sepoys to mutiny so early. As was the case with Vellore, the 
retainers of the former king might have played a more active role; several months 
later, three of them were apprehended on suspicion of tampering with the sepoys. 
The British certainly believed that the dethroned Wajid Ali Khan was behind the 
unrest, and Major-General John Hearsey, who commanded the Presidency Division 
at Barrackpore, was said to be ‗confident that they have been tampered with, and 
thinks that he has traced this to the King of Oude‘s people at Garden Reach.‘74  
Although the deposed Nawab of Awadh seldom moved out of his Garden 
Reach residence, his visitors were kept under close surveillance. It was reported that 
Man Singh, the Awadh Taluqdar, and Alle Nuckee Khan, the Prime Minister of the 
erstwhile Nawab, had visited Calcutta and held meetings with Wajid Ali Khan and 
other persons who were in the ‗conspiratorial‘ league.75 Tickaet Rao, the Steward of 
the Court of the deposed Nawab, was also an object of suspicion. Colonel Orfeur 
Cavanagh, the Town Major, mentioned in the 21 May entry of his journal that 
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according to his informant, Man Singh called for Wajid Ali Khan‘s sanction to a 
rising in his favour.76 John Peter Grant, the member of the Governor General‘s 
Executive Council did not rule out any of these possibilities. He was firmly of the 
opinion that an emergency had arisen. On 10 June 1857 he wrote a letter to Governor 
General Canning wherein he spelt out the threats the Europeans were exposed to: 
‗We have as enemies three Native Infantry regiments and a half, of which one and a 
half are the very worst type we know; one, two, three (for no one knows) thousand 
armed men at Garden Reach, or available there at a moment; some hundred armed 
men of the Scinde Ameers at Dum Dum.‘77  
It is important to mention in this context that the province of Sindh was 
formally annexed by the British forces under the commandership of General Charles 
Napier in the year 1843.
78
 The tribal chieftains of Sindh, also known as the Amirs of 
Sindh, were defeated and taken as captives and were put in strict seclusion by the 
colonial government.
79
 But under the present situation the government were visibly 
concerned regarding the motives of these Amirs, many of whom were located in 
Calcutta, as the prisoners of the state. The possibility of an impending threat from the 
Sindh Amirs was also expressed by the Bengal Hurkaru newspaper:  
The Ameers of Scinde are residing at Dumdum and in its vicinity, 
they are prisoners, and still they are allowed to retain about four 
hundred armed men as followers, a low long haired Mahomedan 
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rabble, who only wait for an opportunity of flashing their tulwars. So 
long as this station remains quiet, they may consider it their interest to 
sneak about the Station bazaars without arms, but the mischief these 
men are capable of doing is incalculable. Is it possible that our 
Government for a moment believe that in case of any disturbances 
(such as we are advised by authority to prepare for) these disreputable 
Mahomedans, thoroughly armed as they are within their own grounds, 
would remain passive spectators of our difficulty?
80
  
 
Under the circumstances the government therefore decided that in order to thwart the 
imminent threat from these groups of men it was important to move Wajid Ali Khan 
from his residence at Garden Reach. Accordingly on 15 June 1857, the former king 
along with Ali Nuckee Khan and three of his other associates were called upon and 
subsequently confined inside Fort William.
81
 Although Wajid Ali Khan tried hard to 
persuade the government of his innocence, he eventually gave up and surrendered to 
the authorities.
82
 
 
2.4 THE ‘GREAT FEAR’ OF CALCUTTA AND ITS VICINITY  
It is against this background that the panic that gripped the colonial government all 
through these months needs to be understood. Both the colonial officials and the 
European population residing in Calcutta unexpectedly found themselves 
overwhelmed with a fear of being massacred by the rebels of 1857 and would bring 
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an abrupt end to the rule of the Company. The feeling now dawned upon them that 
all the recent radical changes brought about by the government had antagonised the 
Indians to a large extent. In fact in an earlier letter to the Office of the Adjutant 
General, Major-General Hearsey tried to caution the government regarding some of 
these restlessness and uneasiness prevailing among the sepoys and the inhabitants of 
the city.
83
 John William Kaye wrote that ‗the native mind was at this time in a most 
sensitive state and easily wrought upon by suspicious appearances.‘84 He in fact goes 
on to mention that there were amongst the European officers of the Bengal army 
many ‗earnest minded and zealous Christians‘ who used to seriously think of saving 
the souls of the indigenous people by teaching them from the Bible. Kaye‘s argument 
is corroborated by a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler dated 15 April 1857, 
who wrote to the government that ‗when speaking therefore to a native on the subject 
of religion, I am then acting in the capacity of a Christian soldier under the authority 
of my heavenly superior.‘85 Writing about a decade later, Kaye commented that such 
men ‗did grievous wrong to the Government they professed to serve.‘86 Clare 
Anderson points out in this context that it is little wonder that many Indians regarded 
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missionaries as the religious arm of the Company.
87
 In an article dated 17 April 
1857, Hindu Intelligencer shared the similar apprehension: ‗there seems to be a 
feeling predominant in the minds of all classes of natives, that it is the intention of 
Government to subvert forcibly their (native) faith and make them lose caste…that 
the Government is bent on converting them to Christianity at the point of the 
sword‘.88 Kaye further wrote that the native population of the city was so much 
apprehensive of losing their religion in the hands of the British authorities that even 
the sight of Lady Canning‘s carriage in front of the Bethune Female School and her 
frequent visits there were being interpreted by them as motivated and a part of a deep 
conspiracy against their tradition.
89
  
Wagner has noted that these rumours would not have been so much in 
circulation if they had not reflected a shared perception of contemporary events, and 
thus been considered credible by the native population. Absurd as they may appear, 
at times, these rumours were not just hearsay or idle chatter. They represented a 
significant medium through which the native population attempted to comprehend 
the actions of the British and make sense of an unfamiliar situation.
90
 One may 
certainly raise questions about the reliability of Kaye‘s perceptions of the native 
superstitions or descriptions of the panic amongst the European inhabitants and the 
administration since it provided the necessary justification for the harsh counter-
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measures – strangling the voice of the press, allowing Europeans to carry arms while 
denying the natives the same, extraordinary powers to the civil and military officers 
to carry out summary trials and the punishment of all who were under suspicion 
without the reference of the Headquarters – to be taken by the colonial government.91 
What is beyond doubt is the fact that the course of events that were occurring in 
various parts of north-central Gangetic heartland, coupled with the prevailing 
rumours about the forced conversions by the Christian evangelicals and the 
subsequent proclamations
92
 issued from Kanpur and elsewhere, made the native 
population deeply concerned. This concern was also expressed by the Bengal 
Hurkaru which urged the Governor General to issue a declaration, without any 
further delay, stating their intentions clearly to the native people.
93
 Canning tried to 
address at least some of them by announcing to the Council his intention of issuing a 
proclamation which would testify that the government had no intention of tempering 
with the religious belief of the Indians and denying all the false charges that were 
labelled against the government.
94
 Canning himself later confessed to the Military 
Secretary Colonel Birch that he regretted for not having issued it earlier, as Birch had 
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advised.95 But it is doubtful whether this proclamation, even if it was published 
earlier, would have much of an effect as it seemed unlikely under the present 
situation the Indians could have been persuaded by such logic from the government. 
Considering the exigency of the situation, various other local organisations 
comprising the Europeans and the Christian population of the city came forward to 
offer their services to the government. For instance, in a general meeting organised 
by the Calcutta Trade Association on 20 May 1857, it was resolved by the members 
of the Association to send to the government a statement that they were prepared to 
afford the government every possible assistance in their power towards the 
preservation of order and the protection of the Christian community of Calcutta 
‗either by serving as special constables or otherwise, in such manner as may appear 
most desirable to the Government.‘96 Similarly, the French and the Armenian 
inhabitants, the native community in Calcutta and the British Indian Association all 
presented their petition to the government offering their services under the prevailing 
situation.
97
 Perhaps more interestingly, even sections of the Indian population of the 
city too had come up with their concern and their desire to assist the government.
98
 
Most prominent amongst others was the meeting organised by the Committee of the 
British Indian Association headed by the Honorary Secretary of the Association Raja 
Iswar Chandra Singha of the Paikpara Raj family. The committee passed a resolution 
on the 22 May 1857 criticising the atrocities committed by the rebels across the 
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country: ‗The Committee view with disgust and horror the disgraceful and mutinous 
conduct of the native soldiery… and the excesses committed by them‘ and earnestly 
hoped that peace would soon be restored by the vigorous measures that the 
government had adopted in this exigency.
99
 Following the precedence set by the 
British India Association, the Muslim residents of the city too held a meeting on the 
27 May 1857 extending their full cooperation to the colonial government.
100
  
It is to be noted that Canning had previously turned down the offer that was 
being made by the French consul and residents in Calcutta regarding their services to 
the colonial government in consequence of the rebellion of the Indian regiments in 
the city. He firmly believed that since ‗everything is quiet within 600 miles of the 
capital‘ there would be no need to call for the services of the French community. 101 
The disturbances caused by the passing of the ‗groundless panic has already been 
arrested‘ and therefore Canning was confident that peace and stability would soon be 
restored in Calcutta in a few days‘ time.102 But it was increasingly becoming 
apparent to Canning that the attempts made by him and his government in order to 
persuade the sepoys stationed in and around Calcutta were not successful. The 
occurrence of the subsequent incidents in Calcutta in the month of May 1857 did not 
                                                          
99
 Proceedings of a Meeting of the Committee of the British Indian Association, 22 May 1857, 
Enclosure 9, Papers related to the Mutinies in East Indies, Supplement to the Papers presented July 
1857, p. 5, BLOC. 
100
 Proceedings of a Meeting of the Mahomedans of Calcutta, 27 May 1857, Enclosure 15, Papers 
related to the Mutinies in East Indies, Supplement to the Papers presented July 1857, p. 9, BLOC. 
101
 Letter from the Secretary to the Governor General to the French Consul in Calcutta, Judicial 
Proceedings, 25 May 1857, Government of Bengal. WBSA; also, Enclosure 8, Papers related to the 
Mutinies in East Indies, Supplement to the Papers presented July 1857, BLOC.  
102
 Letter from the Secretary to the Governor General to the French Consul in Calcutta, Judicial 
Proceedings, 25 May 1857, Government of Bengal. WBSA; also, Enclosure 8, Papers related to the 
Mutinies in East Indies, Supplement to the Papers presented July 1857, BLOC. 
Page | 118  
 
help his cause either. Canning‘s hopes were soon belied when a sealed document, 
written in Persian, was discovered from a crowded part of the city that called upon 
‗the faithful among the inhabitants of the city to rise en masse, and kill the Feringhee 
Kaffirs.‘103 The terror of the European community became excessive upon this 
discovery, coupled with the report that the former king of Awadh had left his 
residence at Calcutta for some purpose unknown to the government, but imagined to 
be in connection with the proceedings in his late kingdom.
104
  
The situation in Calcutta deteriorated even further when a plot was discovered 
on 17
 
May 1857 that abruptly destroyed whatever delusion the government had about 
the possibility of an existing danger around the city. It was found out that in the 
evening of the same day, i.e., 17 May 1857, sepoys belonging to the 25
th
 regiment of 
the Bengal Native Infantry, who were encamped along with another wing of the 47
th
 
Native Infantry on the Esplanade area between the Coolie bazar and the Fort 
William, were planning to hold communication with the soldiers on guard duty.
105
 
These soldiers belonged to the 2
nd
 and the 70
th 
Regiment of the Native Infantry. The 
plan was to obtain a portion of the ammunitions from the guard soldiers and to make 
a surprise attack upon the Fort William at night, slaughtering the European 
population within the fort.
106
 Once the Fort was captured, the guns were to be turned 
upon the European ships on the bank of the Ganges. The next step was to plunder the 
remaining European inhabitants of the city, and march towards Delhi in order to join 
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the other rebel forces.
107
 The point to be noted in this context is that the rebels had 
not only charted out a plan of the whole attack, but also were conscious of the 
importance of preventing the intelligence being conveyed out of the city. Also to be 
noted from the plan is the fact that the mutinous sepoys did not contemplate the 
possibility of broadening their mass base in and around the city of Calcutta; they 
were rather interested in joining their brethren in northern India. Fortunately for the 
colonial government the sepoy-guards at the Fort William did not conform to the 
plan and reported the whole scheme of things to the Fort Major.
108
 As a consequence, 
without wasting any further time, orders were issued to place the Fort in a state of 
security: 
The drawbridges were raised and the ladders withdrawn from the 
ditches; the guns on the bastions were posted; additional guards were 
placed over the arsenal; European sentinels were stationed at the 
officer‘s quarters and on the ramparts; while patrols, within and 
without the fort, were kept on duty throughout the night.
 109
 
In addition, a requisition was also forwarded to Dumdum the following day for the 
53
rd
 European Regiment to be marched to the Fort William without a moment of 
delay.
110
 Thus with the timely interception and immediate precautionary measures, 
the colonial government, coupled with the loyalty of the sepoy guards belonging to 
the 2
nd
 and 70
th
 Regiment of the Native Infantry, was able to avoid a serious 
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massacre in the seat of the colonial administration, though not without a lingering 
suspicion.  
These kind of rumours and reports of an impending attack by the rebellious 
sepoys upon Calcutta created a climate of opinion in favour of more coercive 
measures. The North British Review later reported: ‗Every fresh symptom of danger, 
as it arose, called forth a clamorous outcry for the adoption of some specific 
measure. All sorts of strange and incredible reports were floating about in the social 
atmosphere.‘111 Some even suggested a general disarming of the Indian sepoys as a 
precautionary measure. Lord Canning, it is true, resisted some of these extremely 
alarmist suggestions. It was in this spirit that he firmly refused to agree to accept a 
petition suggesting that martial law should be proclaimed throughout Bengal; and, to 
the satisfaction of the Queen Victoria and the Prince, he passed a resolution to ensure 
that captured sepoys should not be punished without regard to the gravity of their 
offences.
112
 The other probable reason for his initial refusal to introduce harsh 
retaliatory measures was because ‗there was a reasonable apprehension that strong 
measures would drive into active hostility men who were merely dallying on the 
banks, and not yet prepared to plunge into the stream.‘113 Although there might be a 
grain of truth that Canning showed remarkable leniency towards his native subjects 
during the rebellion of 1857, but contrary to general perception, he was not always 
the epitome of clemency. Earlier in May 1857 Sir Henry Lawrence who had already 
been granted the military rank of Brigadier General was vested with the 
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extraordinary power. Canning wrote, ‗You have full military powers. The Governor 
General will support you in everything that you think necessary.‘114 In fact, on 30 
May and 6 June 1857 Canning promulgated two more coercive acts which made a 
mockery of the Rule of Law.115 On the 6 June 1857, Governor General Lord Canning 
passed an Act giving extraordinary powers to civil and military officers to carry out 
summary trials and punishment of all who were under suspect without the reference 
of the Headquarters.
116
 Furthermore, after some initial hesitation, he also acceded to 
the demands of the European officers for the enrolment of the volunteers. On 13 June 
two other decisions were taken. In order to stifle dissentient voices in the press, 
Canning introduced into the Legislative Council a Bill for controlling the Press in 
Calcutta.
117
 While introducing the Bill Canning said: 
Whilst I am glad to give credit to the conductors of the European 
Press for the loyalty and intelligence which mark their labours, I am 
bound by sincerity to say that I have seen passages in some of the 
papers under their management which, though perfectly innocuous as 
far as European readers are concerned, may, in times like the present, 
be turned to the most mischievous purposes in the hands of the 
persons capable of dressing them up for the native ear…118 
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A more detailed argument in favour of the promulgation of the Press Act was also 
put forward by Lady Canning in her journal. She wrote with deep contempt that the 
English press had been publishing ‗all sorts of imaginary reasons and grievances‘ as 
the cause for the rebellion, thereby spreading panic and alarm amongst the colonial 
administration as well as the civil population of the city.
119
 She was particularly 
critical of The Friend of India, a weekly newspaper that ‗thinks itself as great here as 
The Times in London‘, which had published a long detailed account of the position of 
the whole of the English troops and the tracts of unprotected country ‗and told 
exactly how vulnerable we were and must be until such and such reinforcements 
could arrive.‘ 120  
One of the most significant aspects of this particular act was that no distinction 
was made between the European and the Indian Press. As British historian Michael 
Maclagan had pointed out, there was no doubt that this measure, by the hostility it 
aroused, did more harm to the reputation of Canning than any other of his acts.121 The 
Indian press, no matter of what language or opinion had hitherto always been to the 
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highest degree critical and independent.
122
 This was the reason why this act was 
derisively described as the ‗Gagging Act‘ by the English press.123 The bulk of 
Canning‘s ire was reserved for the Anglo-Indian press, particularly in Calcutta, and 
the wider European community that aided and abetted the papers. The relationship 
between the European press in India and the East India Company, as Chandrika Kaul 
informs us, was often rather tumultuous and marked by attempts on the part of 
officials to curb press intrusion and comment.
124
 Quite understandably therefore the 
passing of the Act XV of 1857 provoked heavy criticism from various quarters, 
especially from the English newspapers. The Bengal Hurkaru in its editorial column 
of 15 June 1857 was visibly furious with the enactment of the Press Act and 
announced that they ‗cannot for one moment admit the necessity for such an extreme 
step even at the present time.‘125 Hurkaru saw it as a direct insult to their honour and 
integrity since according to them in the performance of their duties as journalists they 
had done their best to support the cause of the colonial government. Although they 
have been ‗compelled occasionally to comment severely‘ on what they considered to 
be the instances of official ignorance, but those were certainly not unjust in any 
ways.
126
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A similar article in consequence of the censorship of press was also published 
by the Dacca News on the 20 June 1857. The Dacca News came down heavily upon 
the government in view of the fact that they had been forced to ‗choose between an 
unpleasant censorship or a dishonest silence.‘127 Likewise, The Friend of India were 
deeply anguished by the fact that ‗there is not a man in Calcutta, or elsewhere, who 
will put upon the excepted paragraphs the construction which Lord Canning has 
chosen to fix on them, or who will adopt any other conclusion than the palpable 
one.‘128 As a consequence of these types of articles that were being published at a 
regular basis, the license of the Bengal Hurkaru was withdrawn on 18 September, to 
be restored again on the 23
 
September after the resignation of the offending editor 
had been secured by the proprietor. Many newspapers, including the Dacca News, 
The Friend of India, Durbeen and Samachar Sudhabarshan were also warned 
subsequently.
129
  
On the same day when the Press Act was passed, Corps of Volunteer Guards of 
Calcutta was also formed that comprised mainly of Europeans and East Indians. The 
corps consisted of a battery of four guns, four troops of cavalry and five companies 
of infantry.
130
 In terms of organisation it was decided that the Commandant and two 
Adjutants (Military Officers) were to be appointed by the government. The officers 
of the troops and companies were to be selected by the volunteers, but needed to be 
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confirmed by the government.
131
 The cavalry was to be divided into squads of five, 
while the infantry into a squad of ten, each under a non-commissioned officer.
132
 
Although it was part of civil defence, its leitmotif was to arm sections of the white 
population of Calcutta in order to guard against the rebellious sepoys and distrustful 
police. Spurred by all these, the European population of Calcutta made frantic efforts 
to arm themselves. The Commissioner of Police admitted there was hardly a house 
inhabited by Christians in Calcutta, which did not contain one or more muskets or 
pistols.133  
Thus, there were adequate incendiary materials in the vicinity of Calcutta for 
the rumours to feed on. There were persistent demands from the European residents 
of Calcutta for the posting of European guards in the White Town. But in view of the 
dispatch of troops to Benares and Allahabad, Canning could not overstretch his 
slender resources. Nevertheless, so potent was the alarm that some reinforcements of 
European troops for the city and Barrackpore had to be arranged to reassure the 
Europeans living in Calcutta. However that it did not have much effect on the 
Europeans is clear from the letters of Rev. Alexander Duff. He wrote,  
The four native regiments at Barrackpore, Fort William, and the 
Esplanade in front of it, with another newly arrived from Burmah, 
known to be ―mutinous to the very core‖... it was to be the signal for a 
general rise and massacre, which would have opened like wildfire into 
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the very heart of Calcutta, where there were thousands eagerly ready 
for insurrection, and plunder, and bloodshed.134 
 
The atmosphere of fear and panic that prevailed in and around the city is perhaps best 
illustrated in the series of letters that were written by Rev. Alexander Duff. As a 
Christian missionary he had already spent nearly three decades in India. Apart from 
evangelical activities, he took an active interest in the spread of western education. 
Between 16 May 1857 and 22 March 1858 he wrote twenty-five fairly long letters to 
Dr. Tweedie, Convener of the Free Church of Scotland‘s Foreign Mission 
Committee, and published in the Edinburgh newspaper, The Witness.
135
 These letters 
were significant for two reasons: firstly, Duff was not an official spokesman of the 
British East India Company, and is thus more reliable in his description and analysis 
of the situation than many other British officials. In fact, Alexander Duff himself 
raised the question of the reliability of the official description time and again. He 
wrote, ‗Their object very naturally is, to have it proclaimed that all is quiet – all 
right; that all are contented, all satisfied, all happy; since such a state of things would 
redound to their own credit, flatter their self-complacency and earn for them at once 
promotion and renown.‘136 Secondly, at this time he was staying in Calcutta and was 
the eye-witness of the whole proceedings.
137
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A panic measure undertaken by General Hearsey in Barrackpore on the 13 June 
1857 made matters still worse for the colonial government. Hearsey informed 
Governor General Canning that the sepoys at Barrackpore had ‗conspired‘ to rise in 
revolt on the night of the 13 June 1857, and that he had requisitioned for the 78
th
 
Highlanders from Chinsura to help the government disarm the suspected regiments.
 
138
 It is important to note that although Canning gave his consent, he was 
apprehensive about its possible impact on the morale of the remaining regiments of 
the Bengal Native Infantry, whose loyalty was still beyond reproach. On the morning 
of the 14 June 1857, a general disarming of the sepoys took place in Barrackpore and 
that too in the presence of the Highlanders who managed to reach there from 
Chinsura.
139
 Similarly at around the same time the Indian guards, whom the colonial 
government thought had been affected by the spirit of rebellion, were also disarmed 
without much of an effort. The moral of the story was that an armed Indian sepoy 
could no longer be trusted. Neither the military nor the civilian authorities had ever 
been so nervous. Not at least since the discontent was first noticed in Dumdum 
earlier that year.  
It was in this context that Calcutta witnessed a scene reminiscent of, in the 
words of Lefebvre, ‗The Great Fear of 1789‘ in France.140 The colonial officials as 
well as the European population residing in Calcutta came to believe in the rumour 
that an uprising had ‗actually taken place‘ in Barrackpore the previous night and that 
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the rebels were marching towards Calcutta.
141
 If they succeeded in reaching the city, 
it was said, the deposed Nawab of Awadh‘s men would join them and no European 
house would be spared. Forgetting that Fort William was held tightly by the English 
troops, forgetting that Calcutta contained more Europeans than in any other city of 
India, forgetting even that they themselves had been enrolled as volunteers, the 
inhabitants of the city gave themselves up in an orgy of panic. Hindu Intelligencer 
noted in its editorial on 18 June 1857 that ‗from an early hour in the morning a great 
shudder ran through the capital, and soon the confused activity of panic flight was 
apparent.‘142  
From the morning of 14 June the European quarters of the city were firmly in 
the grip of a panic. On this ‗Panic Sunday‘, the Europeans were found scurrying for 
cover either in the safety of the fort or in any ship or steamer anchored in the 
midstream of the river. Others unearthed rusty weapons of whose use they were 
almost ignorant, and barricaded their doors, while the more valorous ones went to the 
streets of Calcutta in search of an enemy whom not even their imagination could 
produce. There was a prevailing feeling amongst the residents of the city that 
enemies were on their track, and that a general massacre was soon to follow if they 
failed to get themselves into the Fort William.
143
  
This wild behaviour was not only confined to the European civil population of 
the city, for a number of officers, both civil and military establishments, played a part 
in it. The government officials had a hard time persuading them to believe that the 
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rumour had no substance. It was the duty of Colonel Cavanagh, the Town Major, to 
convince the frightened populace that no harm would come their way and that the 
city was safe.
144
 But he found the task difficult. In his own admission, ‗on my return 
home, I found my house besieged by all sorts of people wishing to obtain shelter in 
the Fort, and all full of rumours of the worst description from Dumdum and 
Barrackpore. I endeavoured to reassure them to the best of my power; but I am sure 
that many left under the impression that I was misleading them.‘145 For several hours 
throughout the day, the whole streets of houses in the richest quarters of Calcutta and 
its vicinity, the Chowringhee, stood empty and deserted. Dr. Mouat, an eye-witness 
to the account, compared the scamper across the city to ‗what might have been if a 
modern Herculaneum had been evacuated in broad daylight on the approach of a 
visible eruption from a neighbouring volcano.‘146 This kind of confusion caused by 
panic continued throughout the day, but as nothing had happened, it gradually came 
to subside and the Europeans returned home, though not without lingering 
apprehension.  
Close on the heels of ‗Panic Sunday‘ was another panic on 23 June 1857, the 
centenary day of the Battle of Plassey. Kim Wagner has pointed out there was a 
general prophecy among both the Hindus and the Muslims in Bengal that the reign of 
the East India Company in India, established after the battle of Plassey in 1757, was 
to last exactly one hundred years.
147
 In other words, that at the end of one hundred 
years from its commencement on 23 June 1757, it was destined suddenly to 
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terminate in a terrible overthrow.
148
 Sitaram Pandey, a sepoy serving in the 12
th
 
Punjab Infantry, wrote in his autobiographical narrative: ‗Our learned men had told 
us that the Company's rule would come to an end in 1857, since this was one 
hundred years after the Company's first great battle‘.149 During the rebellion it was a 
strongly held belief that the expulsion of the British was final, and as Mukherjee 
pointed out, it was conceivable that for many sepoys who took to arms in 1857 the 
fight represented the pursuit of the centennium.
150
 John Everett, a Risaladar of the 
14
th
 regiment of the Irregular Cavalry, later recalled a Muslim officer of the same 
regiment in the Company‘s service by the name of Mirza Taki Beg, recorded to have 
said that ‗it was written in his books that a change would take place and that the 
British rule would soon be overthrown‘.151 Everett‘s statement was further 
corroborated by Ahsan Ullah Khan, physician to Bahadur Shah Zafar, during the 
latter‘s trial. Khan admitted that a person by the name of Muhammad Hasan Askari, 
a priest by descent who used to visit the King (Bahadur Shah) frequently, 
prophesised that ‗the King of Persia with his army would annihilate the British power 
in the East, would restore the King (Bahadur Shah) to his ancient throne and reinstate 
him his kingdom, and at the same time the infidels, meaning the British, would be all 
slaughtered‘.152 Furthermore, in the proclamation of Bahadur Shah, dated 25 August 
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1857, noted that ‗the ancient works, both of the Hindoos and the Mahommedans, the 
writings of the miracle workers, and the calculations of the astrologers, pundits and 
rammals, all agree in asserting that the English will no longer have any footing in 
India or elsewhere‘.153 Although the exact origin of such a prophecy could not be 
traced, to the contemporary official, the prophecy probably appeared to predict the 
intervention of the Amir of Afghanistan. The links between Calcutta, Delhi, 
Peshawar and Kabul were very strong and the memories of Nadir Shah and Ahmad 
Shah Abdali still fresh. Some of the rebels and leaders hoped that the Amir of 
Afghanistan would intervene to save their cause.
154
 
The prevailing situation in Calcutta became all the more tense, particularly 
after the arrest of the deposed Nawab Wajid Ali Khan and his compatriots, namely 
Talukdar Man Singh, Mulayam Singh among others. Alexander Duff, who was at the 
point of time residing in Calcutta, in one of his private letters described in detail the 
considerable alarm that existed among the European population of Calcutta during 
this time. In the letter Duff mentioned about an ‗elaborate plan‘ that was being 
hatched by the men of the deposed Nawab of Awadh in the city about a general 
uprising that was to take place on 23 June, the centenary day of the battle of 
Plassey.
155
 Duff however did not specify the details of the plan apart from the fact 
that a map of Calcutta was discovered, sketched out as to divide the whole of town 
into sections and a general rise was planned to take place on 23 June. On that day 
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‗the city was to be taken, and the ―Feringhi Kaffirs‖, or British and other Christian 
inhabitants, to be all massacred…parties who swore on the Koran, and proved that 
they had taken an active share in the butchery and pillage of the Europeans, were to 
have certain sections of the town allotted to them for their own special benefit.‘156  
As mentioned before, the deposed Nawab of Awadh along with his close 
associates were arrested on 15 June and were lodged in as a prisoner of state in Fort 
William, followed by the arrest of several others associated with him in Bengal.
157
 
Perhaps not yet aware of the fact that the Nawab was being already arrested, Duff 
expressed his anxiety regarding the possible connection between the Nawab of 
Awadh‘s men with the rebels of Gangetic heartland. In his letter dated 16 June 1857 
the needle of his suspicion was against Wajid Ali Khan and his associates:  
Not far from Allepore is Garden Reach, where the ex-King of Oude 
has been residing, with about a thousand armed retainers, the 
Mussulman population, generally armed also, breathing fanatical 
vengeance on the ―infidels‖ and praying in their mosques for the 
success of the Delhi rebels. Calcutta, being guarded by native Police 
only, in whom not a particle of confidence can any longer be reposed, 
seemed to be exposed on all sides to imminent perils as most of the 
European soldiers had been sent to the North-West.
158
 
 
In order to thwart the inevitable danger and possible extermination at the hands 
of the rebels, guns were placed in ‗some of the more dangerous neighbourhoods‘ in 
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addition to small companies of European troops.
159
 At night the streets were 
perambulated by bodies of armed horsemen. Places of rendezvous were fixed in case 
of a sudden outbreak in any of the quarter of the city. In addition, all the European 
residents of the city not possessing guns were temporarily provided with arms from 
the Fort William arsenal. At the same time, in a presentment made by the Grand 
Jury, it was recommended that the native population of Calcutta should be disarmed 
and the unrestricted sales of firearms be prohibited.
160
 The residents of the ‗white 
town‘ within the centre of the city were relatively few in number and were at times 
completely isolated from the European counterparts elsewhere, thereby making them 
exposed to any outburst on the part of a ‗fanatical and infuriated native multitude‘.161 
Lingering apprehensions of violence and bloodshed forced many of the residents to 
leave the town for their friends elsewhere in the city. It was thus not without reason 
that he wrote in utter dismay the following lines, which adequately summarises the 
popular perceptions of the Europeans residing in Calcutta. Duff wrote: 
Delhi was the capital of Mohammedanism, Benares of Hinduism, but 
Calcutta is pre-eminently the capital of the British... From all this, it is 
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easy to infer, if the actual fall of Delhi, and the all but actual fall of 
Benares, gave such a shock to the supremacy of the British power, 
how much more tremendous a shock the actual, or all but actual, fall 
of Calcutta would give it to it!
162
  
 
It is evident from the statements, such as the one mentioned above, that to Duff and 
the European inhabitants of the city, the fall of Calcutta at the hands of the rebels of 
1857 would have meant the actual fall of the British Empire in India. While the fear 
and apprehension of the European population was Duff‘s main concern, Hindoo 
Patriot in a similar effort described the situation of the native inhabitants of Calcutta:  
For the native portion of our fellow-townsmen we but crave that the 
system of terrorism under which they have been kept for the last two 
weeks may be mitigated to an endurable form. For two weeks, the 
town has been in a state of siege. Not a soul allowed to enter it from 
the suburbs a little after evening till daylight, not one to traverse the 
streets without giving a full account of himself and his purposes. The 
Mahomedans have been frightened with stories of soldiers being let 
loose against them, and they are sending away their families to where 
they conceive safety is to be found.
163
  
The situation of the colonial authorities in Calcutta continued to remain the same, if 
not worse, by the arrival of fresh news of disasters from the Gangetic heartland of 
India. In a telegraphic despatch dated 2
 
July 1857, the government in Calcutta 
received the news of the mutiny of the native regiments in Kanpur, and that, joined 
by Nana Sahib and his followers, the rebels with several guns and a considerable 
quantity of ammunition in possession were besieging Wheeler in his entrenchment 
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and shortly thereafter, with the surrender of Wheeler, Nana Sahib was proclaimed 
the Peshwa.
164
 It was further reported that Sir Henry Lawrence was about to be 
besieged in the residency at Lucknow; while the troops of the Gwalior regiment had 
mutinied on the 13 June 1857 having attempted a general massacre.
165
 On 4 July the 
authorities in Calcutta heard from Lawrence the massacre at Kanpur and soon after 
of the defeat of his own force at Chinhat. Four days later, Lawrence was himself 
dead, and the Residency of Lucknow was in a state of siege.
166
 The situation was 
indeed alarming for the government in Calcutta since ‗if Cawnpore were indeed 
gone, the weak middle piece was broken in twain‘, and under the situation it would 
be almost impossible to defend themselves in Calcutta with a handful of English 
infantry regiments and scanty artillery power.
167
 The apprehension, as expressed 
above in the editorial report of Hindoo Patriot, was not unfounded. The 
administration in Calcutta was haunted by the thin presence of the European soldiers 
in the city at this time of crisis and was identified as a major sourse of weakness. 
A.R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in a correspondence dated 22 
August 1857 to Cecil Beadon, Secretary to the Government of India, confided that 
he conceived ‗the present moment to be a war of extermination and that the presence 
of small bodies of English, is an actual source of weakness, as every defeat of these 
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small bodies is counted as a serious setback to the Empire‘s power and prestige‘.168 
Considering that the Bengal presidency contained less than twenty thousand 
European soldiers, with above ten times that number of Indian troops, and ruling 
over a race that numbered nearly one hundred millions, a proposal was adopted to 
enhance the proportions of Europeans in the Bengal army to the level of one 
European for eleven Indians.
169
  
From the above discussion we can thus surmise that the panic that had gripped 
the colonial officials as well as the European inhabitants in Calcutta during this 
period was not without a reason. It was the cumulative effect of the actual events that 
were unfolding in the northern India, followed by the unverified reports and rumours 
coming from various sources to Calcutta that created an atmosphere of terror and 
panic amongst the residents. The colonial government had to take some serious 
precautionary steps in order to curb the fear of being massacred by the rebellious 
sepoys. But, as this section showed, even those preventive measures could not allay 
themselves of the enduring panic that rattled them throughout this period of crisis. 
And, as the following section will show, the sequence of events occurring in the 
neighbouring districts of Calcutta did not help their cause either. 
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2.5 THE NEIGHBOURING DISTRICTS OF CALCUTTA 
While the colonial administration as well as the European population of Calcutta was 
trying to grapple with an atmosphere of panic and fear, the echoes of similar nature 
were felt in other parts of the lower province of Bengal as well. The Nadia division, 
lying adjacent to the north of Calcutta, was not exempted from its own peculiar share 
of anxiety either. The division was affected both directly and indirectly by the 
general disturbing causes — directly by the presence in the neighbourhood of 
Calcutta and of Murshidabad of the mutinous sepoys; and indirectly by the constant 
arrival of large bodies of European troops in Calcutta. It should be noted that it was 
in this Division that the first symptoms were displayed of the coming mutiny which 
was soon to destroy the hitherto trusted army of Bengal. In the district of Berhampur, 
a panic occurred on 23 June 1857, in consequence of the two Regiments at that 
station that had mutinied. Detachments of Her Majesty‘s 34th and 35th Regiments 
were sent to Berhampur, whose progress were greatly assisted by His Highness the 
Nawab Nazim.
170
 At the Presidency, ‗seditious placards‘ containing the rebellious 
messages were posted up and panic prevailed among the European officials and 
residents about the large number of arms that were being purchased and concealed in 
the city by the indigenous residents.
171
 The government apprehended that the rebel 
sepoys might get hold of these arms from the indigenous local shopkeepers and 
residents.
172
 As a result, various legislative acts suited to the existing emergencies 
were passed and different public bodies and private individuals submitted addresses 
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of loyalty and good will to the government. In addition to these, a corps of volunteer 
guards was formed comprising of British and other Europeans in order to check the 
sales and purchase of unauthorised arms and ammunitions.
173
  
The Special Narrative records that a sepoy of the late 37
th
 Native Infantry was 
detected by a trooper of the 11
th
 Irregular Cavalry.
174
 This deserter from the regiment 
that had mutinied was tried and sentenced to transportation for life. The 63
rd
 Native 
Infantry division and a greater part of the 11
th
 Irregular Cavalry were also disarmed 
with the aid of Her Majesty‘s 90th Foot.175 The Cavalry exhibited a strong spirit of 
insubordination and were deprived, in addition, of their horses.
176
 There were also 
reports that the sepoys who had been disarmed, were making enquiries as to the arms 
procurable in the city as in the event of their being obtained, a portion of them had 
determined to desert, for which they required arms. On the recommendation of the 
Commissioner of Police, two light field pieces, with ammunition, were placed in the 
police compounds.
177
 In addition, a force of sixty Europeans was added to the Police 
for the protection of the City. As an additional measure of precaution, the city itself 
was disarmed with the aid of the 90
th
 Regiment.
178
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Likewise in the nearby district of Barasat, an uneasy feeling amongst the 
Muslim population existed on account of rumours that some violent measures were 
to be adopted by the colonial officials towards them during their upcoming festival of 
Muharram. The government too were apprehensive towards the Muslim population 
of this region on account of the various unverified reports about their impending plan 
to ‗massacre the European inhabitants‘ during the festival. They were supposedly 
instigated by the ‗mischievous‘ Faraizis inhabiting the district.179 The Joint 
Magistrate of Barasat also reported to have apprehended certain persons who were 
allegedly the followers of the deposed Nawab of Awadh.
180
 Subsequently, some of 
them were arrested and were sent to the Alipur Jail. As a precautionary measure, the 
sepoys stationed at the district were detained by the Magistrate and were sent to 
Barrackpore for court martial.
181
 In addition the police and the jail guards were also 
increased in the district. Furthermore in a meeting organised by the ‗Committee for 
the Preservation of Peace in the district of Barasat‘ in the premise of the government 
school it was resolved that,  
…till the total annihilation of the barbarous mutineers, be heard, the 
service of fifty efficient paiks be secured at the expense of the 
committee for the protection of the town from the hand of the 
budmashes, and the Magistrate be humbly prayed to incorporate this 
body with the police corps.
182
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In the district of Purulia, the mutinous disposition of the detachment of the Ramgarh 
Battalion apprehended the government officials so much so that they had to leave 
their stations.
183
 The mutinous sepoys took advantage of the situation and plundered 
the government treasury and committed other outrages. In fact, it is in this district 
that one of the most prominent instances of the wider connection between the 
mutinous sepoys and the civil population could be found. In the month of October 
1857, it was reported that the Rajah of Pachete, Nilmani Singh Deo, was suspected to 
be a privy to the rebel bands who had scoured the country and blocked the road to 
Ragunathpur, the sub-divisional town of Purulia.
184
 It should be noted here that 
Rajah Nilmani Singh possessed extensive zamindari estates in Pachete and probably 
had a long lineage of ancestors who served as the Rajah of Pachete. It was also 
alleged that the Nilmani Singh was trying to secretly rope in the tribal population of 
his estate, especially the Santhals, and inciting them to rebel against the colonial 
government.
185
 In his letter written to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Frederick 
James Halliday, the Rajah allegedly claimed that he was given the title of ‗Maharajah 
Bahadur‘ of Pachete which was later ordered by the government to desist and when 
he protested this, he was insulted in front of his own people by the Assistant 
Commissioner, Captain George Oakes.
186
 The district officials reported that the 
Rajah had not only refused assistance to the government to suppress the present 
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disorder, he was in fact trying to instigate the rebel sepoys and had a large amount of 
gunpowder and other ammunitions.  
As a consequence the colonial government thought it prudent to keep the Rajah 
under close surveillance and issued orders to arrest him. However, when the 
Company army reached Raghunathpur to arrest him, they had to face resistance from 
the local populace. The Rajah was supposedly staying in a camp near Raghunathpur. 
E.H. Lushington, the officiating Commissioner, and Colonel Forster with a wing of 
the Sheikhawati battalion was able to arrest the Rajah from his camp only when the 
latter realised that he had no other option but to give up.
187
 The following morning, 
the Principal Assistant Commissioner, Captain Davis, Colonel Forster and his 
detachment along with arrested Nilmani Singh proceeded to Pachete where the 
latter‘s house was searched and military stores and arms of various descriptions were 
found.
188
 The Rajah was subsequently arrested and was detained in Calcutta until 
March 1858. A case was made out by the government that the position of Nilmani 
Singh was similar to that of the Rani of Tikari of Bihar and so he was entitled to the 
same treatment.
189
 Nilmani Singh was tried under Act XIV of 1857 on the charge of 
rebellion against the state and was acquitted on 21 May 1858.
190
 However, he was 
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kept in custody as a state prisoner under Regulation III of 1818 as the Lieutenant 
Governor thought it imprudent to set him free at a time when the adjacent 
Singhbhum district was still in open rebellion.  
 
TABLE 4 
ARMS AND AMMUNITION FOUND WITHIN THE PREMISES OF NILMANI SINGH DEO 
OF PACHETE191 
 Several earthen pots, sieves, &c., and materials for making powder, with 
powder in several stages of preparation. 
 Gunpowder, in quantity about 7 maunds. 
 Sulpher, in quantity of about 2 maunds. 
 Saltpetre, in quantity about 3 maunds. 
 Grape, in quantity about 1 maunds. 
 A box of canister. 
 A few large balls, for cannon. 
 Several hundred bullets, of sizes. 
 4 cannons. 
 17 swords, small and large. 
 32 matchlocks, small and large. 
 pistols. 
 spears. 
 11 ammunition pouches, complete. 
 A bag of flints, for muskets. 
 15 matchlock-moulds. 
 English rifles. 
 
E.H. Lushington, Officiating Commissioner of Burdwan to the Secretary to the 
Government of Bengal, Camp Raghunathpur, 9 November 1857.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
extended not to Military Officers only but to Civil Officers and trustworthy persons not connected 
with the government who under Martial Law properly so called would have had no authority." 
191
 HCPP, Further Papers (No. 9) in continuation of No. 7, relative to the Insurrection in the East 
Indies, Enclosure 446-47 in No. 1, 1858, pp. 188-89. BLOC.  
Page | 143  
 
 
It is therefore quite obvious from the present section that not only the outbreak 
of events of different multitude in the north-central Gangetic heartland along with the 
inflow of various sorts of rumours and unverified reports that kept the colonial 
government in Calcutta alarmed of their own situation in the seat of their empire. 
Even in the adjoining districts of Calcutta, situations were not favourable for the 
administration. There were clear instances of outbreaks of rebellion of the sepoys of 
various cantonments, coupled with the discreet cooperation of the local population 
and the landlords in some districts, and their linkages with the rebels of northern 
India. Worse still, under the prevailing situation rumours and reports of various kinds 
that were already in circulation added fuel to the fire. As a result the government had 
to take recourse to strong precautionary measures in order to keep the situation under 
control. Yet the government could not allay themselves and the European inhabitants 
of the city from the fear of being exterminated by the rebels. This becomes apparent 
from the following section which examines the alarming rate of the sale of firearms 
and weapons of various kinds in the city in this period and the response of the 
colonial government in this regard. 
 
2.6 THE SALE OF FIREARMS IN AND AROUND CALCUTTA 
As a consequence of these developments in and around the city of Calcutta, the price 
of guns reached its height in and around the city of Calcutta during this period of 
crisis. The colonial officials as well as the European residents of Calcutta were 
gripped with fear, indiscipline and helplessness. Rumours and reports coming from 
across the different corners of the city terrified and threatened the day-to-day life of 
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the European inhabitants of the city. Many Englishmen and the indigenous Christians 
residing in the city were anxious to possess guns for their own defence. The 
‗Firangis‘ of Kasaitala, Chunogalli, and Chowringhee who had never ever imagined 
themselves with firearms of any kind, were now seen practicing shooting, in case of 
an emergency. The officiating Commissioner of Police of the time S. Wanchope, 
appealed to the Government of Bengal that no one should be allowed to possess arms 
without prior government sanctions.
192
 Those who were found in the streets of 
Calcutta without a proper authorisation to carry arms ought to be disarmed by the 
police and the volunteer guards, under the Military Act of XIII of 1856.
193
 In fact, the 
Commissioner of Police was even thinking in terms of issuing a notice to this effect, 
but hesitated as his apprehension was that such measures might bring the police in 
direct opposition with the armed Europeans in and around Calcutta.
194
 However, he 
strongly recommended calling in all the arms that had already been distributed from 
the arsenals.  
Accordingly, on 25 June 1857, S. Wanchope, the Officiating Commissioner of 
Police issued a notification whereby the police were instructed to ‗disarm all persons, 
Europeans and Native, found armed in the streets of Calcutta, with the exception of 
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those authorised by the government, or the Commissioner of Police, to wear arms.‘195 
The patrols of the Calcutta Volunteer Guards too received the similar instructions.
196
 
A.R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, under the instructions from F.J. 
Halliday, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, requested the officiating Commissioner 
of Police in Calcutta and the Magistrate of the 24 Parganas to make an enquiry 
regarding the possession of arms within their jurisdiction, and check whether there 
had been any noticeable sale of firearms to the population under ‗suspicious‘ 
circumstances. The Commissioner of Police reported the sale of several thousand 
muskets and brass guns of large calibre in Moorghyhatta, where most of the 
indigenous gun-makers of Calcutta resided.197 He also mentioned an individual 
named Hurrish Chunder Bose, who had in his premise more than six thousands old 
guns and pistol barrels, and a number of spears which he had apparently purchased 
from the government arsenals as old and scrap iron. Although most of these arms 
were damaged and of no use, the government, under the present circumstances, 
expressed concerns since many of these arms could be repaired and reused by the 
disbanded soldiers and their associates in case they get hold of them.
198
  
Reports were already pouring down from the north of India that the disbanded 
sepoys were on their way to Bengal and that many of them were already in and 
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around Calcutta, waiting for the right opportunity to strike. The government officials 
in Calcutta issued orders to destroy all of these arms under the supervision of the 
Inspectors and to take possession of the spears and other smaller arms.
199
 In fact, on 
25 July 1857, in a presentment made by the Grand Jury, the Supreme Court 
recommended that the Indian population of Calcutta and its suburbs should be 
disarmed and that the unrestricted sale of arms and ammunitions should be 
prohibited with immediate effect.200 The Commissioner of Police in Calcutta and the 
Magistrates of the suburbs were asked to keep a close watch on the sale of arms in 
the bazar and to prevent the dealers from selling these arms to any person whom the 
government suspected of having rebellious tendencies.201 But, in spite of the trying 
efforts on the part of the government to stop the sale of fire-arms, the trade continued 
at a brisk pace. In a detailed report presented to the Town Major, the Commanding 
Officer of the Calcutta Native Militia, Major C. Herbert, expressed his grave 
concerns regarding the continuing unrestricted and indiscriminate sale of fire-arms in 
the city and its vicinity.
202
 His investigation in the bazar of Murgihatta revealed the 
enormous amount of guns and pistols of various descriptions that were being sold 
and purchased by a large number of people. This was accompanied by some 
inconclusive reports that the whole of the Indian population was actually armed with 
firearms, and that, he believed, stores of such kind were hidden in different localities 
all around the city.203  
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Under the circumstances, in order to control the unrestricted sale of arms in the 
city, the Legislative Council of India thus promulgated the Act XXVIII of 1857 on 
11 September 1857.
204
 Under this act the Magistrates or other Officers, as specified 
by the Executive Government, were directed to send in writing the details of ‗the 
fire-arms, bayonet, sword, spear-head, or any other weapon which shall be on his 
premises in the possession of any of his retainers or servants.‘205 The Magistrates 
were empowered to seize any such unaccounted arms or ammunitions that were to be 
found around the city and detain in safe custody for such time as may be deemed 
necessary by the government. Furthermore, according to this act, any people who 
were to be found carrying arms, had to produce a certificate issued by the Magistrate 
or other officer authorised, failing which he would be disarmed by any Magistrate, 
Deputy-Magistrate or by an European Commissioned Officer in the service of the 
government.
206
 However, the above mentioned provisions were not applied to the 
officers, soldiers and sailors in the Military or Naval Service of the East India 
Company in respect of arms and ammunition kept by them for the use in the public 
service. Even the members of the Volunteer Corps were exempted from the 
restrictions to carry arms. This was significant as the formation of the Volunteer 
Corps was already subjected to immense criticism from the civil population of the 
city who had to bear the hostility and rudeness from the members of the Volunteer 
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Guards.
207
 In a way this act superseded the previous notification issued by the 
Officiating Commissioner of Police in Calcutta according to which the Volunteer 
Guards too were prohibited from carrying arms.  
Similar restrictions were also issued to all the shops in and around Calcutta that 
dealt with arms and ammunitions. The government declared that if any person 
manufactured, repaired, sold or kept arms or ammunitions without a license to do so, 
they would be liable to be convicted by the Magistrate.
208
 As a penalty he would be 
charged five hundred rupees in addition to pay to the government double the amount 
of the value of the arms or ammunition sold by him. Also, all the arms and 
ammunition belonging to the offender would be forfeited if the Magistrate so 
desired.
209
 Every shopkeeper or manufacturers were instructed by the government to 
enter in a book an account of all the stock-in-trade and the details of every purchaser 
of arms and ammunitions from him. Such books were to be open at all times to 
inspection by the Magistrate or other duly authorised officer, failing which the 
license of the guilty person would be revoked.
210
 The Magistrates were also 
authorised to inspect at any time the premises in which the arms and ammunitions 
were manufactured or kept by the licensed dealer.  
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However the point that the government missed out, thereby making their own 
and the European residents‘ situation further complicated in the Calcutta and its 
neighbouring areas, was that most of these fire arms that were being sold by the 
various local dealers in and around Calcutta were mostly to European concerns and 
the majority of the buyers were actually the Christian inhabitants of the city.
211
 In 
fact, if one were to make an investigation in all the Christian households of the city 
and its vicinity, every such household would have at least one pistol or musket in 
their possession considering the exigency of the situation. Quite expectedly therefore 
there were instant protests from amongst the European inhabitants of the city against 
some of the clauses of the ‗Arms Act‘. Although they appreciated the Act as a 
welcome relief for them in the sense that this would ‗enable the Government to take 
arms out of the hands of disaffected and dangerous persons‘, but at the same time 
they were equally apprehensive about the fact that the ‗proposed power [given] to the 
Magistrate, or Commissioner of Police may endanger the public peace.‘212 These 
Magistrates or Officials, according to the European inhabitants residing in and 
around the Calcutta, might be acting ‗under the influence of panic, prejudice, or 
error‘ thereby leaving all the Christian inhabitants within his district wholly 
defenceless.
213
 It was their strong conviction considering the recent proceedings in 
the city of Calcutta, that the threats were definitely potent and thus under the 
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circumstances ‗such powers cannot be safely entrusted to all the officials‘.214 
Extending such an Act to the Christian inhabitants of the city ‗will be to oppress and 
irritate the loyal, while it will be wholly ineffectual as regards the disaffected, who 
will neither register nor expose their arms till the moment for using them shall have 
arrived.‘215 One needs to keep in mind in this context that these firearms, many of 
which were imported from Europe, had to go through the Customs House before they 
were actually delivered to different buyers. Under the present circumstances, these 
dealers were now concerned that the government might actually confiscate their 
stock of firearms or seal their establishment. As a result, they tried their best to sell 
off their products as quickly as possible. It was this unusual circumstance under 
which the sale of arms went high during this period in Calcutta and made the 
European and indigenous population as well as the colonial government extremely 
concerned.  
 
2.7 TRANSGRESSING THE BOUNDARIES: PANIC AND FEAR IN THE STRAITS 
SETTLEMENTS 
Before concluding this chapter and moving on to the next, one might pause here 
briefly to note that the prevailing panic amongst the Europeans – both civil and 
administrative – had a much larger impact, which transcended the regional/national 
boundaries and reached far and beyond, making this epoch event almost a global in 
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character. In fact the global aspect of the rebellion of 1857, as Crispin Bates has 
pointed out, remains inadequately explored, despite several promising initiatives.
216
 
However the recent contributions by the historians working on this aspect has 
brought out some fascinating dimensions, which promises to yield rich dividend in 
terms of understanding the impact of this watershed event in a global scale.
217
 Based 
on these researches, a brief albeit an interesting comparison may be drawn of the fear 
and panic that had gripped the European population in Calcutta, and in the regions 
located in the distant colonies of the British Empire.  
As the rebellion was gradually unfolding, within a few weeks the British 
officials in India began to consider the fate of the disarmed and disbanded sepoys, 
particularly those who had shown no inclination to join the mutnieers. One of the 
suggestions proposed by Neville Warren (Agent of Sindh railways) and supported by 
Lord Elphinstone (Governor of Bombay) and others was that the disbanded sepoys 
should be transported to various other colonies of the British Empire and use them as 
potential labourers.
218
 Suggestions for sites where convict-rebels could be used 
favourably included British Guiana, the Cape, the Kooria Mooria islands, the north 
coast of Australia, Perim and the West Indies. While doing so what was not 
considered by the colonial officials was how the prospect of importing the mutnieers 
would be received by the residents of these colonies. To cite one example out of 
many, in the Straits Settlements, which had already received many Indian convicts, 
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residents raised strong apprehensions about importing any mutineers.
219
 Initial 
reports of tensions in the native militia in India were already published by The Straits 
Times in Singapore as early as March 1857, which noted the disturbances in 
Barrackpore on the issue of the manufacture of greased cartridges causing 
considerable consternation amongst the native sepoys regarding the forcible 
conversions.
220
   
Although the European inhabitants in the Straits Settlements initially did not 
pay much heed to these initials reports amongst the European inhabitants in the 
Straits Settlements, by the summer of 1857 reports began to pour in, describing the 
horrors of the European population in India. The global communication system, 
consisting primarily of steamship mail services and complemented by a nascent 
telegraphic network, enabled the regular circulation of news of the major events 
across the English-speaking world.
221
 The arrival of the steamships carrying the 
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transported convicts and other Indians, along with the newspapers and documents, 
informed of the spread of the rebellion in northern India and in the lower province of 
Bengal. The news of the rebellion and panic amongst the European population in 
Calcutta and elsewhere were published in The Straits Times: 
From Calcutta we have frightful news...several Native regiments have 
revolted and murdered all their officers. The City of Delhi has been 
captured and nearly every European killed, under most atrocious and 
revolting circumstances, and not sparing age or sex. Meerut also had 
fallen; even Calcutta itself was in great peril…222              
 
The fear and apprehension amongst the European population in the Straits 
Settlements worsened when the news of the massacre at Kanpur reached on 30 July 
1857 via Calcutta and was published by The Straits Times the very same day: 
‗Cawnpore is fallen! Sir Hugh Wheeler killed, and every European soul, the number 
exceeding six hundred women and children, inclusive of 200 of our bravest 
Soldiers‘.223 As a consequence the European inhabitants apprehended the possibility 
of a similar uprising among the existing 3000 strong Indian convict population in the 
Straits Settlement.
224
 To make the situation further complicated, the authorities in 
India, unaware of the panic amongst the Europeans in Singapore, called on the Straits 
Settlements to take in the most dangerous criminals from India, i.e. those sentenced 
to more than three years imprisonment, to alleviate the overcrowded conditions of 
Indian jails.
225
 In order to voice their opinion the European residents drew up a 
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memorandum expressing their deep anxiety and alarm at the arrival of more such 
convicts.
226
 As precautionary measures in case of emergency, the residents suggested 
that the Europeans should replace the Indian militia at the arsenals and guns on 
Pearls and Government Hills – these being the most strategic military locations at the 
Starits Settlements – and European guards be used to supplement the sepoy lines. 
The appeal also called for European seamen and sailors to be provided with arms and 
ammunition; that immediate efforts be taken to engage Malays as policemen 
‗substituting them for Natives of India‘; and finally to designate ‗a place of refuge 
for (European) women and children‘.227  
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, E.A. Blundell, attempted to reassure 
the European inhabitants that the apprehensions were groundless, and that every 
precautionary measures was taken to put down any disturbances with a strong hand. 
In order to alleviate the fear amongst the residents, the Governor sought to move as 
many Indian convicts as possible to the area outside town, calling on the municipal 
committee to use free labour instead of the services of ‗convict scavengers‘.228 But in 
spite of the efforts undertaken by the European population and the colonial 
administration in the Straits Settlements, fear and apprehension continued to prevail. 
This was exacerbated by the ‗the discovery that Khurruck Singh, a Sikh political 
prisoner (then on parole), was engaged in treasonable correspondence with the 
convicts‘, who, the local press noted, were ‗mostly natives of Bengal, akin to the 
wretches belonging to the Sepoy regiments, whose barbarities have shocked the 
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whole civilised world‘.229 European inhabitants were concerned that Khurruck would 
influence a revolt amongst the large body of convicts stationed at the fort that housed 
the main guns defending the settlement. The apprehension was further intensified 
when a drunken Indian sepoy entered the residence of a European officer, threatening 
to massacre all Europeans in the settlement.
230
 In order to thwart the impending 
rebellion, an urgent meeting of the European population, followed by a deputation of 
fifty Europeans, pleaded the colonial officials to replace the native Indian troops with 
European-only militia at the Fort Cornwallis, where Khurruck Singh was then 
prisoned. Although the alarm proved to be false at the end, the fear and anxiety 
amongst the European community continued to prevail for the next few months. A 
series of demonstrations and public meetings were held by the European community 
in the Straits Settlements protesting against this settlement being any longer used for 
penal purposes, except for its own convicts. The Singapore merchant community 
went a step further and sent a petition to the parliament, asking for their separation 
from India and future direct rule from London.
231
 Eventually, on 23 December 1857, 
the Governor-General of India decided to prohibit further transportation of 
mutineers, deserters and rebels to the Straits Settlements, informing that a new penal 
settlement in the Andamans was under consideration.
232
 The transfer of the Straits 
Settlements to the colonial office was completed in 1867. 
From the above discussion, one can safely surmise that the fear and panic 
which had gripped the European population in Calcutta did not remain confined to 
the region, but had its impact even in the regions that were otherwise far away from 
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the epicentre of the rebellion of 1857. The stark similarity is noticeable with which 
rumours (both verified and unverified) and the news of the events travelled and 
gripped the European population in the Straits Settlements with fear and 
apprehension, as much as it did to their fellow residents in Calcutta. Parallel may 
also be drawn the way the residents in the Straits Settlements responded to the crisis. 
Similar to the residents in Calcutta, who had lost the confidence in the official force 
to secure their lives, the European inhabitants in the Straits too decided to form 
armed volunteers and pleaded to replace the Indian militia with Europeans, showing 
a complete lack of faith and trust towards the native Indians.  
 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
Contrary to the established understanding of 1857, it becomes quite evident from the 
present discussion that there was considerable commotion in the capital city of the 
British Empire and its neighbouring regions during this period. The cumulative effect 
of the outbreak of events during the course of the rebellion in the Gangetic heartland, 
followed by the circulation of rumours of various kinds, had put the colonial 
administration in Calcutta, the European and the Christian inhabitants as well as the 
native population of the city in a highly restive and panic-stricken situation 
throughout the course of the year. This was further complicated by the occurrence of 
various incidents within the city, interconnected with the events unfolding in the 
Gangetic heartland of India, which did not help their cause either. As we have 
observed from the chapter, the circulation of rumours played a crucial part in shaping 
the course of the events of the rebellion right from its very inception. This also points 
out the fact that when placed in a specific context rumours could play as significant a 
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role as the outburst of actual events. This is evident from the response of the colonial 
administration before and after the open act of rebellion by Mangal Pandey. The 
government was hesitant regarding the authenticity of some of these reports and 
reluctant to take appropriate measures before the rebellion broke out. But 
interestingly, it was the same officials who were visibly concerned and often 
exaggerated these similar reports once the rebellion had commenced. This difference 
of perception regarding the authenticity of rumours on the part of the colonial 
government was shaped by the context in which these rumours were based. It was 
this context, coupled with the series of incidents and reports that caused serious 
consternation amongst the officials and European inhabitants of Calcutta. This was 
augmented by the occurrence of events of different multitude in the neighbouring 
districts of the city. As a consequence the colonial government had to take every 
precautionary measure they could perceive of in order to protect not only the city 
from falling in hands to the mutineers but more importantly to prevent the actual fall 
of their Empire. And yet they could not allay themselves from the fear and panic of 
the uprising of 1857. On the contrary these steps often created further complications 
for them as well as for the inhabitants of the city. Furthermore, drawing a parallel to 
the situation in the Straits Settlements, the chapter showed that the fear of being 
overrun by the mutineers was not confined to the capital of the British Empire or its 
neighbouring provinces, but pervaded far and beyond the regional/national 
boundaries.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM RUMOUR TO REALITY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN 
EASTERN BENGAL 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter analysed the impact of rumour and panic among the civil population 
and the colonial government in Calcutta and its vicinity. Calcutta, being the capital of 
the British Empire in 1857, was crucial to colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent. 
As a result, the government left no stone unturned in order to secure the city of 
Calcutta and its immediate neighbourhood from the cumulative effect of the rumours 
and panic following the events of 1857. And yet, in spite of the radical and extreme 
measures, colonial officials could not allay the fear that developed in their own midst 
nor in themselves or the native population – a fear that was persistent albeit in 
varying intensity, throughout the period under review. The open acts of rebellion in 
and around the city by the rebel sepoys were limited in scale and outcome because of 
the timely interception on the part of the colonial government. However, the various 
‗seditious plots‘ that were being planned and subsequently discovered by the officials 
in and around Calcutta, the continuous reports of acts of open rebellion in the 
northern and central India, and their possible connections with the rebel leaders and 
sepoys around Calcutta created insecurity and undermined the stability of the area.  
The present chapter moves towards the region east of Calcutta, what is known 
today as Bangladesh. This chapter shows the situation and the nature and character of 
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the uprising in the eastern part of the lower province of the Bengal Presidency, the 
principal actors and the dominant social groups that were involved, the extent of the 
connections that the rebels were able to establish with the other nearby regions, and 
the degree to which these events were connected with the events unfolding in the 
central Gangetic heartland. Unlike the situation in Calcutta and her neighbourhood 
this chapter will show that the resultant effect of rumours, panic and even 
‗conspiracies‘ led to actual acts of open rebellion of a more serious nature in this 
region. In this context the chapter also seeks to examine the response of the colonial 
state. The colonial government was at a complete loss with regards to the 
development of the situation and the movements and intentions of the mutineers in 
the region. In spite of all their precautionary measures and information and 
intelligence gathering, the government could not check the outburst of the rebellion 
and its fall-out effects in the nearby regions as well. 
 
3.2. POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION  
The first century of colonial rule in India witnessed a dramatic shift in Muslim 
political fortunes. While some Muslims profited by collaboration, colonial policies 
devastated many families, both the aristocratic and the salaried.
1
 Their predicament 
was especially grim in Bengal. Eastern Bengal had a predominant Muslim presence 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Battle of Plassey (1757) and 
Buxar (1764) had put an end to the rule of the Muslims in Bengal. This decline of the 
political authority of the Mughals led to a decline of the positions of the Muslims in 
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the region in general. The introduction of Permanent Settlement in 1793, application 
of Resumption Laws on rent-free grants, abolition of Persian as the language of the 
court and the administration, introduction of English as the medium of instruction 
and enforcement of new rules for recruitment to the government posts adversely 
affected the position of the Muslims and accelerated the process of their decline.
2
  
Eastern Bengal was already in a volatile state even in the years prior to the 
outbreak of the rebellion in 1857. This region had a sizeable Muslim population and 
the continuous presence of Wahabis and Faraizis in the region created considerable 
alarm among the colonial administration. There was of course a common belief 
among many officials that the whole Muslim community was implicated in the 
rebellion, a conviction that was furthered strengthened by the publication of William 
Hunter‘s damaging treatise The Indian Mussalman in 1871.3 From the British 
perspective, as Bayly pointed out, the most dangerous networks of sedition ‗were the 
ones maintained by Muslims of the purist Tarikh-i-Muhamadiyya (Wahabi) 
tendency‘.4 Although these movements were not widespread all across the lower 
province of the Bengal presidency, their influence over this region was considerable. 
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The chief aim of the Wahabi movement was to purge all non-Shariati elements from 
the practices of the Muslims in order to regain Islam‘s glorious past.5 According to 
the Wahabi doctrine as set out by Sayyid Ahmad, under the colonial rule India had 
turned into ‗Dar-ul-Harb‘, i.e., a land of war ruled by the non-believers of Islam.6 
The Muslims of the country, therefore, should once again pledge to follow strictly 
the instructions prescribed in the Holy Quran and the Hadith and wage a ‗Jihad‘ 
against the ‗Kafir‘ rulers, i.e., the British, and once again re-establish the ‗Dar-ul-
Islam‘, i.e., the rule of believers, in India.7 It might be interesting to note in this 
context, as Ayesha Jalal has pointed out in a recent study of the concept of ‗Jihad‘ in 
south Asia, that many moderate Muslims in the nineteenth-century insisted that a 
fatwa describing India as ‗Dar-ul-Harb‘ did not amount to a call for ‗Jihad‘ and that a 
‗Jihad‘ itself need not necessarily involve armed struggle.8 Those categorised as 
‗Wahabis‘ included the great Muslim reformer Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the poet 
Hakim Momin Khan Momin, although they did not participate directly in the Wahabi 
movement.
9
 In fact, after the ‗Wahabi trials‘ (1863-1873) the followers made a 
submission to the colonial government pleading that they be referred to as the ‗Ahl-i-
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Hadith‘ (followers of the Prophet‘s word).10 A spate of ‗fatwas‘ even questioned the 
validity of a ‗jihad‘ arguing that so long as Muslims were allowed to practice their 
religious rituals without hindrance as protected people (mustamin), India was ‗Dar-
ul-Aman‘ (abode of peace).11  
The Wahabi movement in Bengal was led by the peasant leader Mir Nasir Ali, 
popularly known was Titu Mir (1782-1831). Although not a village aristocrat, Titu 
Mir was ‗above the class of ordinary villagers‘.12 In his early life Titu Mir used to 
work under a local zamindar but was arrested in a case. Soon after his release he 
went on a pilgrimage to Mecca where he met Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli, the other 
prominent leader of the Wahabi movement in India, who made a lasting impression 
on Titu Mir.
13
 On returning to his district around 1821 Titu Mir was able to form a 
mass base with the help of poor Muslim peasants of the area. His call for a refusal to 
pay unjust taxes to the government and local zamindars were readily responded to by 
many. Quite understandably the landed elites, which included Hindus as well as the 
Muslims alike, and even the Mollahs, reacted sharply against the Wahabi preaching 
from the very beginning and tried to persuade the colonial government to take 
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appropriate actions.
14
 Titu Mir was also beginning to realise the fact that the time 
was opportune to change the character of the movement, from socio-religious to 
politico-economic, and put up a strong and united resistance against the oppressions 
of the landed elites and the European planters. On October 1830, Titu Mir declared 
that the period of British rule had expired and all the zamindars and talukdars of the 
locality should henceforth remit revenues to him and not to the British treasury. In 
addition, the ryats were asked not to pay rents to the zamindars who were opposing 
the movement.
15
 Also, as Sugata Bose has mentioned, in a bold act of inversion, Titu 
Mir declared himself the representative of the Muslim sovereignty of India and 
appointed his nephew as the commander of his forces.
16
 At the initial stages the 
colonial government did not take the matter seriously. But the subsequent attacks on 
the factories of the European Indigo planters by the Wahabi activists during the year 
1830-31 made them realise that the Wahabis were trying to ‗paralyse the civil 
power‘.17 In fact, by the beginning of November 1830, the situation deteriorated 
beyond the control of the local authorities: ‗from 8th to 15th of the month they (the 
rebels) remained gradually increasing in numbers and confidence, acting in short in 
open contempt of all authority‘.18 Titu Mir and his band of followers successfully 
repulsed a number of armed offensives launched by the local colonial authorities, 
along with the zamindars and indigo planters for about a year. But by November 
1831, the authorities realised that the massive support-base of Titu Mir made it 
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virtually impossible for them to succeed.
19
 Alarmed by the rapid success of the 
activities of the Wahabis under the leadership of Titu Mir, the authorities sought the 
immediate help from the then Governor-General Lord William Bentinck: 
 
After what I have myself witnessed of the spirit, resolution and 
fanaticism of this most extraordinary body of men, whose numbers 
could not have been less than 1500, in league with all the surrounding 
villages, I have no hesitation making the most urgent representation to 
Government of the absolute necessity for prompt and efficient aid.
20
 
 
The Governor General responded almost immediately to the call for help and sent a 
full-fledged military force under the command of Major Scott, Lieutenant 
Shakespeare and Captain Sutherland containing a cavalry and artillery with three 
hundred armed personnel and two cannons.
21
 In the bitter battle that ensued between 
the colonial government and Titu Mir‘s peasant forces, the latter fought valiantly but 
eventually lost and died in the battlefield.
22
 About 800 rebels were apprehended and 
sent for trial at Alipur Court.
23
  
With the death of Titu Mir in the early 1830s, the movement lost its 
momentum in the region. Nevertheless the significance of the movement was far-
reaching. It challenged the very framework of the colonial presence in the region, 
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albeit in a limited way, which depended to a large extent on the land revenue 
exaction from the peasants. Even though there was a deliberate attempt on the part of 
the colonial government to categorise the movement in terms of ‗religious 
fanaticism‘, there were others who were more skeptical. Even an otherwise 
conservative journal like ‗John Bull‘ wrote in this context: ‗It is doubtful how far 
fanaticism has to do with this disturbance. It rather seems to have arisen from 
absolute want and starvation.‘24 Titu Mir‘s movement turned out to be a direct 
manifestation of a determined class struggle of the poor peasants against colonial 
rule in Bengal.
25
 The movement made use of religious ideology, as class struggles in 
the pre-industrialised society have often done. But though religious, it was not 
communalist.
26
 The message of the movement were soon taken up and carried 
forward by the two disciples of Saiyed Ahmad – Unayat Ali and Inayat Ali – and 
slightly later by Keramut Ali. They were mainly active around the districts of Bengal 
and Bihar and spread the message far wide across the region.  
When the rebellion broke out in 1857 in different parts of the Bengal 
Presidency, the authorities showed great concern with regards to the probable links 
between these sects and the mutinous sepoys. George N. Dodd, one of the earliest of 
the mutiny historians, remarked that ‗a mischievous set of Mohammedans, under one 
Keramut Ali, were detected in the endeavour to sow the seeds of disaffection.‘27 
Keramut Ali, a resident of Mullahata, Jaunpore, United Province, was one of the 
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more prominent leaders of the Wahabi movement during this time working chiefly in 
this part of the region. But as Jalal informs us, he had broken with the Tariqah-i-
Muhammadi to form his own movement, called ‗Taiyuni‘ (to identify) since he 
disagreed with the rejection of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence by Sayyid 
Ahmad‘s Wahabi followers.28 Keramut Ali believed that the ‗jihad‘ against the 
British was unjustified, and he concentrated on reforming Muslim society. Keramut 
Ali continued his preaching amongst the Muslims of Jessore, Khulna, Barisal, Pubna, 
Rajshahye, Dhaka and other nearby districts of the region during the period under 
review.
29
 At around the same time, the Faraizis too, under the leadership of Dudu 
Miyan (1819-1862), were very active in different parts of the eastern Bengal. The 
Faraizi movement was founded in the year 1804 by Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840), a 
pious Muslim reformer from the Faridpur district of east Bengal.
30
 The movement 
was initially started with a peaceful reformist agenda, trying to purify Islam that was 
said to have been impaired by growing superstitions and false beliefs amongst the 
Muslims of the region.
31
 According to Shariatullah‘s interpretation of Hanafi law, 
Friday congregational prayers were abolished designating India as a ‗Dar-ul-Harb‘.32 
Similar to the Wahabi movement, the Faraizis too practiced a right adherence to the 
truth, abstinence from all ceremonies approaching worship of idols or men and a 
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strict conformity with the Quran. Based on the belief that the earth was a common 
property, the payment of land revenue was regarded as contrary to the divine law.
33
 
Many Hindus as well as British landlords of the area, along with the colonial 
administration in general, were concerned and alarmed by the development of the 
movement. Haji Shariatullah was soon exiled to Nawabganj, accused of being behind 
the protests and disturbances in East Bengal. Later he died in Dhaka district in 1840. 
But the movement was carried forward by his son, Dudu Miyan, under whom it 
tended to be more broad-based through an amalgam of political, economic and socio-
religious programmes.
34
 He organised resistance to Hindu landlords and money 
lenders, boycotting the payment of taxes and interest charges. He also formed an 
armed force of cudgel bearers to attack the zamindars and their followers and then 
went one stage further by attempting to form a parallel Muslim government within 
East Bengal. District Commissioners called Khalifas were appointed to each village, 
their role being to raise funds, carry out propaganda, and settle disputes between 
villagers who were expressly forbidden from taking their cases to the British courts 
without permission. The Colonial administration made persistent attempts to 
prosecute Dudu Miyan for crimes ranging from theft to murder. But all such 
allegations foundered from a lack of witnesses prepared to give evidence. Revolving 
around Dudu Miyan, the Faraizis built up a very well knit organization. The 
influence of the sect spread over several districts of eastern Bengal. In fact, the 
government reported that the number of Faraizis acknowledging Dudu Miyan as their 
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leader was variously estimated from fifty to eighty thousand.
35
 A very large 
proportion of the Muslim population of Faridpur, Bakhargunj and Jessore belonged 
to this sect.
36
 However, it was Faridpur, the home district of Dudu Miyan, which 
became the center of the movement.  
 
3.3 THE JESSORE CONSPIRACY CASE 
The outbreak of the rebellion in 1857 furthered complicated the situation for the 
administration. The government was already concerned about the activities of the 
Wahabis and the Faraizis and apprehended probable links between the native sepoys 
and these sects because ‗only with Europeans here, there can be no danger, for they 
cannot fraternize with the Faraizis, but if the latter can give over native troops, all 
that has to be done is to murder a few European officers.‘37 Walter Scott Seton-Karr, 
who was appointed to officiate as Civil and Sessions Judge in the district of Jessore 
in the year 1857, wrote in this context:  
 
The then head of the Faraizis was Dudhu Miyan, and he had been for 
sometime an object of suspicion to the Police authorities. The Faraizis 
held some very questionable and wild doctrines about the non-
payment of rent to infidel zamindars. Some of them had been 
imprisoned for outrages on Hindu functionaries of a very violent 
character, and it was discovered some years afterwards, that this sect 
had correspondents amongst the Wahabis... in 1857 the Faraizis were 
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mainly looked on as a fanatical sect, of new and violent political 
opinions.
38
  
 
During the early months of 1857 the Collector of Jessore sent a few leaflets of 
the sepoys to the Collector of Dhaka which contained ‗seditious‘ and ‗instigating‘ 
materials and enquired about similar such leaflets in Dhaka. Although the Collector 
of Dhaka could not trace any such leaflets in circulation, it however indicated the fact 
that secret activities of the sepoys had been going on for some time.
39
 The reports 
submitted by the officials in Faridpur district however indicated the link established 
between the rebel sepoys and the Faraizis. The Joint Magistrate of Faridpur district in 
a report to the government stated that an anonymous petition had been presented 
stating that ‗the Ferazees in a body were rising and had written to the sepoys for 
support‘.40 The local authorities in Dhaka received another petition from a person 
named Gyabullah in the month of August 1857. Gyabullah affirmed that he had 
knowledge of a secret meeting between two Hindustanis and some of the Faraizi 
Khalifas, and suggested that unless these Khalifas were detained, they might, in 
league with the sepoys, create a disturbance in the districts of Dhaka and 
Bakharganj.
41
 Under the present circumstances the government considered it 
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necessary to detain Dudu Miyan as a political prisoner. Accordingly, he was arrested 
and was kept under detention at the Alipur Jail in Calcutta till the rebellion came to 
an end.
42
 The authorities considered it prudent to keep him under arrest since ‗as long 
as Doodo Meah is kept from all communication with them there is little to fear from 
Ferazees.‘43 However the intention of the Faraizis to rise in support of mutineers was 
again confirmed in another anonymous petition addressed to the Governor General of 
India. The petitioners sent a list of names of Dudu Miyan‘s followers, including that 
of his son-in-law, and warned the government that though Dudu Miyan was in jail his 
followers had become restive and might create troubles.
44
 Considering the alarming 
situation, the colonial authorities decided to keep a close vigilance over these sects 
and orders were also issued to the Thana Darogahs ‗to keep a strict watch at all the 
Ghats on the Jamuna River and to apprehend every person who cannot give a 
satisfactory account of himself.‘45  
However, in spite of the efforts on the part of the British government to 
stabilise the volatile situation, uneasiness continued to prevail in different parts of the 
province. In Jessore the sentiment of the people took different shape centering on the 
issue of conversion to Christianity.
46
 One of the contemporary newspapers of the 
time, The Dacca News, wrote in this context: ‗Now and then we hear such expression 
as these amongst groups of labourers in the street: we will be cut to pieces sooner 
than give up our Deen and become Christians; the way of the Company is to take our 
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religion bit by bit, Sati, Widow Marriage and so forth.‘47 Rumour had spread out 
taking multiplying form in Jessore and the adjoining regions and an obvious reaction 
to this rumour in public mind was manifested in mortification and ultimate 
displeasure towards the Company‘s rule. Curiously though, there were neither any 
regular in-service native sepoys stationed nor the movement of any disbanded sepoys 
at Jessore. But what had given rise to suspicion and agony amongst the colonial 
officials was the presence of thirty Najibs. The term ‗Najib‘ was applied to a body of 
irregular infantry under the native government.
48
 Under the British government the 
Najibs were retained chiefly as a kind of militia and most of them were hailed from 
the North-west Provinces. Most of these Najibs were either retired or disbanded 
‗sepoys‘ who had previously served in the Company in several wars, like against the 
Afghans and the Sikhs. For instance, Jamadar Ram Singh was employed after the 2
nd
 
Sikh War, in the jail at Amballa and then was made a Najib, and then promoted to be 
a Jamadar by Mr. Ward.
49
 All these Najibs were recruited for the establishment of the 
Commission for the Suppression of Dacoity and were placed under a Jamadar and 
they were all accommodated in a large compound opposite to what was then known 
as the Planter‘s Club.  
The Office of the Commissioner was established in Bengal in 1852 in order to 
check the increasing number of Dacoities that the administration could not handle 
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with the existing police system.
50
 The Court of Directors in its letter to the Governor 
General in Council dated 24 September 1856 clearly stated that the spectre of the 
poor performance of the Police in different parts of Bengal, combined with the many 
incidental notices of failure or abuse, deepened its conviction ‗that an immediate and 
thorough reform of the police in all the old Provinces of British India is loudly called 
for.‘51 Already, as Basudeb Chattopadhyay had mentioned, the success of the ‗Thagi‘ 
programme, launched by W.H. Sleeman caught the imagination of the 
administrators.
52
 Sleeman was appointed as the superintendent of a police 
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organisation known as the ‗Thuggee and the Dacoity Department‘ established in the 
year 1838.
53
 The basic strategy of Sleeman‘s outfit was the ‗approver system‘ 
whereby the convicted Thagis were offered suspension of sentences on condition that 
they disclosed the identities and the crimes committed by the gang. Sleeman claimed 
that the wider population were either too terrified to testify against the Thagis, or too 
ignorant of the menace that lurked in the margins of their societies. Proof of 
‗Thuggee‘, as Tom Lloyd noted, could only have come from the Thagis themselves.54 
The category of ‗approver‘, according to Kim Wagner, was derived from the old 
English law, and is defined as a criminal who, in return for his own pardon, testifies 
to the complicity of his accomplices in the crime in question. The role of the approver 
was thus to approve the identity and involvement of his fellow accomplices.
55
 An 
elaborate network of informers spread over an extensive catchment area enabled 
Sleeman to eventually eradicate much of the alleged menace. It is also interesting to 
note, as Wagner pointed out, that part of Sleeman‘s success in getting the approvers 
to denounce their former comrades derived from his strategy of playing different 
approver factions out against each other. The factions were constituted primarily of 
family and caste members and thus Muslim approvers would gladly denounce Hindu 
suspects and vice versa.
56
 There were of course, occasional sceptics who argued that 
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the repressive measures adopted by Sleeman curtailed the already limited legal 
protection for the accused thereby making a mockery of the Rule of Law. However, 
to these critics, Sleeman turned a Machiavellian face arguing that in a country like 
India it was pointless to quibble over the means. To him, in order to combat greater 
evils, radically unorthodox measures were necessary. Thus, in view of the efficacy of 
this method, the Dacoity Commission was now extended to other areas in the lower 
Province in Bengal and the Commissioner was empowered to summon all the 
necessary information from the concerned Magistrates. In the period under review, at 
the head of the Dacoity establishment was an experienced Bengali officer called 
Baboo Guru Charan Dass who, according to Seton-Karr, was ‗an official of some 
experience and decided sharpness.‘57 
In the second half of July 1857, according to the information supplied by Baboo 
Guru Charan Dass, it was alleged that the Jamadar, the head of the Najib guards, and 
his subordinates were found to be involved in highly treasonable conversations, 
regarding the activities of mutineers in different parts of India. They were alleged to 
be predicting the imminent downfall of the Company‘s rule, and also conspiring with 
some other Bengalis of the area about the great political change that was about to 
come in India.
58
 As noted in the previous chapter in detail, rumours of these kinds, 
which are not based on evidence, were common all through the nineteenth century. 
However what made these rumours a cause of anxiety and deep concern for the 
administration was the cumulative effect of the rumours that was being followed by 
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actual incidents taking place around the country at this point of time. Therefore, 
under the present circumstances, the authorities in Jessore expressed deep concern 
and as a panic measure, the Magistrate of Jessore, Edmund Weldon Melony, sent 
private messages to F.C. Fowle, J.P. Grant, J. Elliott and C.B. Skinner, asking them 
to assemble in a definite place immediately.
59
 It was considered wise to disarm and 
arrest the Najibs in the first instance. Soon the European civilians posted for the 
administration in the district, were transformed into ‗civilian soldiers, and being 
armed with pistols proceeded straightway to arrest the rebellious Jamadars and 
Najibs‘.60 The sentry on guard of the Jamadar resisted and came forward with his 
sword but was immediately disarmed. 
The administration succeeded in arresting five principal Najibs without much 
difficulty. The entire operation was accomplished with extreme quickness and with 
utmost secrecy. The next morning, when E.W. Molony intimated details of the whole 
incident to Seton-Karr, the then Civil and Sessions Judge of Jessore, he immediately 
wrote an official and demi-official letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, F.J. 
Halliday, asking him to confer Seton-Karr with the power to conduct a summary trial 
under the special Act. As stated in the earlier chapter, Regulation V of 1857 and 
Section One of Act XVII of 1857 introduced by Lord Canning, the Governor General 
of India had bestowed the European citizens with the power to try the suspects and 
the rebels in Court martial, although a formal permission from the Supreme Authority 
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was required before exercising the power.
61
 Under the present circumstances it was 
therefore not surprising that Seton-Karr was immediately empowered with this 
special power by the Governor General Canning.
62
 Seton-Karr however decided to 
keep this as a secret so that no one else could have any idea of his extended powers 
till the Sessions trial was concluded.  
Following the usual practice, E.W. Moley first committed two Najibs, who 
were initially suspected to be the ring-leaders behind the entire ‗seditious‘ plot, and 
the Civil and Sessions Judge having found enough evidence against them sentenced 
them to transportation for life. However the authorities soon realised that the actual 
ringleaders were not apprehended and thus the real truth still remained unclear. He 
therefore had to resort to Sleeman‘s approval system. Accordingly, E.W. Molony 
apprehended nearly all the remaining Najibs and remanded them with the hope that 
such drastic action could pressurise them to come up with the actual truth.
63
 
Ultimately, this brought the desired result and one of the convicted Najib came 
forward to give evidence and following this lead, a few others too volunteered to 
provide the information regarding the ‗seditious‘ plans of the Jamadar and the 
Najibs.
64
 Later in the year, Bechu Singh, the Najib who provided the valuable 
information to the government, was handsomely rewarded and was promoted to the 
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position of Jamadarship, while Govind Singh, another of the Najib, was promoted to 
the Duffadarship.
65
 According to the information provided by these Najibs and other 
witnesses, the Jamadar Ram Singh, in ation with the Najibs, had chalked out a clear 
plan to attack the treasury of the Collectorate who was known to have with him no 
less than ten thousand gold Mohurs.
66
 With the seized money they were then planning 
to set the bazar on fire, liberate the prisoners from the jail and then head off to 
Murshidabad and join the rebels or mutineers over there at the first convenient 
opportunity.
67
 It was discovered that the Jamadar Ram Singh, who was a native of 
Murshidabad and was a sowar in Ranjit Singh‘s bodyguard, was the prime mover in 
the whole affair. He had been in private correspondence with the mutinous sepoys 
both at Murshidabad and at Allahabad. Apparently, Ram Singh the Jamadar had 
received a letter from a sepoy of the 63
rd
 Native Infantry at Barrackpore informing 
him that they had sided against the government and invited him ‗to join them with as 
many followers as he could collect.‘68 The Jamadar also found 12 or 13 of his men 
willing to join him. He was also found speaking openly against the Company‘s rule in 
the manner that the native raj would soon be reinstated and as a consequence all the 
English speaking persons would be thrown out and the court language would only be 
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Persian thenceforth.
69
 The extent to which colonial officials were terrified by this 
whole issue and considered the whole incident to be of utmost significance is evident 
from the statement of the Civil and Sessions Judge himself. He wrote:  
 
Sitting as judge of life and death, without any appeal from my 
decision, I considered that words and intentions derived their 
significance from surrounding circumstances; and that what might be 
loose and idle talk, or evidence of the speaker‘s insanity, at a time of 
profound peace and security, assumed a very different aspect if 
spoken when rebellion and mutiny had occurred over a large part of 
the Empire.
70
 
 
Considering the exigency of the situation Seton-karr decided that an exemplary and 
harsh punishment, in tune with the example set by Sir Christopher Rawlinson – the 
Chief Justice of the Madras Supreme Court – regarding a similar incident, was the 
order of the day in order to give confidence to the loyal part of of the population, both 
and European and the natives.
71
 It is important to point out in this context that the 
convicted were tried in the court without any jury, but with two loaded pistols by the 
Judge‘s side as a precautionary measure. It was one of the many instances of the 
kangaroo trials that were now made possible by Lord Canning under the Special act 
of 1857. 
In the trial it was decided that the convicted would be sentenced to death. While 
passing on his judgment against the Jamadar Ram Singh, the Civil and Sessions 
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Judge commented that ‗he [the Jamadar] is evidently a man of influence and 
determination. Provided the unprotected state of the district... I am bound for the sake 
of future security to the mass of the people, to make a striking example of this man.‘72 
Thus, the decision to award the death sentence was also meant for giving a salutary 
warning to all the other natives of the region so that they did not dare even to think of 
conspiring against the government. Therefore the manner of the execution of the 
death sentence was intended to make a more effective and lasting impact among the 
local populace. The trial was conducted at around 4 P.M. on Saturday. However the 
colonial government considered that a quick execution of the death sentence would 
not be able to bring the desired effect. Since the next day was Sunday, an official 
holiday, and less people around, the day and time of the execution chosen was on 
Monday, when the area would be crowded with people going to the market. 
Accordingly Seton-Karr decided that the Jamadar would be hung on the Monday 
morning at a public place known as ‗Tin Mohini‘ (The three cross-roads), located in 
front of the police station near the market, from where a vast number of native 
populace would be able to observe the execution directly.
73
 As was the case with the 
Berhampore mutineers, it was also a punishment as a spectacle. The method of 
execution was in contravention to the normal practice. All the Englishmen residing in 
the area of Jessore were well-armed and attended the execution on horse-back like a 
royal celebration. Furthermore, as if the public execution was not enough to satisfy 
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the purpose of the colonial government, the corpse of the Jamadar was allowed to 
remain suspended the whole day, with the handkerchief tied over the face.
74
     
The government as well as the European population of the city in and around 
Jessore were deeply concerned and in a state of panic following the incident. The 
alarm was also expressed by the Magistrate of Jessore who proposed that as a 
precautionary measure a force of 20 or 30 men to be sent up for general purposes 
such as guarding the jail and the treasury on an emergency or ‗putting down any 
uprising in any part of the district before it gained head. The men should be sent up 
armed... their presence would also have a very good moral effect and by a show of 
preparation would inspire confidence in the well-effected and terror in the ill-effected 
part of the population.‘75 The extent to which the event in Jessore stirred the colonial 
authorities in general is also reflective from the private letter written by Lord 
Dalhousie, then residing in England, and also from Lady Canning, both of whom 
entirely approved of the means by which the authorities dealt with the ‗culprits‘ and 
expressed their satisfaction with the hope that such a successful ‗salutary warning‘ 
should stop further plots of similar kind.
76
 A few observations can be made in this 
context. Firstly, this particular event made the authorities apprehensive regarding the 
employment of the native ex-army men and the disbanded sepoys in matters of civil 
administration. Although the authorities did manage to avert the ‗open acts of 
rebellion‘ in Jessore by their timely intervention, the event is significant in the 
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context of understanding the broader participation of the native populace in rebellion 
of 1857. In the event discussed above, the presence of in-service native sepoys in 
Jessore and its vicinity was hardly noticeable. In fact, there were no sepoy barracks in 
Jessore and its vicinity at the time; the nearest ones being situated about hundred 
miles to the east in Dhaka, and about the same distance in west at Murshidabad.
77
 
Almost all the actors involved in the ‗mutinous conspiracy‘ were native sepoys but 
who had earlier retired from their services and were now a part of the civil 
administration. According to the information provided by Mr. J.R. Ward, the 
Magistrate of the Dacoity Commission in Jessore, the Jamadar Ram Singh, the prime 
mover of the whole affair, was in the 31
st
 Bengal Native Infantry who retired in 1846, 
while one of the Duffadars got his discharge from the 40
th
 Native Infantry about the 
same time, and one of the Najibs left the 42
nd
 Native Infantry after the Punjab 
campaign.
78
 This assertion on the part of the Magistrate in a way shows that even he 
found it hard to believe that it was the sepoys who had hatched the ‗conspiracy‘. On 
the contrary this involved a set of people who had the left the army quite a few years 
back and as the administration felt, was driven by an anti-British feeling that did not 
originate from the cantonments. At the same time, this particular event also shows the 
network of communication that the rebels were able to establish to an extent with the 
civil population in the region. As Seton-Karr had pointed out while passing sentence 
against the conspirators that the witness was ‗invited to join the prisoner in a 
conspiracy to rebel and murder... what to him was the representative of the British 
power, i.e., the Civil Magistrate.‘79 Also, the way the conspiracy of the intended 
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rebellion was hatched suggests the stark similarity in terms of the mode of actions – 
plundering the treasury and the Collector‘s office, burning down the government 
houses and setting free the prisoners from the jail – on the part of ‗conspirators‘ in 
Jessore and the mutineers in different parts of the country. As Rudrangshu Mukherjee 
has argued in the context of the rebel actions in Awadh, this was not just a symptom 
of mindless pathological disorder on the part of the mutineers.
80
 ‗The destruction of 
property – or direct action – is a common phenomenon in ―popular movements‖ 
involving crowds or ―mobs‖.‘81 Properties owned, used or lived in by the English or 
the Europeans were the objects of the wrath of the mutinous sepoys. They saw in the 
Raj an entity and structure that was intervening in their rights, customs and practices. 
As a result they intended to frontally assault and destroy the proximate symbols of 
that structure.
82
 As a further proof to the fact that these rebel ‗conspiracies‘ were not 
unfounded or the figment of imagination of the colonial officials, borne out of fear 
and panic, will be corroborated by the following events that unfolded in the nearby 
region of Chittagong, as we move on to the next section.  
 
3.4 CHITTAGONG UPRISING  
In the remaining months of the year, two major incidents related to the uprising 
deserve our attention. The most important of these occurred at Chittagong in 
November. Chittagong was an important port in eastern India, which had a long 
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history of trade across the Middle-East, China, Turkey and Europe.
83
 This port 
handled a large amount of shipping for the East India Company‘s trade across the 
South-East Asian countries. Naturally, the Company was particularly concerned to 
ensure its protection. The situation in Chittagong was generally peaceful in the first 
half of 1857. As noted in the previous chapter, seven companies of the 34
th
 Native 
Infantry stationed at Barrackpore had already been disarmed following Mangal 
Pandey‘s mutiny. The remaining three companies of the 34th, i.e., the 2nd, 3rd and the 
4
th, were garrisoned at Chittagong. Following the ‗disgraceful conduct‘ and the 
subsequent disbandment of the companies 34
th
 Regiment in Barrackpore, the 
companies stationed at Chittagong expressed their loyalty through an application 
where they mentioned that,  
 
By a careful performance of our duties we have gained a reputation 
for fidelity to the Government; these men [the disbanded companies 
of the 34
th
 Regiment in Barrackpore] have deprived us of it... we all 
know that the Government will consider us as faithful as ever, and we 
pray that this petition may be sent to the Governor General in order 
that his Lordship may know the state of our feelings.
84
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They also urged the government to send them to Delhi and other places in order to 
fight against the rebel sepoys.
85
 But, in spite of the repeated assurance of fidelity on 
the part of the sepoys stationed in Chittagong, there were periodic reports of panic all 
through these months. The Commanding officer of the 34
th
 Native Infantry had 
already warned the Commissioner of Chittagong regarding some of the drafts drawn 
up by some sepoys of the Detachment in favour of their relations with the sepoys in 
the North Western Provinces.
86
 The authorities continued to be apprehensive and 
extremely alarmed because of the prevailing rumour that the city of Chittagong 
would soon be ransacked by the disgruntled sepoys and every European resident of 
the city would be dead.
87
 In Chittagong many of the European residents resorted to 
their private boats and continued there to remain out of harm‘s way.88 The 
government tried its best to maintain peace and order in the district but with no 
success. However the situation, according the official reports, was still under control. 
But by November things had changed beyond recognition.  
On the night of 18 November 1857 the three detachments of the 34
th
 Native 
Infantry stationed at Chittagong had mutinied. They plundered the treasury, released 
the prisoners from the jail, killed one of the jail barkandazes, burnt down their own 
lines, fired the magazines and then left the station, carrying off with them three 
government elephants and the whole of the treasure they found in the office of the 
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Collectorate.
89
 Although the name of one Havildar Rajab Ali Khan has been 
mentioned in some of the native literatures, as the principal actor behind the whole 
plan, no conclusive evidence has ever been cited in support of this.
90
 However, we do 
come across the name of one Takur Bax, a pensioned Jamadar of Chittagong, who 
was allegedly found to be associated with the sepoys of the 34
th
 Regiment Native 
Infantry during the time of the rebellion.
91
  
It is interesting to mention in this context that during the rebellion of 1857, the 
rebels always targeted the jails. As Clare Anderson pointed out, this was not just for 
practical purposes such as the acquisition of labour and supplies, but also because 
they saw them as one of the principle instruments of colonial rule and the multiple 
cultural and religious transgressions that implied.
92
 In other words, prisons were 
considered as an imposing representation and embodiment of culturally intrusive 
forms of colonial governance.
93
 The other important aspect of this act of breaking the 
jails and releasing the prisoners was that escaped prisoners were important sources of 
information about the progress of the rebellion, and their arrival in the districts even 
heralded its spread.
94
 Indeed, they were involved in the transmission of the rumours 
that assumed such a central place in the revolt. The conduit of information was all 
the more pronounced because long-term prisoners were often imprisoned in jails 
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some distance from their districts, and after their release they made for home. In 
addition, Anderson further explained that the mutineers-rebels opened prisons, often 
by the sepoys, looking to release locally influential prisoners in order to intensify 
unrest.
95
 This was also corroborated from the writing of A. R. Young, the secretary 
to the government of Bengal. He wrote: ‗The first object of all rebels and mutineers 
appears to be to inflict the greatest possible amount of mischief to society generally, 
and to associate with themselves in their work of massacre and destructionthe ready 
instruments that exist in all jails.‘96 But quite clearly, there were more to jail-
breaking than the above mentioned comment indicated. 
In regard to the conduct of Takur Bax, the Collector of Chittagong later 
reported that he was on terms of intimacy with the men of the detachment before the 
outbreak.
97
 The general impression entertained by the European population in 
Chittagong was that ‗Takur Bax (was) in some way connected with the mutiny, but 
no reliable evidence was forthcoming whereby he can completely be said to be 
satisfactorily proved nor with one exception any presumptive evidence which may 
not fairly be refuted.‘98 The Thannah Barkandaz who was on guard duty at the 
Magistrate‘s Cutcherry on the night of the mutiny later reported that he saw Takur 
Bax leading the mutinous sepoys, instructing them to plunder the treasury and to 
release the prisoners from the jail.
99
 Some of the prisoners who were later captured 
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also reported that it was on the advice of Takur Bax that the lines were burnt and the 
magazines blown up, the same course which had been followed in almost every 
instances of the mutiny.
100
 But in spite of their suspicion of the Jamadar‘s 
involvement in the whole affair, the authorities could not be certain of the charges 
brought against him as there was no reliable evidence to prove him guilty of 
treachery or open acts of rebellion. Perhaps the main reason for which the authorities 
were reluctant to convict Takur Bax was the fact that all these reports became 
available to the government only when the rebellion was coming to a close. As the 
Collector of Chittagong noted later,  
…that no steps were taken to verify the truth of the account of his 
proceedings immediately after the mutiny is such to be regretted as no 
doubt a few minutes attentive then would have satisfactorily cleared 
up the mystery which it does not seem possible to determine now, but 
much allowance must be made for the feeling of insecurity which for 
long pervaded the mind of all and for some days suspended all the 
actions.
101
  
 
In his defence, Takur Bax repeatedly denied any kind of involvement with the 
mutinous sepoys of the 34
th
 Regiment. But he admitted the fact that during the 
outbreak, ‗the sepoys had plundered his house and belongings and ‗had beaten him 
with the butt ends of their muskets for not consenting to be the Rajah of the 
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district.‘102 This statement of Takur Bax does indicate that the object of overthrowing 
the British Raj was conveyed to the rebellious sepoys of the 34
th
 Native Infantry in 
Chittagong. It is also interesting to note that that the night before the outbreak on 18 
November 1857, arrangements were made for a large feast of some sort by the 
sepoys, whereby the mutineers had chalked out the details of the plan of attack for 
the next day.
103
 All these indicate a pattern that the mutineers were following in 
accordance with the rebel sepoys of northern India. The mutiny was not accompanied 
by physical violence against the Europeans. None of the European residents were 
injured.  
Nevertheless, this was indeed a major development. The already beleaguered 
Company was particularly concerned about its fallout especially in the neighbouring 
districts. The district officers were instructed to watch the movement of the 
mutineers. On the basis of their reports the precise trajectory of their movements can 
be reconstructed. From Chittagong the mutineers headed towards the princely state 
of Tripura. The Raja of Tripura was accordingly instructed to prevent the onward 
movement of the mutineers and to apprehend them if possible. All the boats in the 
ferry had also been seized to prevent them from crossing over to Tripura.
104
 
Nevertheless, the Chittagong mutineers did manage to cross over and entered the 
independent territory of the Rajah of Tripura on 22 November 1857. Having spent a 
few days in the hills and jungles of Tripura they tried to enter into Cachar and 
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thereafter to Manipur.
105
 It seems reasonable to infer that the rebels of Chittagong 
received some support from the local population, especially hill tribes of the region. 
Some apprehensions were also entertained that they should be joined by the subjects 
of the Rajah of Tripura.
106
 The Commissioner of Chittagong Division grudgingly 
admitted that ‗so many as 1200 people were said to have engaged themselves in 
opening roads, cutting jungles and procuring provisions for them.‘107  
To make the matter worse, it was further reported that the princes of Manipur 
joined the Chittagong mutineers. After being defeated at a place called Latu in Sylhet 
the mutineers entered the Manipur territory and were joined by the Manipuri princes 
with his followers. An official report also runs to the effect that the Manipuri princes 
were in operation on the bank of the river Barak. Probably as a sequel to this several 
princes of the Manipur royal family were kept under detention in the Cachar jail. 
Narendrajit Singh, the chief of the Manipur rebel princes broke his arrest and fled to 
Manipur.
108
 The Chittagong mutineers, aided by Narendrjit Singh and six other 
princes of Manipur along with their followers, confronted Lieutenant Ross and 
Lieutenant Birst, who were stationed at a place called Birmacondy.
109
 At the time of 
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attack, the colonial officials had about 250 men with them. After a heavy exchange 
of fire, which lasted for about three hours, the mutineers were defeated following 
which they dispersed into the forest. The officials did apprehend a few of the 
mutineers and were subsequently tried, sentenced and executed, but the rebel pricnes 
managed to escape with the help of their supporters around the region.
110
 The 
evidence of the prince having joined the mutineers of the 34
th
 Native Infantry was 
said to be complete.
111
 Rana Singh, the Diwan of the state, was also an accomplice in 
the ‗seditious‘ activities. The administration was also anxious about the fact that the 
mutineers were being aided by the local Kookie people by supplying foods, carrying 
their baggage and also cutting paths for them through the jungles.
112
 It is to be noted 
that the Kookies were local tribes who lived in the hills of Tripura and in Manipur 
and Lushai hills on the south.
113
 The correspondence from H.S.Metcalfe, the Judge 
of Tripura, expressed the similar apprehension on the part of the government: ‗I have 
no idea that the Maharaja who is as timid as a girl will communicate with the 
mutineers, but I think his Kookie subjects may give us trouble.‘114 The interesting 
point to explore in this regard is the statement of the Judge of Tripura. In a letter 
dated 23 November 1857, he stated in a convincing manner that these Kookies, who 
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were being used as coolies and guides through the jungles, were arranged prior to the 
rebellion by the rebels.
115
 This statement of the Judge of Tripura further corroborate 
to the fact that the rebels of Chittagong had charted out a plan and course of action to 
be followed prior to the uprising. Although there is little doubt about the active 
participation of the Kookies with the Chittagong mutineers, the statement of the 
Judge of Tripura regarding their alliance prior to the outbreak of the rebellion in 
Chittagong however seems to be a bit too farfetched as it was not supported by 
factual evidences of any kind.   
The network of connection that the rebels were able to develop with the hill 
tribes such as Kookies, and with Manipuri princes or Chera chiefs is an interesting 
story that would repay careful investigation. Unfortunately the paucity of documents 
did not allow us to make further exploration on this. The Commissioner of the 
Chittagong division, however, attributed this nexus to liberal distribution of the 
money the rebels had plundered, which enabled them to make hill men their friends. 
Needless to say, the explanation sounds too simplistic and is in tune with the 
conspiracy theories forwarded by colonial officials. The Chittagong mutineers were 
either killed or apprehended towards the close of 1857 and the early months of 1858. 
Those who were apprehended were tried under Act XVII of 1857 by the Sessions 
Judge of Dhaka. Ten of them were sentenced to death and the rest to transportation 
for life.
116
 It was later reported that rest of the Chittagong mutineers were on their 
way to Dhaka to join the sepoys of the 73
rd 
Native Infantry, but later changed their 
                                                          
115
 Letter from Metcalfe reporting proceedings of the Chittagong mutineers and the measures adopted 
by him regarding the station at Cummillah, dated 23 November 1857, Home Public Proceeding 
Number: 56, 14 December 1857, Government of Bengal, NAI. 
116
 Letter sent from A.R. Young to the Secretary to the Government of India dated 5 December 1857, 
Judicial Proceedings Number 209, 17 December 1857, Government of Bengal, WBSA. 
Page | 192  
 
course and crossed the Tripura hills to join the men stationed at Sylhet.
117
 A few of 
them were captured but the bulk managed to escape. The Magistrate of Chittagong 
later in his report pointed out the complete lack of civilian sympathy towards the 
Company during the uprising.
118
 However the Chittagong mutiny had a somewhat 
unanticipated impact on Dhaka.  
 
3.5 THE UPRISING OF THE 73rd REGIMENT NATIVE INFANTRY IN DHAKA 
Dhaka had already been closely monitored by the colonial officials because of the 
on-going activities of the Faraizis, in addition to its large population of Muslims.
119
 
At the end of May or beginning of June 1857, two of the companies of the 73
rd
 
regiment arrived from their headquarter in Jalpaiguri as a relief for those that had 
been in Dhaka for some time. In Dhaka, there were stationed two companies of the 
73
rd
 infantry numbering in all about 180 men, along with about 30 artilleries, two 
six-pounder field guns, and the magazines.
120
 It is important to note here that the 
regiment of 73
rd
 Native Infantry were mostly reecuited from the Arrah and Shahabad 
area of Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur in Bihar, and from the regions 
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around Awadh.
121
 H.C. Wake, the Magistrate of Shahabad, had already informed 
Governor-General Canning in a report about Kunwar Singh‘s disaffection and 
‗treasonous activities‘ in and around the region.122 William Taylor, the District Judge 
of Shahabad, however contradicted the report about the infidelity of Kunwar Singh 
shortly thereafter.
123
 But the fact that Kunwar Singh was involded in open mutiny 
against the colonial government was proved by July 1857 when the rebel sepoys 
attacked Arrah and placed themselves under Kunwar Singh‘s orders.124 As a 
consequence the authorities in Dacca and also in Jalpaiguri, the Head-Quarter of the 
73
rd
 regiment, were visibly apprehensive about the connection between the 
disaffected sepoys of Arrah-Shahabad region and Dacca-Jalpaiguri. Any 
provocation, they believed, on the part of Kunwar Singh might escalate the 
disaffection of the sepoys belonging to 73
rd
 into an open rebellion.
125
 On 12 June 
1857 a panic spread among the Europeans in consequence of a report to the effect 
that the two companies of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry, which had left the station about 
the beginning of the month had met with some disbanded men from Barrackpore and 
had mutinied. It was said that these sepoys had returned to Dhaka and, joined by the 
fellow sepoys at Lal Bagh, they were looting the bazar, setting free the prisoners at 
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the Jail. A number of Europeans assembled at the house of Mr. Jenkins, the 
Magistrate, others resolved to defend themselves at the Bank.
126
 Some of the women 
went on board boats on the river, arms were collected, and the whole town was in a 
state of excitement. Lieutenants McMohan and Rhynd, the Officers in command of 
the troops, started for the Lal Bagh, where the sepoys were located. On their return 
they reported that their men were all quiet and in their quarters and the alarm was 
groundless. On the evening drive, the natives who were collected in groups along the 
road seemed surprised to see them, after the report that the English had all left in a 
hurry, leaving them to their fate.
127
 One can easily discern the stark resemblance of 
the nature of panic that gripped the colonial administration in Calcutta on the very 
same day. Also noticeable is the similarity of response from the administration and 
European population of the city in averting the crisis.  
Alarmed by such rumours and the accompanying panic the government as a 
precautionary measure decided to set up a hundred men of the Indian Navy under 
Lieutenant Lewis, for the protection of the town.
128
 They were located in the house 
on the opposite side of the road to the Baptist Chapel. Furthermore in a meeting held 
by the European and the East Indian inhabitants of the city capable of bearing arms, 
it was resolved to form two corps of volunteers – one of Infantry and the other 
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Cavalry.
129
 In addition it was also decided to fortify the Mills that could, if the 
situation arises, withstand five to six thousand rebels. Also if the sepoys of the 73
rd
 
Regiment stationed at Jalpaiguri mutinied, then the sepoys in stationed in Dhaka 
would be at once disarmed. This apprehension amongst the officials in Dhaka was 
not without any foundation.  
It was around this time that some of the sepoys of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry 
stationed at Jalpaiguri in the Rajshahye Division already began showing signs of 
mutinous behaviour. It is important to mention in this context that the Head Quarters 
of the 73
rd
 Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry was situated in Jalpaiguri. The 
officials in Dhaka apprehended that if the sepoys at Jalpaiguri became rebellious, the 
fall-out would be disastrous in Dhaka.
130
 In the month of July a plan was revealed 
amongst the sepoys of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry to take the lives of their officers, or 
that of any Europeans as opportunity should occur. The plot was disclosed by the 
Havildar who initially pretended to join the rebel sepoys but later shot one of them 
through the head and apprehended the others.
131
 The names of men in the 73
rd
 Native 
Infantry were given up and two of the three men were at once quietly arrested, when 
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it was discovered that the information given was correct.
132
 The following month 
another plot was discovered, and this time amongst the men of the 11
th
 Irregular 
Cavalry, who had bound themselves by the most solemn oaths, that they would not 
leave the cantonment in Dhaka before they had destroyed all the ‗Sahib Logs‘.133 The 
Jamadar of one of the troops was allegedly at the head of it who explained to the 
‗conspirators‘ that there was no occasion for hasty action, but that they were to 
remain quiet till he, who was watching his opportunity, should ‗order them and that 
then they should be prompt and unanimous in executing the work of death.‘134 The 
Joint Magistrate of Jalpaiguri in his letter to the Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal expressed his deep concern regarding the whole affair. In this context he 
wrote,  
This was of course rather startling because it was clearly the only 
proper way to destroy the Europeans. Everyone here is armed, and so 
an attack by one or two men, or even more would probably fail, but a 
body of twenty or thirty attacking the Europeans when scattered and 
unsuspecting, could not but succeed.
135
  
As a result a court martial was immediately ordered for the following day, and the 
suspected Jamadar was placed on the court. Three of the ‗conspirators‘ were tried 
convicted, sentenced for imprisonment for life and sent to Calcutta in handcuffs and 
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irons. However, the arrival of a party of one hundred seamen from the H.C.S. 
Zenobia with two armed pinnaces in the month of July restored some confidence 
among the Europeans.
136
 
This relative quietude however did not last long enough. The first three days of 
August was the Bakri Eid, which put the government again in a state of panic since 
the government apprehended that any kind of large congregation of Muslims might 
cause some disturbance. As a precautionary measure, the volunteers were all put on 
alert and patrols were out all night on each of the three days of the Eid. Great alarm 
existed amongst the European and Armenian residents, especially among those with 
families, on hearing the news of the massacres from the Gangetic heartland that were 
already filtering down in Dhaka.
137
 This was immediately followed by the Hindu 
festival of ‗Jummo Ostomee‘ and the Muslim occasion of Muharram, together which 
put the town once again in a state of panic throughout the month of August.
138
 Both 
these festivals had large congregation of followers. The administration, under the 
prevailing circumstances, was naturally apprehensive regarding such an assemblage. 
As a consequence, during the days of the festival, the European cavalry officers were 
mounted on elephants and along with the infantry were well armed and ready for 
anything that might occur.
139
 In the end though, everything passed off relatively 
quietly. But rumours and unverified reports of various sorts were continuously 
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coming from Calcutta that kept the tension unhindered amongst the administration 
throughout the month. The Dacca News reported on 17 August 1857 that the 
mutinous sepoys were ‗pouring into Calcutta…that armed boats swarm in the 
Hoogly… Constantly Raneegunge is reported burnt to the ground and the railways 
destroyed…‘140  
The civil population had no clue what was going on or about to happen. The 
Magistrate of Dhaka even went to the extent of forming something like a ‗Committee 
of Public Safety‘ amongst the native residents and proposed that the Muslim 
residents of the city should ‗supplicate Allah Tala to protect the present Kafir 
(Infidel) Government, and that the Kutbah be read in the name of His Honour, the 
lieutenant Governor of Bengal, and not his majesty of Delhi.‘141 In addition, the 
influential Muslim residents ‗who used to keep a regular correspondence with the 
leading men amongst the co-religionists in the North-West and were subscribed to 
Urdu and Persian newspapers‘ were also requested to report immediately ‗should 
they become acquainted with any indications of a rebellious spirit in the district.‘142 
Similarly the Hindu residents of the city were also requested to ‗set about in right 
earnest to make Shama Poojah and Sanckirtons‘ throughout the station.143 These 
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kinds of odd requests perplexed the residents who failed to comprehend as to why 
the authorities were suddenly asking them to perform such rituals: ‗What has 
happened that the Sahebs should order us to make new images, and new Poojahs?
144
 
Some of them even began to wonder that ‗the Sahebs must be in possession of 
information regarding some invisible calamity, which their blunt intellect cannot 
perceive.‘145 Quite clearly, at a time when the administration was supposed to put up 
a strong and effective resistance in order to calm down the prevailing tension 
amongst the civil population of the region, these kinds of superstitious acts on their 
part worsened the situation. As the Dacca News surmised towards its concluding 
section of the article, these kinds of actions on the part administration, in otherwise 
‗ordinary times‘ would have been perfectly harmless. However under the present 
situation ‗the ill-effects of popular rumours on the native mind‘ should have been 
checked by ‗the prudent, firm, but silent actions of the Europeans‘.146 The important 
point that once again emerges from the above discussion is that under a given 
situation rumour and subsequent panic has the potential to adversely affect the 
rational thinking capacity of the colonial administration, thereby taking recourse to 
such superstitious actions.  
A somewhat minor furore was created in September when the detachment of 
sailors sent on the expedition to Assam arrived at Dhaka but refused to proceed any 
further. Barring a few deserters the rest were persuaded to go to Assam where their 
presence was considered necessary in view of a rapidly deteriorating situation. 
Dhaka remained relatively quiet for a month or so. However, this relative quietude 
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was once again shattered by the state of affairs which lasted the whole of November. 
In the beginning of November something like a panic occurred which was caused by 
the removal of the sailors to the house near the church that was previously been 
occupied by the nuns.
147
 The sepoys got the ammunition out of the magazine, and the 
government perceived that the outbreak of rebellion was imminent.
148
 These sepoys 
were also reportedly in touch with the sepoys in Jalpaiguri, asking them to resist if an 
attempt was made to disarm them. Although the officials were relatively sure of their 
safety while disarming the sepoys in Dhaka, they feared the possible disastrous 
effects that could have on the troops stationed at Chittagong, Sylhet and Jalpaiguri.
149
 
The officials believed that if they tried to preserve the order in Dhaka, the other 
places would remain quiet.  
On 21 November, 1857 the intelligence of the Chittagong mutiny reached 
Dhaka and the principal civil and military authorities at once assembled to consider 
what precaution should be taken to prevent the sepoys at Dhaka from following the 
example.
150
 The Magistrate of Dhaka, Mr. Jenkins, strongly believed that the 
Chittagong mutineers were in communication with the 73
rd
 regiments in Dhaka, and 
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together they were ‗plotting to massacre the district, break open the treasury and the 
ammunitions, and then head towards Arrah in order to join their fellow comrades.
151
 
Although the above mentioned conviction of the Magistrate could not be verified, the 
communication between the sepoy regiments, more so as they were recruited from 
the same areas, stationed in the nearby districts were not that uncommon. The 
apprehension was also reflected in an editorial of Hindoo Patriot, which noted:  
Mutiny has reappeared in the extreme east of the empire. The three 
companies of the 34
th
 N.I. at Chittagong have risen, released the 
prisoners in the jail, plundered the local treasury of about three lacs 
of rupees, and made off for Dacca…they are evidently in 
communication with the detachment of 73
rd
 N.I. at Dacca.
152
  
It was further reported that the remnant of the 34
th
 Native Infantry, the regiment 
disbanded at Barrackpore, had broken out and that they had looted the treasury, 
taking with them about three hundred thousand rupees, killing several Europeans in 
the course.
153
 At once the district administration, in consultation with the military 
authorities, decided that as a precautionary measure the sepoys at Dhaka, the 73
rd
 
Native Infantry were to be disarmed the very next day.
154
 The Commissioner of 
Dhaka, C.T. Davidson, remarked apprehensively that ‗time has now arrived when no 
alternative remains but to disarm the troops here, for should the Chittagong 
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Detachment manage to form a junction with the two Companies of the 73
rd
 Regiment 
here, we should have to fight five hundred men with arms in their hands instead of 
three hundred.‘155 73rd Native Infantry was under the command of Lieutenant Dowell 
and were about 260 in number, including the 26 artillerymen.
156
 They had in their 
possession two field pieces, and in their lines they had a remarkably strong 
position.
157
 On hearing the decision of the authorities, the sepoys belonging to the 
73
rd
 Native Infantry threatened to resist any attempt at disarming them and also to 
despise the sailors, who were generally of smaller stature, and were about ninety in 
number. The officers in charge decided to tread with caution so as to prevent any 
excitement among the sepoys. The next day, it was decided, that the officials would 
begin by first disarming the Treasury Guard and to place the disarmed men in the 
charge of the Volunteers.
158
 The sailors would then proceed to Lal Bagh and it was 
hoped that the men over there would give up their arms without much opposition.  
Before going into the further details of the struggle that ensued in Dhaka, it 
would be interesting here to briefly describe the place where the conflagration took 
place. Lal Bagh fort complex (also known as the Fort Aurangabad, later renamed as 
Bahadur Shah Park) was the ruins of the incomplete Mughal fortress near the bank of 
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the Buriganga River, in the south-western part of Dhaka.
159
 By the time the rebellion 
broke out, there was but little of it that remained with the exception of a great mound 
of ruins, extending for about five hundred yards, with its southern front towards the 
river.
160
 The barracks for the sepoys was later built upon this structure.
161
 At the right 
angle, towards the west, there ran a high wall that was the part of the old palace. The 
other two sides were enclosed by low walls. In a line running from the east 
westwards, in the middle of the enclosure was a large tank, next to the two storied 
hospital, and behind that was the Beebee Pari‘s tomb, a mosque of considerable size. 
Behind the mosque were the gun-sheds that had two fine six-pounders with about 26 
artillerymen.
162
 
 
Plate 1: Entrance to the Lal Bagh Fort complex.  
Source: Arthur L. Clay, Leaves from a Diary in Lower Bengal, London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1896. 
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The above mentioned plan was successful to an extent. When the volunteers 
advanced towards the quarters after disarming the others, the sepoys there appeared 
dejected and reproached their officers for subjecting them to such disgrace, 
protesting that ‗they would have given up their arms at once to their officers had they 
only been asked to do so.‘163 However, as the sailors marched towards Lal Bagh to 
disarm the sepoys over there, they had to face fierce opposition from the sepoys.
164
 
The hospitals and numerous other buildings in the Lal Bagh, together with the 
barracks which were on the top of a hill were completely occupied by the native 
sepoys in great force. The sepoys stationed over there immediately opened fire 
towards the approaching forces. One of the sailors were shot dead by the sentry, 
which was then followed by the others, and a volley was fired on the sailors as they 
tried to advance through the broken wall near the southern gateway. The guns were 
placed in position in front of the BeeBee Pari‘s tomb, so as to command the 
entrance.
165
 After a sharp exchange of gunfire, which lasted half an hour, the sepoys 
were eventually turned out of their barracks. The magistrate reported that at the end 
forty one sepoys lay dead on the ground. ‗Some more were shot or drowned in 
attempting to escape and 70 or 80 are believed to have been wounded.‘166 On the 
Company‘s side fifteen were severely and three slightly wounded. ‗Of the former 
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three have since died of their wounds. Dr. Green the Civil Surgeon of the station and 
Lieutenant Lewis who commanded the sailors were amongst the wounded.‘167  
                                                          
167
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Plate 2: Sketch Plan of the Fort of Lal Bagh during the Uprising of 1857 in Dhaka. 
Source: Arthur L. Clay, Leaves from a Diary in Lower Bengal, London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1896. 
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Once the sepoys were overpowered, the sailors and the volunteer guards took 
charge of the treasury. The disarmed sepoys broke up into small detached parties and 
tried to escape to different directions. Some twenty of them were captured, ten of 
whom were hanged soon after.
168
 Reinforcement of European sailors and officers 
were immediately sent from Calcutta to restore confidence among the Europeans. 
However, the fear and apprehension amongst the European population of the city 
lasted for several months and were found ‗sleeping with revolvers under their pillows 
and their loaded guns by their bed-sides, ready for immediate use.‘169 In a somewhat 
later account, Hridaya Nath Majumdar wrote,  
 
…all of them were put to the gallows and the Dacca Mutiny was thus 
terminated. The Antaghar Maidan being the scene of this tragical 
occurrences, used to be looked upon with awe by the people of Dhaka, 
and many superstitious stories were used to be narrated by the people 
of the surrounding Mahallas – Bangla Bazaar, Shankhari Bazaar, and 
Kalta Bazaar how the spirits of the departed sepoys used to visit the 
Maidan during the night and how the groans and awful sounds were 
used to be heard. These stories were used to be told by the old people 
and we never dared to go the Maidan after the evening. Thus, in this 
way the Dacca Mutiny ended.
170
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Meanwhile the main body of the Dhaka rebels passed through Mymensingh 
and reached the district of Rungpore.
171
 By the end of November, the Magistrate of 
Mymensingh reported that a party of about one hundred and fifty sepoys passed 
through that station, having committed some depredations on their route, without 
attacking the station.
172
 In the beginning of January 1858, Lieutenant E.R.Wilcox of 
73
rd
 Native Infantry stationed at Jalpaiguri reported that the Dhaka mutineers were 
on their way to Bhutan and were aided and assisted by the Bhutan Subah in general 
and in particular by a person called Hurrah Singh, a zamindar residing near the 
Bhutan border.
173
 It is to be noted that as early as in August 1857 the Superintendent 
of Darjeeling had informed the government about the ‗intriguing communications‘ 
between the sepoys of the 73
rd
 regiment and the local magnates around the border of 
Bhutan.
174
 But since nothing could be proven at that time the authorities had to 
content themselves by keeping a close watch on the regiments in Jalpaiguri. Hurrah 
Singh was commonly known as the Hathea Rajah as he had for many years farmed 
the right to catch elephants in Bhutan. On receiving the report in January 1858 about 
the assistance provided by the Rajah, detachments were sent immediately to arrest 
him. But as British force reached Churabandi, a village near where the Rajah was 
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staying, the officer commanding the force realised that the Rajah had been warned by 
men from within his own army and that he had managed to escape.
175
 After about an 
hour of pursuit in vain the British officials finally gave up, having succeeded in 
taking two of Hurrah Singh‘s dependents. The two men who they believed were the 
informants were put under confinement. According to the deposition of the convicts, 
the Rajah was planning to gather the mutinous sepoys of the 73
rd
 regiment and, along 
with his own resources, would march towards Julpaiguri to take control of the 
headquarter of the 73
rd
.
176
 The convicts were eventually tried on the ground of 
treachery, prosecuted and were blown away by guns.  
The mutineers of the 73
rd
 regiment eventually moved out of Bhutan and and 
having passed through Darjeeling entered Nepal terrain.
177
 The Commissioner of 
Bhagalpur reported in details the route that the mutineers of the 73
rd
 regiment 
followed on their way to Nepal.
178
 It is interesting to note from the correspondence of 
the Commissioner that the mutineers received uninterrupted support from the 
villages through which they crossed. The covert assistance provided by the villages 
was further verified when the colonial officials, who were following the movement 
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of the mutinous 73
rd
 regiment closely, enquired the whereabouts of the rebels almost 
immediately after they left  the villages, but the villagers denied having any 
information.
179
 Kaye and Malleson informed us that the mutineers eventually 
succeeded in making their way into the north-east of Awadh ‗only eventually to fall 
by the bullet and the sword‘.180 Although the information provided by Kaye and 
Malleson cannot be corroborated, it seems plausible to infer from the report of the 
Commissioner of Bhagalpur that the mutineers were indeed moving westwards along 
the Nepal terai area.
181
  
 
3.6 THE NAVAL BRIGADE: SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT DURING THE REBELLION  
Before concluding this chapter it would be interesting to discuss in brief the 
significance and impact of the Naval Brigade, which played a vital part during the 
uprising of 1857, especially in the lower province of the Bengal Presidency. As the 
rebellion assumed momentum, what haunted the colonial administration was the 
insignificant number of the ruling community in comparison to the vast native 
population of the country, which added to their fear, anxieties and apprehension. It 
was roughly estimated that if every insurgent or every mutineer was to be put to 
death or transported beyond the sea, the administration would require a minimum of 
two hundred thousand European soldiers. This was quite impossible a task for the 
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colonial government under the present circumstances. It might be remembered that it 
was around the same time that the British were engaged in heavy fighting with the 
mutineers in many districts of the northern Gangetic heartland that required a regular 
supply of European soldiers. In spite of repeated appeal to the higher authorities in 
England, the government in India could not get adequate numbers of European 
soldiers. However, under the present situation, it was absolutely essential for the 
government to have as many European soldiers, trained or untrained, as possible. The 
purpose was to have a visible overall presence of armed European men to ‗overawe‘ 
the sepoys and other disgruntled sections of the native population. In view of the 
paucity of the trained European men, the colonial government decided to recruit the 
so-called ‗outcast‘ European sailors as a temporary emergency measure.182 
For many decades, the relationship between the wealthier part of the white 
society of British India and the infamous sea-men had been ambiguous. The British 
sea-faring men possessed the reputation of being a source of annoyance, troublesome 
and were considered as a shame rather than pride, at least when they were on shore. 
Their affinity for drink and prostitution and their notoriously ‗unruly conduct‘ 
towards the native population posed a real threat against the ideological substructures 
of British rule.
183
 In fact in the eyes of the colonial administration, as Harald Fischer-
Tiné pointed out, their alleged lack of discipline and ‗reckless and irrational ways‘ 
brought them close to the ‗uncivilised natives‘. To fit these otherwise ‗intruders‘ and 
‗outcasts‘ in the ‗superior ruling self‘ the imperial authority tried and experimented 
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with all sorts of devices.
184
 Their number and mode of presence was adjusted 
according to the requirements of the empire.  
During the crisis of 1857, most of the European soldiers who were available 
had to be sent to the more active theatres of action across northern India. As a result 
there were not many Europeans available in the lower Province of Bengal during the 
time. It was because of this reason that the colonial government had to 
indiscriminately recruit these European sailors with high pay and other benefits.
185
 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, in the weeks following the outbreak in 
Meerut and in Delhi, Governor General Canning agreed reluctantly to call for, in 
addition to the formation of the volunteer corps, more than 350 seamen who were 
asked to assist the police in case of need.
186
 Later in the month, the Governor General 
in Council also sanctioned the proposal of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to raise 
a ‗body of 200 or 250 European Seamen‘ for the service in the various districts of 
Bengal. Considering the geographical and political situation in the lower province of 
Bengal, especially in the eastern Bengal region which was mostly riverine, the 
necessity of imparting military training to them was stressed: ‗it is evident that, 
unless to some extent drilled and instructed before they leave, bodies of seamen 
picked up indiscriminately out of the merchant ships in the port, could not be much 
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relied on...‘187 In the months of June and July, the first units of Indian Navy Seamen 
arrived in Calcutta and shortly afterwards, three ships from the Royal Navy reached 
the port.
188
 Although it is difficult to estimate the total number of troops recruited 
during the period of the uprising, but it might be safely assumed that there were 
between 2000 and 2500 armed European seamen between northern India and Burma 
by the end of 1858.
189
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TABLE 6 
Strength, Armament and Stations of the Detachments of the Indian Naval Brigade 
Serving in Bengal, during the Indian Mutiny, between June 1857, and May 1860, 
under the Command of Captain C.D. Campbell, Senior Naval Officer, Calcutta and 
commanding pennant vessel ‘Calcutta’: 
 
 
NUMBER 
STRENGTH  
 
GUNS 
 
 
STATION 
 
OFFICERS 
 
WARRANT 
OFFICERS 
 
PETTY 
OFFICERS AND 
SEAMEN 
1 6 2 150 - Fort William 
2 3 2 100 6 Barrackpore 
3 4 1 100 4 Buxar 
4 4 1 100 2 Dacca & 
Dibrooghur 
5 5 1 200 6 Gya 
6 5 1 200 - Port Blair 
7 4 1 110 4 Dehree 
8 3 0 50 - Jessore 
9 5 1 120 4 Chyabassa 
10 3 1 100 2 Alipore 
11 4 1 100 2 Moozufferpore & 
Moteeharee 
12 4 1 100 2 Julpigoree 
13 3 1 100 2 Chuprah 
14 4 1 100 2 Chyabassa 
POLICE 
BRIGADE 
3 1 110 4 Dibrooghur 
TOTAL 60 16 1740 40  
Source: Charles Rathbone Low, History of the Indian Navy 1613-1863, in two 
Volumes, vol. 2, London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1877, Appendix: B, p. 585. 
 
From the table above it becomes clear that most of these naval brigades that were 
operating during the rebellion of 1857 were posted in the lower province of Bengal. 
Historians have repeatedly stressed the crucial role played by the Naval Brigade in 
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suppressing the rebellion.
190
 Rathbone Low for instance, tried to argue the 
decisiveness of the Naval Brigades by their sheer presence in and around Calcutta 
which to a large extent helped the European population to overcome their panic. As 
he wrote, ‗In this time of doubt and expectation... the welcome presence of the crews 
on shore ... restored the confidence among the Europeans and stuck terror into the 
hearts of the plotters and the Budmashes.‘191 However, it was not only the native 
‗budmashes and mutineers‘ who were terrorised by presence of these naval Brigades, 
but they often caused trouble for the colonial authorities as well as for the general 
European population and the natives alike. As the Commissioner of Police reported: 
 
These men, who have been accumulating during the last six months, 
have given the public at large and the Police little trouble, and the 
offences they have seldom exceeded drunken brawls and pugilistic 
encounters... I confess however that I look for wars with some 
apprehension to the discharge in Calcutta of at least six hundred more 
seamen, most of them raised in a hurry, and many of them of very 
worst character. As long as they have money, nothing worse perhaps 
will ensue than drunken quarrels in the streets, but when they are 
destitute of cash and credit and without hope of employment, for in 
the present state of trade there is little chance of a quarter of the 
number being shipped for months, I should not be surprised if gangs 
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were formed for the purpose of robbery. As far as Calcutta is 
concerned, the European police in my opinion is strong enough to put 
a summery end to anything of the kind, but there is nothing that I 
know to prevent Europeans plundering in the mofussil with 
impunity.
192
 
 
Part of this problem relating to the government‘s dilemma regarding the 
indiscriminate recruitment of the Europeans arose from the fact that not every 
Brigade was ‗a gallant body of men, gallantly led‘.193 The situation was made more 
complicated by the fact that the legal status of these troops was not clear. In most 
cases they were backed by the military authorities, which in turn gave rise to bitter 
complaints from the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta.
194
 It was therefore natural 
that these men ‗not being amendable to martial laws or accustomed to strict 
discipline‘ were found to be ‗uncontrollable‘ when posted in the districts of 
Bengal.
195
 In Jessore, for instance, a detachment of the Naval Brigade, also known as 
the ‗Jahazis‘ in local dialect, were sent in order to bring the district under control. In 
the words of W.S. Seton-Karr, the officiating Civil and Sessions Judge of Jessore, 
these seamen were in reality ‗a collection of discharged sailors and loafers, of various 
kind and nationalities, picked up from the bazaars of Calcutta… who understood very 
little of any native language and of native ways.‘196 The Commandant of the Brigade 
informed the authority of Jessore with the utmost gravity that ‗on disembarking he 
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formed his men in line, sent on scouts, and threw out skirmishers, as he imagined 
himself to be marching through an enemy‘s country.‘197 Quite predictably therefore, 
this kind of attitude on the part of the seamen caused terror and panic amongst the 
native population of the district. The stories of the activities of some of the drunkard 
‗Jahazis‘ and their avidity for women spread apprehension in the minds of the people. 
Admitting the panicky situation which aroused after hearing the news of the arrival of 
the naval brigade, the Magistrate of Pubna, in a letter to the Secretary to the 
Government of Bengal wrote: 
 
It might be out of place here to mention that quite a panic prevails in 
this station in consequence of the expected advent of the sailors; about 
1 ½ of the inhabitants have already gone away to villages in the 
interior or to a little distance off. The entire respectable female 
portions of the community are amongst the departed. No explanation 
or remonstrances tend to remove the impression which prevails that 
the sailors will commit every kind of outrage.
198
 
 
Reports of a similar nature also corroborate the fact that the undisciplined Naval 
Brigades caused havoc in the rural areas of certain districts, thereby creating panic in 
the minds of the people.
199
 In the district of Jessore the villagers were rather baffled 
after hearing the bewildering stories of the habits of the seamen, or the ‗Jahazis‘. As a 
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consequence, all the markets in the line of the march of these seamen were kept 
closed or were deserted. The closure of the markets added further trouble for the 
natives, as the prices of the commodities increased manifold because of the shortage 
of supply. The native newspaper Sambad Prabhakar lamented the fact that ‗as a 
consequence of the arrival of the Naval Brigade in the country the prices of foods 
have gone high, almost doubled. The poor natives of the country are left with little or 
no food. The sea-men are looting the foods from everywhere, forcing the natives to 
starve‘.200 Similarly, in a letter to The Englishman, a native Christian from Buxar, 
complained that the conducts of these seamen around that place were becoming quite 
unbearable in view of the fact that it was ‗quite common for them to force themselves 
even at the hours of Twelve and One in the night into the houses of respectable 
families‘ to harass the women and insult the male family members as ‗Niggers‘.201 
Even in the city of Calcutta the unruly conduct of the Naval Brigades were far from 
exemplary: the detachment on the Mint Guard, for instance, was found to be ‗in the 
habit of committing robberies on native shop-keepers‘ and had to be stopped by the 
Police.
202
 On the whole, the regular detachments seem to have been frequently 
involved in ‗criminal ‘or‗ uproarious incidents‘ and the authorities had to take a great 
deal of trouble to discipline and educate the sailors.
203
 Thus, although the Naval 
Brigade did play a significant part in suppressing the rebellion and the colonial 
government benefitted from them during the whole crisis, especially in the eastern 
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part of the lower province of the Bengal presidency, it did come with a price tag.
204
 
These seamen became really infamous throughout the Province and were despised as 
a ‗set of thieves and vagabonds‘ by their fellow countrymen.205 They were considered 
to be ‗the terror of friends as well as foes‘ even in the English Press.206 As a 
consequence therefore, as soon as the rebellion came to a close and the armed forces 
were reorganised, most of these seamen who were recruited hastily, were discharged 
to Australia or Britain, as the ‗ill-consequences of their staying on would be great‘.207 
It was only after these sailors were ordered back to Calcutta and broken up 
subsequently, that the government felt some relief.
208
 This policy of hastily recruiting 
and then discharging these seamen on the part of the colonial government eventually 
led to a greater problem of European vagrancy in India.
209
 But this is beyond the 
purview of our present discussion.  
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
The cumulative effect of rumour and panic that was manifested in Calcutta and its 
surrounding regions was followed by acts of open rebellion in the region east of the 
lower province of the Bengal presidency. A few observations can be made in this 
context. Firstly, as has been argued by Eric Stokes and stressed by C.A. Bayly, 
Rudrangshu Mukherjee and Tapti Roy, this chapter too argues that the nature and 
character of the rebellion depended and varied according to the specificity of the 
region. The absence of any formal attachment of the rebel sepoys with the land and 
rural population in the region, as was the case in Awadh, constricted the scope of the 
rebellion. As a consequence, although different regiments of the native army 
mutinied in the region, the objective of these rebel sepoys was to go back to their 
own places from where they were recruited. This is evident from the eventual arrival 
of the mutinied sepoys of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry from Dhaka to Awadh. But the 
stark similarity of rebel action and from the various mutinious plots it appears that 
the region was interconnected with the north-central Gangetic heartland. Secondly, 
although support from the landed aristocracy or the civil population for the rebellion 
was limited, we have argued that the rebel sepoys did receive some covert support 
and sympathy from local groups and from within the neighbouring regions. The 
connections established between the sepoys and the Faraizi sects, the assistance 
provided by the Bhutan Subah and, in particular the local zamindar Hurrah Singh 
towards the mutinous sepoys, the covert assistance received from the rebel Manipuri 
princes and the local Kookies in the region, elucidate this point further. Furthermore, 
it was not only the mutinous sepoys who were a real cause of concern for the 
colonial administration. From the case study of Jessore, it appears that the retired 
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army-men who were later incorporated into the civil administration, had as much 
commonality of interest and were as much involved as the mutinous sepoys of the 
region. In spite of the network of intelligence and the emergency deployment of the 
European seamen in the region, the colonial government not only failed to check the 
panic and the subsequent outburst of the rebellion, but found it extremely difficult to 
keep track of rebel actions. Many a times, the colonial government was clueless 
regarding the activities and movement of the mutineers because of the contradictory 
reports and the unverified sources of information coming from different districts of 
the province and from the north-central Gangetic heartland. As a result even the 
colonial government failed to act rationally taking recourse to superstitious acts, 
which exacerbated the situation. Last but not the least, although the European 
seamen of the Naval Brigades played a vital role in suppressing and checking the 
rebellious outbursts to a certain extent, especially in Chittagong and more so in 
Dhaka, but the ways in which these seamen were recruited by the colonial 
government, did not help their cause in the long run.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FROM RELIANCE TO DISSIDENCE:  
ASSAM AND THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters, which dealt with the regions in the lower province of 
Bengal, I have attempted to study and analyse the nature and character of the 
rebellion as it unfolded in a chronological and spatial sequence. While doing so, 
efforts were made to study the role of rumours in shaping the course of events, the 
actions of rebels and the response of the colonial state in dealing with the crises. In 
the present chapter I wish to analyse similar questions in the context of the North-
East Frontier of British India. As stated earlier in the introduction, the rebellion of 
1857 has so far mostly been studied in terms of the acts of violence that was 
unfolded in various parts of India. As a consequence, the history of the rebellion vis-
à-vis Assam and the northeast region of India had been consigned to collective 
oblivion from the historiography of the rebellion. Although there has been no dearth 
of historical research on the north-east and Assam, the rebellion of 1857 only figures 
as a passing reference in contemporary scholarly writings.
1
 The rebellion formed an 
                                                          
1
 In the recent years, apart from the article on the historiography of literature and sources concerning 
the rebellion in north-east by David R. Syiemlieh, there has been no initiative to have a fresh look 
on this subject. See David R Syiemlieh, "Historiography of Literature and Sources on the Uprising 
of 1857 in North East India," in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), Rethinking 1857, Hyderabad: 
Orient Blackswan, 2007.; The rebellion of 1857 vis-à-vis Assam has figured only as a partial 
reference point in Jayeeta Sharma‘s book which has otherwise dealt with issues of local and 
imperial knowledge, economic improvement and social progress, cultural and religious assertions, 
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important event in the history of the colonial rule and the later-day nationalist 
movement in Assam. This chapter sets the rebellion of 1857 in a historical context 
that analyses the background in which the intended rebellion in Assam took shape. It 
will be an interesting investigation in terms of the contrasting response from the 
actors that were involved. Assam and the North-East Frontier, unlike the lower 
provinces of the Bengal presidency discussed in the previous chapters, came under 
formal British control in 1826, only about three decades before the rebellion broke 
out in 1857. In this context the chapter briefly looks at the ways in which colonial 
rule was established in Assam, socio-political and other structural changes that were 
brought in by the colonial administration in this province, the response and resistance 
of the traditional ruling elites related to the changed structure of administration, 
eventually leading to the intended rebellion in 1857. The chapter seeks to explore the 
extent to which the events unfolding in the lower province of the Bengal Presidency 
and in the Gangetic heartland were interconnected with the development of the 
situation in Assam during the time of the rebellion. While doing so, it also looks at 
the reactions and responses of the actors involved belonging to both the side of the 
spectrum.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
colonial exploitation, local resistances and nationalist ideologies. See Jayeeta Sharma, Empire's 
Garden: Assam and the Making of India, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.; 
Similarly, in the recent book on Goalpara by Sanghamitra Misra, there is hardly any reference of 
the events concerning the rebellion of 1857 and its effect on the region. Sa ghamitr  Mi ra, 
Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India, 
Transition in Northeastern India, New Delhi; New York: Routledge, 2011.  
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4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Assam was formally brought under the dominion of the British East India Company 
in 1826 after the expulsion of the Burmese and the signing of the treaty of Yandaboo 
with the King of Ava on the 24 March 1826.
2
 The authorities of the East India 
Company, both in India as well as in England, were interested in the commercial 
possibilities with the North-East Frontier since 1780s.
3
 As early as in September 
1785, on the representation made by the merchant adventurers, the Council in 
Calcutta had expressed the desire to extend the Company‘s salt-trade into the 
neighbouring kingdom of Assam.
4
 In fact, this period witnessed several officials of 
the East India Company struggling to gain exclusive rights over the sites of 
production and distribution of salt in this region.
5
 
With the Burmese invasion in Assam and the North-East Frontier, situations 
began to change rapidly. By early 1817, the Burmese invaded the Upper Assam, 
crushed all the opposition and carried off in return a huge indemnity including an 
Ahom princess as a present to the harem of the Burmese monarch.
6
 In the absence of 
                                                          
2
 Walter Hamilton, The East-India Gazetteer, vol. 1, London: W. H. Allen and Company, 1828, p. 95. 
3
 Anil Chandra Banerjee, The Eastern Frontier of British India, 1784-1826, 4th ed., Calcutta: K.P. 
Bagchi & Company, 1986, pp. 10-12.  
4
 H. K. Barpujari, Assam in the Days of the Company, 1826-1858: A Critical and Comprehensive 
History of Assam During the Rule of the East-India Company from 1826-1858, Based on Original 
Assamese and English Sources, Both Published and Unpublished, 2nd rev. and enl. ed., Gauhati, 
Assam: Spectrum Publications: Sole distributors, United Publishers, 1980, p. 6. 
5
 Mi ra, Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India: p. 
75. 
6
 Upper and Lower Assam: The province of Assam is usually divided into two broad categories based 
on the flow of the river Brahmaputra. The logic behind this categorization is that the river flows 
from high land towards the low land. Since Brahmaputra flows from the eastern part of Assam 
toward the western side, the eastern parts of Assam, being high lands are known as Upper Assam 
and western parts are known as Lower Assam.  
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a strong and organised opposition and the initial policy of non-intervention of the 
East India Company, the Burmese dictated the terms by becoming the kingmakers of 
these otherwise independent princely states of India. The East India Company 
authorities in Calcutta ignored these initial threats and indirectly encouraged the 
Ahom Princes to build up arms, ammunitions and men in order to be ready for the 
impending attack from the Burmese. However, the continuous aggressive acts and 
war-like preparations from the Burmese in and around Assam and Cachar followed 
by the invasion of the island of Shahpuri in 1823, forced the British authorities to 
reconsider their policy of non-intervention.
7
 As Yasmin Saikia pointed out, the 
British became fearful that the Burmese might overrun the region and subsequently 
knock on their door in Bengal.
8
 Eventually, when the Burmese tried to invade the 
region in the early months of 1824, Lord Amherst, the Governor General of India at 
the time, had no other options but to declare the war against them. In February 1826 
the King of Ava formally renounced his claim upon Assam and the neighbouring 
states of Manipur and Jaintia. Anandaram Dhekial Phukan, one of the eminent 
personalities of the time later recalled, ‗Our countrymen hailed the day on which the 
British supremacy was proclaimed... lawless tyranny and barbarous inhuman policy 
of the Burmese depopulated the country and destroyed more than half of the 
population.‘9 
                                                          
7
 Shahpuri Island is situated in the southernmost part of the Chittagong district in present-day 
Bangladesh. 
8
 Sayeeda Yasmin Saikia, Fragmented Memories: Struggling to Be Tai-Ahom in India, Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 2005, p. 8. 
9
 A. Dhekial Phukan, ―Observation on the Administration of the Province of Assam‖ in Andrew John 
Moffatt Mills, Report on the Province of Assam, Gauhati, 1854, p. 93.  
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With the defeat of the Burmese, the British paramountcy was established in the 
whole of the North-East Frontier of India. David Scott, the Agent to the Governor 
General in the North-East Frontier, on 15 April 1826, almost immediately guaranteed 
the sovereignty of Cachar, Manipur and Jaintia with their respective rulers, and 
proposed to the Government of Bengal the restoration of the former Ahom monarchy 
in Upper Assam under the protection of the East India Company.
10
 Not everyone 
amongst the Company officials was convinced by Scott‘s proposals. Authorities back 
in Calcutta were against the idea of restoring the Ahom princes to the Upper Assam 
mainly on the pretext that none of the princes helped the cause of the British during 
the Burmese war.
11
 After some deliberation, Lord William Bentinck, the Governor 
General of India of the time, finally decided to restore the Ahom Princes to Upper 
Assam. But again, the question that the British administration had to face was whom 
to install as the Raja. Eventually on 2 March 1833 Purandar Singha was declared the 
ruler of Assam, under the condition, amongst others, that he would pay an annual 
tribute of 50,000 rupees to the East India Company.
12
 But more importantly, he was 
given this condition that if, in any way, he was found ‗unsuitable‘ for the job, the 
East India Company reserved the right to either transfer the territory to another ruler, 
or, might take it within its own domain at any point of time. Thus, in other words, 
although Purandar Singha was given the supreme right over the throne, but in all 
practical purposes it was the East India Company‘s government who had the final 
say and control. In order to prevent any further complications, the government 
decided to remove Chandra Kanta Singha, the other claimant to the throne to 
                                                          
10
 Secret and Political Consultations, 14 July 1827, Number: 2, Government of Bengal, OIOC. 
11
 Secret and Political Consultations, 7 March
 
1828, Number 4, Government of Bengal, OIOC. 
12
 Saikia, Fragmented Memories: p. 9. 
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Kaliabar in Central Assam where he was given a pension of five hundred rupees but 
was kept under strict surveillance.
13
  
It is important to note here that after the defeat of the Burmese, the British 
introduced certain far-reaching changes in the region, the most significant being in 
the system of agrarian relations. Under the Ahom rule the payment of revenue in the 
form of cash or produce was of a limited extent and the foundations of its fiscal 
system was an insistence on labour services of the entire community. For this 
purpose the entire free population (paiks) was divided into groups called khels, each 
khel being further divided into smaller units (gots), composed of three or four 
paiks.
14
 This traditional set-up in the land relation in Assam was fundamentally 
altered with the establishment of the colonial rule in the region. The introduction of a 
distinct professional army and an elaborate administrative network of bureaucracy by 
the colonial administration made the labour services of the paiks redundant, since the 
British wanted such labour services transformed into a cash tribute.
15
 Instead, the 
paiks were converted from serfs to free tenants on payment of three rupees a year.
16
 
This measure, as Gareth Price has argued, coupled with the failure to pay any 
compensation to the Ahom ruling class, curtailed the latter‘s economic power.17 In 
addition, the khel system, as a unit of assessment, was unworkable to the British. 
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 Judicial Proceedings Number 341(a), 12 May 1834, Government of Bengal, WBSA. 
14
 ‗Pyke‘, or ‗paik‘, referred to an enrolled adult male subject of the Ahom King having to render 
specific duties to the state. ‗Khel‘ is an organisation of paiks having to perform specific services to 
the Ahom government. 
15
 Benoy Bhushan Chaudhuri, "The Land and the People: Agrarian Relations in Eastern India," in 
Dharma Kumar (ed.), The Cambridge Economic History of India Volume 2, C.1757-C.1970, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983: p. 92. 
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University of Bristol, 1997, p. 144. 
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 Price, ―The Assam Movement‖: p. 144. 
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Furthermore, the Bengal model of permanent settlement introduced by Cornwallis in 
1793 was not followed in Assam, owing to a growing feeling that the permanent 
fixation of the land revenue demand would be a sheer folly in view of the increasing 
financial needs of the Company. As a result, the revenue demand in Assam was 
increased from time to time since the British took control of the region.
18
 As Benoy 
Bhushan Chaudhuri had pointed out, the old Assamese aristocracy, both lay and 
spiritual, to which the Ahom king trusted the defense of the realm and a large part of 
the civil administration, became redundant under the new system.
19
 The British 
denied this aristocracy any share in the administration, and gradually confiscated 
such estates. Even where the aristocrats could retain some, the abolition of the khel 
system and slavery deprived them of the necessary labour force required for their 
cultivation.
20
 Their position only worsened when they, not being able to reconcile to 
the changes, sought to retrieve their lost power by force. 
Quite clearly what the British authorities desired of the dispossessed nobility 
was a radical readjustment in their mental outlook. It fell too heavily on a class of 
people, long accustomed to a life of ease, to change their habits so abruptly and to 
take up other avocations, particularly those demanding manual labour. The far 
reaching changes that had taken place since the British occupation naturally brought 
irritation and suffering in every home that had solely depended on the services of the 
others. The utter destitution to which some of the higher families were reduced to 
could be read in the piteous representations that were made frequently whenever an 
                                                          
18
 Assam Revenue Commissioner's Office, Report on the Revenue Administration of the Province of 
Assam: Calcutta, 1854. 
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 Chaudhuri, ―The Land and the People: Agrarian Relations in Eastern India,‖ p. 93. 
20
 Chaudhuri, ―The Land and the People: Agrarian Relations in Eastern India,‖ p. 93. 
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opportunity presented itself. As the years rolled on their lot became more and more 
unbearable, eventually realising that their salvation lay in the restoration of the 
ancient regime, and only through such an event, could they hope to retrieve their 
fortune.   
Thus, within a few years after the British took control of the region, there were 
already signs of rebellion against the colonial government from various groups of the 
Ahom nobilities. As early as in 1828, Gomdhar Singha, a descendent of the great 
Ahom King Suhummong (1497-1539) claimed his position in the region. His claim 
was to a large extent strengthened by the dispossessed Ahom nobility who took this 
as an opportunity to regain their lost privileges.
21
 But when his claim to be the Rajah 
was denied, Gomdhar had no other option but to go for an open rebellion against the 
colonial government.
22
 Although Gomdhar and his associates met with some initial 
success in troubling the colonial government, but their hopes were soon belied when 
Captain Neufville, along with Lieutenant Rutherford, intercepted the movements of 
the rebels.
23
 After a feeble resistance Gomdhar and his fellow men surrendered and 
was later convicted and tried in Jorhat.
24
 A similar attempt was made by the nobles 
almost immediately in 1829 to overthrow the British rule from the region, this time 
under another Ahom prince named Gadadhar, then Governor of the Burmese 
province of Menda-Tim Myoo. Gadadhar and his fellows had planned for an armed 
resistance with the help of the Burmese emperor by taking him into confidence. In 
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 Foreign Department Secret Consultations Number: 11-4, 12 March 1830, Government of Bengal, 
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24
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addition to this, Gadadhar in an attempt to win over the native sepoys to his side, 
tried to get in touch with one Zalim Singh, the Subadar of the Assam Light Infantry 
at Sadiya.
25
 However the plan failed when Zalim Singh, who was the loyal servant of 
the British government, arrested Gadadhar and sent him to Guwahati for trial.    
The initial attempts of rebellion by the Ahom nobilities in order to overthrow 
the British control from the region were not that successful. Nonetheless there seems 
to be little doubt of the fact that the people were opposed to the colonial control of 
the region right from the very inception. Their failure was chiefly due to the fact that 
these attempted rebellions were mainly confined to the members of the Ahom 
nobility and the other disgruntled sections of the population who were deprived of 
the benefits of the British rule. Also, as Ajit Kumar Dutta has pointed out, there was 
a severe lack of unity amongst these factions and the absence of a strong and 
efficient leader.
26
 At a time when they were expected to rise to the occasion they 
simply could not rise above their own interests and personal rivalries. Another 
important factor behind the lack of popular mass support for these early rebellions 
was the fact that in almost every instance the nobilities were rallying behind a new 
prince, ignoring Chandrakanta Singha and Purandar Singha who were the actual 
legal claimants of the Ahom throne. The hopes of these hard-pressed nobilities 
initially rested on the members of the royal family who were still acknowledged by 
many as the leaders of the people. It was the sole responsibility of Purandar Singha 
to represent the grievances of his nobilities to the British government. Purandar 
Singha endeavoured to impress the authorities in Calcutta that there was a growing 
                                                          
25
 Foreign Department Secret Consultations Numbers: 4-6, 25 June 1830, NAI. 
26
 Ajit Kumar Dutta, Maniram Dewan and the Contemporary Assamese Society, Jorhat: Anupoma 
Dutta Distributors, Bidya Mandir, 1990, pp. 60-61. 
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discontent amongst the higher classes and the nobilities, and that the vast majority of 
the subjects still longed for his restoration.
27
 But it was all in vain.  
At around the time when the nobilities and the aristocracies as well as the 
people of the region were desperately seeking someone who could bring an end to all 
their suffering, Maniram Barua, hitherto one of the most trusted and loyal officials of 
the British government, came up with the task of relieving them. A brief discussion 
about Maniram is necessary to understand the broader context of his involvement in 
the intended rebellion of 1857. 
 
4.3 MANIRAM DIWAN: A COLLABORATOR TURNED REBEL 
Maniram Barbhandar Barua, more popularly known as Maniram Diwan, belonged to 
a distinguished Assamese family with a long record of service to the Ahom 
monarchy.
28
 From his early years, Maniram displayed sharp intellect and rapidly 
excelled in statistical figures, comparative charts and tables.
 29
 After taking the 
formal control of the region, for the British the situation now demanded an urgent 
mapping and settlement as the newly acquired region was relatively unknown to 
them. This provided Maniram an excellent opportunity to ingratiate his way into the 
new political establishment. Maniram was initially so grateful to the efforts of the 
British that he prayed to God to grant the British a million-year rule in Assam as a 
                                                          
27
 A.S., File Number 299; See the memorial by Babu Gopinath Mukherjee, Attorney to the Raja, July 
24, 1849, also April 27, 1841, Government of Bengal, NAI. 
28
 For further details, see: Benudhar Sharma, Maniram Dewan, Calcutta: Publication House, 1950. 
29
 Bijay Bhushan Hazarika, Political Life in Assam During the Nineteenth Century, New Delhi: Gyan 
Pub. House, 2006. 
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reward for rescuing the people from the ‗sea of Burmese trouble‘.30 In fact, for his 
help and assistance towards the British, Maniram was rewarded with an important 
post in the revenue department in 1828, apart from his de-facto position as the chief 
native advisor to the colonial administration in Assam. Thus, in many different ways, 
it was a symbiotic relationship between Maniram and the colonial administration.  
Maniram‘s honeymoon period with the British was not destined to last for 
long. After the resumption of the Ahom monarchy in 1838, the government took 
away from him most of the benefits he had enjoyed. Disillusioned to a large extent, 
he decided to take up the post of Diwan in the Assam Tea Company instead. 
Maniram‘s knowledge and local networks greatly helped the tea enterprise to 
establish itself firmly in the province. As Jayeeta Sharma reminds us, he helped more 
regular supplies of scarce rice through his establishment of weekly haats (local 
markets) near the tea gardens where villagers brought goods to sell.
31
 One of the 
directors of the Assam Tea Company, William Princep, on a visit from Calcutta, was 
delighted with Maniram‘s endeavours: ‗I find the Native Department of the office in 
the most beneficial state under the excellent direction of Muneeram, whose 
intelligence and activity is of the greatest value to our Establishment.‘32 Although 
successful in the initial few years as the Diwan, he had a bitter confrontation with 
one of the junior assistants of the Assam Tea Company, and finally resigned from the 
post in 1845.
33
 Disappointed and disheartened with the colonial policies in the 
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 Dutta, Maniram Dewan and the Contemporary Assamese Society: p. 36. 
31
 Sharma, Empire's Garden: p. 45. 
32
 Assam Company Report of the Local Directors Made to the Shareholders at a General Meeting, 
Held at Calcutta August 11th, 1841, Calcutta: Bishop's College Press, 1841. 
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region, Maniram henceforth associated and started projecting himself as the 
spokesperson for the restoration of the Ahom monarchy and the rights and privileges 
of the Ahom nobilities.
34
 This would lead him to visit Calcutta quite frequently 
where he petitioned the British authorities in favour of the restoration of the Ahom 
monarchy.  
The ambitions of Maniram are best reflected in one of the petitions that he 
presented to Sir Andrew John Moffat Mills, the Judge of the Sadar Diwani Adalat, 
who was deputed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in 1853 to conduct an 
enquiry into the state of the local administration in the province.
35
 In this petition, 
Maniram presented a balance sheet of the rule of the East India Company in Assam 
for the last three decades, highlighting a long list of grievances amongst the people of 
the region. Maniram praised the initial intervention of the British in the region 
whereby they assumed the direct administration of the lower part of the province 
while the upper province was set aside for the Ahom throne. However the trouble 
began when the government started interfering with the traditional order and system 
                                                                                                                                                                    
he was slapped by one of the officials of the Assam Company and was thus dismissed. Another tale 
has it that Maniram‘s establishment of his own tea-estates offended the Assam Company. See 
Sharma, Empire's Garden: pp. 45-46. 
34
 Maniram‘s disillusionment towards the colonial rule was further exasperated when the land he had 
acquired for the two tea-gardens at Cinnamora and Safrai was not granted special revenue 
concessions under the Waste Land Grant Rules of 1838. On the other hand his plantation land was 
assessed as ordinary rice-land, for which Maniram had to pay very high rates of land revenue. See: 
Tilottoma Misra, ―Assam: A Colonial Hinterland‖, Economic and Political Weekly, 15, no. 2, 1980, 
pp. 1357-1364: 1358.      
35
 Petition of Maniram Diwan on account of Ghanakanta Singha Yuvraj and others to A.J.M. Mills, 
Report on the Province of Assam Calcutta, 1854, pp. 603-604. 
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of authority.
36
 Interestingly the memorial also pointed out the changed relationship of 
the government with the hill tribes of the region. During the days of the Ahom rule 
all the tribes used to enjoy certain royal favours. But the British government 
abolished all these favours. ‗By the introduction into the Province of new customs, 
numerous courts, an unjust system of taxation, an objectionable treatment of the Hill 
Tribes, the consequence of which has been a constant warfare with them, involving a 
mutual loss of life and money‘ on both the sides.37 They feared that the British were 
about to take absolute control of the region and their initial proclamations were only 
a camouflage to conceal their real intentions. Also, many of the Ahom nobles could 
not be accommodated under the pension scheme and became disaffected elements. In 
light of this, he strongly urged for the restoration of the Ahom princes – Ghanakanta 
Singha or Kandarpeswar Singha – that might reintroduce the customs and institutions 
of the old days. It is important to note in this context, as Barpujari had argued, that 
Maniram perhaps did not have any preference as to which of the Ahom prince he was 
speaking in favour of. All he wanted was the restoration of ancient regime in the 
province.
38
  
Maniram had thus taken a decisive step forward as far as his relationship with 
the British was concerned, though an open defiance towards the British was yet to 
come. However, the violent terms in which he had denounced the British 
government did not serve his cause and worsened the already embittered relations 
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with the local authorities. A. J. Moffatt Mills, the Judge of the Sadar Diwani 
Adawlat (Chief Civil Court), was deputed by the Governor-General in Council to 
make a close enquiry regarding the local state of administration in the province.
39
 
This detailed and exhaustive report, commonly known as the Mills’s Report on 
Assam, forms one of the principal source materials of the administrative history of 
the region in the days of the Company. In this report Mills himself made a searching 
criticism on different aspects of the government‘s policies and spared no one in this 
regard. But, where he differed fundamentally from Maniram was that while the 
former came up with some constructive suggestions for the general improvement of 
the administration and help consolidate the position of the British Empire in the 
region, the latter was convinced that the only way to change the existing situation 
was to return to the older order. Mills believed that Maniram was by nature ‗an 
intriguing person‘, and was responsible for creating discontent and disturbing the 
general tranquillity of the region.
40
 He strongly suggested the government not to 
entertain the points raised by Maniram in his petition. Disappointed Maniram was 
not about to give up his hope and made several attempts to represent his case to the 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in Calcutta. But despite his trying efforts, he could 
not persuade the government.  
 
4.4 THE REBELLION OF 1857 AND MANIRAM DIWAN 
It was at this time when the outbreak of the rebellion of 1857 provided the desperate 
Maniram with a new opportunity. While he frequently visited Calcutta to persuade 
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the colonial government, he heard the reports of the outbreak of mutiny in different 
parts of north and central India. Fresh reports were pouring in every day of the 
circulation of some strange and apparently meaningless items like chapatis across the 
villages and districts of northern India.
41
 Like the modern day chain letters, these 
chapatis were to be multiplied and circulated amongst friends by the recipient.
42
 The 
government, though very much aware of this circulation, had no idea what these 
actually signified. As Wagner has noted, the colonial administration regarded with 
deep suspicion, bordering on paranoia, any type of communication amongst Indians 
which they could not understand.
43
 The administration was particularly confused and 
unnerved by the speed with which these chapatis were being circulated.
44
 By the time 
the authorities were informed of its transmission within a district, it had already 
moved on – an understandably disturbing sign of the efficiency of the indigenous 
modes of communication that lay outside colonial control. Calcutta, the capital of the 
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British empire of the time, was swayed with reports of various kinds: how the British 
arsenal in different parts of north and central India had fallen in to Indian hands, how 
the prisoners kept confined in various prisons had been set at liberty, how the various 
lines of communications had been shattered in various places. As we have already 
seen in the previous chapters, these reports, verified and unverified, had already 
created an atmosphere of panic and terror among the British administration in and 
around the city of Calcutta. The proclamations in the name of Bahadur Shah Zafar, 
the last of the Mughal Emperor, were being circulated and read in the dark of night. 
These proclamations contained some common grievances of the people of India 
which Maniram found were similar to his own thoughts in his petitions. The way 
forward was also the very same path that he had previously chalked out. The only 
difference being that, while Maniram was trying to persuade the government through 
prayers, pleas and petitions, the rebels of 1857 in the heartland of India had taken 
recourse to armed resistance. But these sensational reports and proclamations were 
adequate to move the Diwan away from the constitutional procedure which he had so 
far followed. 
There were already adequate incendiary materials in the North-East Frontier 
which Maniram realised could easily be united with that of the general uprising of 
1857. The geographical location of the region, the attitude of the nobility, the empty 
assurances of the colonial officials, the successive humiliation suffered at the hands 
of the British by both the rulers and the ruled of the region and the growing 
unpopularity of the British administration amongst the border tribes of the region – 
all these factors were already on his mind. But what made the Diwan change his plan 
of action was the deployment of the native sepoys in the region. It might be 
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recollected that since the withdrawal of the Regular Troops in 1828, the defence of 
the North-East Frontier was entrusted to the regiment that was originally formed for 
the service in the province of Cuttack.
45
 This became the Assam Light Infantry 
Battalion whose headquarter was in Guwahati. In addition, to guard the extreme 
frontiers, Captain Hannay raised another battalion of the Irregular army composed of 
recruits mostly from the Assamese, Singhphoes and some other tribes.
46
 But by 1844, 
when the government realised that most of the tribes had withdrawn from the corps, 
there were some redistribution of the sepoys and officers and the corps were 
upgraded and converted into the Second Assam Light Infantry battalion. At around 
the time of the uprising of 1857, the head quarters of the First Assam Light Infantry 
was under the command of Major Hannay and was based in Dibrugarh, while the 
Second Assam Light Infantry was based in Guwahati under the command of Major 
Richardson. This apart, detachments were also posted at other strategic outposts of 
the frontier.
47
 Although the harrowing tales of massacres of the British men and 
women by the native sepoys were, by then, already pouring in from various sources – 
wanderer and fakirs, newspapers, reports, personal letters and rumours – the sepoys 
of the Assam Light Infantry remained calm and remained loyal to the British 
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government in the initial period.
48
 One of the probable reasons was the fact that the 
number of Hindustani sepoys in these regiments was not so great and the social 
composition of the sepoys in this region was heterogeneous in nature.
49
 The majority 
of the sepoys recruited in the army came from different communities like Nepalis, 
Manipuris, Rabhas, Jarrowas, Doaneahs and other tribes. That the prevailing 
situation in the barracks was peaceful is evident from the statement of Major Jenkins, 
the Commissioner of Assam who flattered himself to report to the authorities back in 
Calcutta that despite the pressing invitations from the rebels, both the regiments 
stationed at Debrugarh and Gauhati had not only expressed their loyalty to the 
government but even some of them have also volunteered their services for joining in 
actions against the rebels.
50
  
 
4.5 INTENSIFICATION OF THE UPRISING IN THE GANGETIC HEARTLAND AND ITS 
REPERCUSSIONS IN THE REGION 
The situation in Assam began to change towards the close of July 1857 when the 
news of the mutiny of the Danapur Regiment and especially the defection of Kunwar 
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Singh of Jagdishpur in Bihar began to reach the North-East Frontier.
51
 There was a 
sizeable number of native sepoys in the Assam Light Infantry who were recruited 
from the district of Arrah in Bihar, near to where Kunwar Singh lived.
52
 These 
sepoys were now persuaded to believe the rumour that the British rule that was to last 
for hundred years was actually coming to an end and that the Mughal Emperor in 
Delhi had already reinstated himself on the throne and a large part of the country was 
already in the hands of the native sepoys.
53
 The diary of George Carter, a British 
soldier stationed at Debrugarh at the time, provides an important source for this 
period. Carter, a sergeant in the 2
nd
 Bengal Fusiliers in Ambala, was transferred in 
1856 to the 1
st
 Assam Light Infantry. In the beginning of June 1857, Carter learnt 
through the Calcutta Phoenix Extraordinary of the outbreak of the mutiny in the 
heartland of India. He wrote,  
The rebellion as far as I can glean from natives has been foreseen for 
some years by them in an indiscreet manner: there is a prophecy 
among them which has been talked of till they believed it would be a 
true one: namely, that after the completion of a hundred years from 
the time the British took Bengal (i.e., the battle of Plassey on 23
rd
 
June 1757) the British in India will expire.
54
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Colonel Hannay, the commander officer of the 1
st
 Assam Light Infantry, in the month 
of July reported excitement prevailing in the cantonment and urged for precautionary 
measures to be taken immediately. He also informed Carter in August that the agents 
from northern India were in Gauhati and was ‗trying to arrange a rising amongst our 
Sepoys in connection with the Assam Rajah.‘55 What made the situation even more 
critical for the British was the dearth of adequate European soldiers in the province 
compared to the vast number of native sepoys. Although there were a few platoons of 
European soldiers miles away, they could not be discharged from their duties at the 
time and moved in to the North-East Frontier.
56
  
Enthused by all these factors and developments discussed above, Maniram 
started sending letters through messengers in the guise of fakirs. The letters were 
more often written in heavily coded language that echoed the ‗surging passions of 
Hindustan‘ to Kandarpeswar Singha, the grandson of Purandar Singha and the young 
Rajah of Assam. These correspondences addressed to the King and the nobles soon 
reached a wider audience. These letters and private correspondences containing 
detailed instructions were also addressed to the leading ranks and nobilities of Assam 
like the Gosain of Kamalabari, Madhuram Koch, Mayaram Barbara, Chitrasen 
Barbara, Ganesh Chandra Barua, Marangi Khowa Gohain, Sheikh Bahadur Gaonbura 
and most notably, Piyali alias Mahesh Chandra Barua.
57
 In the absence of the Diwan, 
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Piyali Barua acted as the Chief Counsel to the young King Kardarpeswar Singha. 
Piyali had a rare combination of being a politician with musical talent. But, more 
importantly, he was a man of rare organising capacity. He had his hold not only over 
the people but also over the sepoys of the 2
nd
 Assam Light Infantry. In fact all these 
correspondences and secret deliberations from the Diwan mainly veered around 
Piyali Barua who was the rallying point behind the network. At a time when the 
sepoys in the region were becoming restless with the recent developments across the 
country, Piyali Barua along with Nirmal Hazari took the opportunity and regularly 
visited the several military detachments in Golaghat, in the district of Sibsagar, and 
also at Debrugarh and Saikhowa, in an attempt to raise them against the British 
government. Supposedly sent by the young prince Kandarpeswar Singha, these two 
agents tried to lure the native sepoys with tempting bait: ‗The Sahibs must be killed 
and the rajah should be placed on the throne; the latter would have to furnish with 
‗rasud‘ [provisions], the ball and powder‘ while the Rajah in turn ‗would double the 
pay of the sepoys and give the native officers‘ pay like the ‗Jongie paltan‘ [i.e. a 
platoon of Europeans] if all the sepoys would join and get him the country.‘58  
These voices of dissent were soon heard echoing from others as well. The 
reports of the Calcutta Directors of the Assam Tea Company noted that in the town of 
Nazira, in the Sibsagar district of Assam, under the leadership of one tea garden 
contractor named Madhuram Koch, labourers refused to carry out their tasks any 
further on the plea that they would not get their pay since all the Europeans will soon 
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be cut up.
59
 This point has also been highlighted by Amalendu Guha in his study 
Planter Raj to Swaraj.
60
 The popular character of the rebellion in Assam could be 
discerned from the observations made by the Board of Directors of the Assam Tea 
Company in Calcutta at the time which observed on 2 March 1858 that while the 
private servants were still obedient and loyal in maintaining order, the native 
inhabitants of the region who served as independent contractors for cultivating the 
land were suspected to be the troubled lot.
61
 Many of these native contractors, far 
from being cooperative in suppressing the rebellion, were in fact sympathetic with the 
young prince Kandarpeswar and the rebel sepoys. During this period, these dissenters 
held off from the performance of their contracts on the plea that they were not to be 
paid, believing that the Europeans ‗were to be cut up‘. The Chairman of the Assam 
Tea Company, D.C. Mackey, further reported about a series of meetings that 
Madhuram Koch had with the tea-plantation workers of the region ‗in the secret of 
the night‘ during the month of June and July 1857.62 Although the details of the 
meetings are no where to be found, but from the statement of one of the workers 
named Ramlal Bahadur, later recorded by Mackey, it was known that Madhuram had 
persuaded the workers to wait for the right opportunity, and once ‗the fitting moment 
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arrives‘ they should all rise up in arms, join their fellow comrades and help reinstate 
the King of Assam.
63
 According to the statement of Ramlal Bahadur, Madhuram had 
promised the workers that once they have succeeded ‗in freeing the country from the 
Firingis the King of Assam shall be rewarding them in the most wonderful manner‘.64 
Under the circumstances the Board of Directors therefore hardly had any confidence 
about the fidelity of these men: ‗Had an outbreak occurred, there can be little doubt 
that they would have sided with the rebels‘.65 The involvement of the Tea plantation 
workers during the rebellion of 1857 in Assam is an interesting aspect that deserves 
further investigation. Unfortunately the paucity of archival records has constricted us 
from doing so. But considering the traditional feudal setup of the Assamese society, it 
is not highly unlikely that the plantation labourers, many of whom were local recruits 
and had their loyalty towards their King, would probably have supported the cause of 
the rebellion in Assam.       
In addition to the labourers of the Plantation Company, Dutiram Barua of the 
House of Namtial Kakati, who was then serving as the ‗Seristadar‘, a keeper of 
records, at Sibsagar, resigned from his post and joined the ‗rebel cause‘.66 Shaikh 
Bhikan, the Subadar in command of the Hindustani sepoys at Dibrugarh, and other 
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leaders of the sepoys at Dibrugarh and Saikhowa, inspired by the development of the 
situation, swore upon their knightly words to help the cause of the King by all means; 
while Marangikhowa Gohain, the step-grandson of the King Purandar Singha who 
was in charge of the estate of Marangi, started recruiting men from his estate for the 
cause. 
The guiding spirit behind this whole plan was Maniram Diwan, then residing in 
Calcutta, who prompted the young prince Kandarpeswar, and with the help of his 
friends most notably a Bengali ‗muktear‘ (an agent or a spokesman) Madhu Mallik, 
prepared the grounds for the insurrection.
67
 These confidential deliberations were to 
an extent successful in evoking a ready response from the Chief and nobles of 
Dibrugarh, Golaghat, Nowgong, Gauhati and other places which were at a distance 
from Jorhat. Captain Holroyd, the Principal Assistant of Sibsagar at the time, later 
reported in details the proceedings of the rebels. According to Holroyd‘s report from 
around the time of the commencement of the rebellion, Madhu Mallik used to come 
to the Rajah and read to him and others in the court the news of the rebellion from the 
newspaper Samachar Darpan.
68
 In the month of May 1857, a letter came from 
Maniram Diwan in Calcutta to the Rajah that was later intercepted by colonial 
administration. It was a long letter about tea and indigo and other miscellaneous 
matters but inside of this was a smaller letter. In that letter Maniram Diwan wrote: 
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…in Hindoostan [Northern India] the Badshah had taken all the 
country… that but a little distance remained for his reaching Calcutta. 
The Sahebs in Calcutta were in great alarm and that in a few days‘ 
time Calcutta would be destroyed. The Rajah should consider and 
arrange matters for ascending on the Ghuddee [throne] and that he 
would reach Assam shortly with the sepoys [who were] ready to rise 
to join with them.
69
  
 
Holroyd added that Madhu Mallik insisted the Rajah to see to this matter at once but 
‗that it was not good to keep this letter and should be torn up at once.‘70 Towards the 
end of July 1857, Piyali Barua was deputed to Golaghat with letters from the Saring 
Rajah (Kandarpeswar Singha) in order to arrange matters with the native officers and 
sepoys on that command. The point to be noted in this context is that similar to the 
Gangetic heartland where the rebels had carried the formal ratification of the Mughal 
Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, Maniram realised that however strong his influence 
over the ruling elites of Assam was, in order to receive the support of the people it 
was essential to have the formal sanction of the King. Piyali Barua, while in 
Golaghat, visited influential people in the vicinity and arranged that the intended 
rising should occur about the time of the Durga Pujah in the month of October, when 
Maniram had stated to arrive.
71
 In the meantime during the months of July and 
August Piyali Barua and Madhu Mallik, along with a few others like Hensou Barua 
and Kumla Saringi Barua, took an active part in holding frequent meetings at Jorhat, 
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in the presence of the Saring Rajah.
72
 These meetings were attended by many others 
including Bahadoor Gaon Boora and Shaikh Farmud, who exerted themselves to 
induce others to unite in aid of the Rajah‘s designs. In addition, others were 
persuaded to collect russuds for the troops by offering them gold and valuable 
metals.
73
 
The tide seemed rapidly to be turning against the authorities and both the 
colonial administration as well as the European population in the region was alarmed 
with the prospect of an impending rebellion. Colonel F. Jenkins, the Agent to the 
Governor General of the North-East Frontier, had already expressed his concern 
regarding the restless behaviour of the sepoys in the province, many of whom were 
recruited from the region of Arrah, and were loyal to their rebel leader Kunwar 
Singh.
74
 Jenkins also mentioned the prior intimation from Captain Holroyd, the 
Principal Assistant of Sibsagar district, who had reported to him that ‗two or three 
native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, of the 1
st
 Light Assam 
Infantry on duty with a Detachment at Golaghaut proceeding on leave through 
Jorehaut, had on coming and going, interviews with the young Saring Rajah 
Kandarpeshwar Singh and offered the assistance of the men of both Regiments to 
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reinstate him on his throne and maintain the country for him.‘75 Lieutenant Colonel 
F. Hannay, Commander of the 1
st
 Assam Light Infantry, had also warned Jenkins 
about the treacherous nature of the Infantry since he was ‗well aware of the 
intriguing men in the Corps, as well as that amongst the Hindustanees… the brothers 
and relations of men whose Regiments have proved false, and I fear much more 
excitement on this head will take place when the mutiny of the Dinajepore 
Regiments is known.‘76 Mention may also be made in this context of the role of one 
native doctor Hydait Ali of the 1
st
 Assam Light Infantry. In one of his confidential 
correspondence Colonel Hannay described him as a ‗clever, intelligent and a bigoted 
Mohamedan who possessed a tolerable knowledge of the English language and was 
imbued with all the prejudices of sectarianism.‘77 Hydait Ali was alleged to have 
lately assumed the role of a ‗spiritual leader among the class of Mohamedans‘ in the 
corps and the station in Dibrugarh. He along with another Jamadar in the corps, Noor 
Mohamed, was reportedly holding regular meetings of ‗seditious nature‘.78 From 
some of the individuals who were cognisant of and shared in these discussions, it was 
learnt that they were trying to ‗contaminate the minds of the ignorant men in the 
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corps‘ and were planning the feasibility of seizing the guns from the station.79 
Furthermore, Colonel Jenkins was also sceptical about the conduct of the sepoys of 
2
nd
 Assam Light Infantry. Although the Hindustani sepoys were relatively few in 
number, Jenkins apprehended that their influence over the other sepoys in the 
regiment were great and would be able to sway them against the colonial 
government.
80
 
 
4.6 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 
The colonial government considered it necessary to reassess the whole situation and 
take appropriate steps to counter this impending storm that was threatening to engulf 
the entire province. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the 
government had earlier sent a few detachments of sepoys of the 1
st
 Assam Light 
Infantry towards Jalpaiguri in order to counter the mutiny of the sepoys of the 73
rd
 
Native Infantry.
81
 In addition there was severe paucity of the European troops and 
artillery in the whole of the North-East Frontier at the time, since most of the 
European troops were already engaged in bitter fight with the mutineers in the 
Gangetic heartland. Apprehending an impending attack from the rebellious groups in 
the province many of the European planters and English civilians left their property 
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and took shelter inside churches or were driven underground while others boarded 
country boats and lived mainstream till relief came.
82
  
Under the prevailing circumstances, Colonel Jenkins, Agent to the Governor 
General of the North-East Frontier, pleaded to the Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal to post in Assam a detachment of two companies of European Infantry along 
with the European Artillery consisting of at least two guns.
83
 In addition, he also 
requested the Governor General in Council to dispatch a detachment of European 
mariners and sailors by steamer or a light boat to Dibrugarh as soon as possible in 
order to ‗save the province from the revolution‘ along with the hope that would help 
infuse ‗confidence in all the parties, secure the allegiance of any who might be 
wavering and repress any hidden feeling of disaffection.‘84 However, it was easier 
said than done. Even though the authorities back in Calcutta could manage to spare 
some European troops for the service to Assam, which was indeed difficult for them 
to arrange at the time because of the paucity of the troops in the context of the 
intensification of the rebellion in the northern India, it would be extremely hazardous 
to move the reinforcements up through the Brahmaputra river during the rainy 
season. Nevertheless, considering the exigency of the situation, a small body of the 
European force of 104 men –under the command of Lieutenant Davis was ordered to 
be despatched to Dibrugarh without any further delay.
85
 This amphibious force – half 
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of whom had some kind of military training while the rest were seamen and were 
newly recruited for the purpose – left in the month of September 1857 on board the 
‗Haroonghatta‘ along with some supplies of medicines, arms and ammunition 
including two twelve pounder guns.
86
  
Luckily for the colonial administration there were still a few groups in the 
region who remained loyal towards the Raj, in spite of the repeated attempts made by 
the Hindustani factions amongst the sepoys to lure them away. Unlike the 1
st
 
regiment of the Assam Light Infantry, which was comprised mostly of the 
Hindustani sepoys, the regiment of the 2
nd
 Light Infantry, stationed in Gauhati, was 
more heterogeneous in its structural composition. Although initially the authorities in 
Dibrugarh, the head-quarters of the Assam Light Infantry, had reason to suspect the 
behaviour of the whole regiments, but later they were persuaded to believe that at 
least some of them would remain loyal and stand by their officers in command. The 
2
nd
 regiment, apart from a few Hindustani sepoys, was comprised mainly of the local 
recruits and the Nepalese, in addition to the Gurkhas, whom the administration 
believed would remain faithful towards them even under the present situation.
87
 In 
order to thwart the imminent rebellion in the province, arrangements were thus being 
made so as to bring all these groups of men and others who were available from the 
outlaying detachments – the Rabhas, the Manipuris and other non-Hindustanis – to 
the head quarter and place them in the various regimental lines around the 
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province.
88
 Some of the ‗able bodied‘ Nepali men were also recruited as a sort of 
military Police in order to maintain order in the stations. As a precautionary measure, 
in the district of Nowgong, Mr Morton, the Principal Assistant, destroyed the bridges 
over the rivers Missa and Diju, and cut off all communications from Jorhat to prevent 
the rebels from entering the province from that direction.
89
 In addition to this, Major 
Richardson, commanding the 2
nd
 Assam Light Infantry, suggested the formation of 
an independent body of artillery for lower Assam as a temporary measure. 
Consequently, he was authorised to raise a party of Cacharis or other local recruits 
for the service since the authorities apprehended that it might not be possible for 
them to command the service of the Captain Reid‘s Company of Artillery, which was 
completely made up of Hindustani sepoys.
90
 The colonial administration was 
extremely worried about the safety of the post in Dibrugarh because being the head-
quarters of the Assam Light Infantry, there were four 6 pounder Field guns, two 
twelve-pounder Howitzers and about sixty native artillery-men, and nearly all of 
whom were Hindustanis. As a precautionary measure, all the extra powder and the 
gun ammunitions were put in the fortified square and two six-pounder guns along 
with a party of picked men were put into the fortified square as a measure of defence 
in case of necessity, leaving the remaining two 6 pounders in the gun-shed of the 
artillery company, under charge of the officer commanding and his European non-
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commissioned officer.
91
 In addition the officials feared that the disbanded sepoys 
would ‗take advantage of any commotions to join any bands with whom they may 
have already connection‘, and thus decided to place armed bodies of men totally 
distinct from the present Police under the control of ‗the most respectable of the 
European planters.‘92 
 
4.7 THE TURNING POINT OF THE INTENDED REBELLION IN ASSAM 
The colonial government thus had genuine grounds to be extremely concerned 
regarding the situation in the North-East Frontier and had definite reasons to take 
immediate appropriate steps to avoid the danger that was beginning to threaten their 
presence in the province. The ‗rebels‘ too gauged that the time was ripe for them to 
strike. Accordingly, they tried to finalise their plan and fixed the date of attack in 
early October when Maniram was supposed to return to Assam with additional 
reinforcements.
93
 On that date, it was planned that all the sepoys would rise 
simultaneously at the various headquarters, seize the magazines and artilleries, 
release the prisoners, kill the Europeans and burn their properties after which they 
would march to Jorhat and proclaim the young Kandarpeswar Singha as the Rajah of 
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Assam.
94
 One may pause here to see the remarkable similarity and pattern between 
the intended uprising in Assam and that of the Gangetic heartland. As have been 
discussed in details in the previous chapters, these were ‗not just a symptom of 
mindless pathological disorder on the part of the rebels… but a common 
phenomenon in the popular movements involving crowds.‘95 That there was a 
definite plan for the future and a concerted action on the part of the ‗mutineers‘ is 
evident from the following deposition of Keramat Ali, one of the native doctors of 
the Golaghat regiment: 
… Maniram was to be the Prime Minister… that Mudoo Mullick was to 
be immediately under him in rank and position… that he (Peali) was to 
be the Barbhandar Barua, Lockeenath Hensoa Barua was to be the 
Nowbaisa Phukan… that Kamala Saringia Barua was to be made 
Subadar and Darogah of Jorhat… there would be no Khazana 
[revenue] but liksos as in older times…no revenue on barilands and 
[only] one rupee per poorali on the rupit lands as in former times; that 
all the Sahibs from Gauhati up to Dibrugarh were to be [transferred] to 
Jorhat and made over to the Rajah. That Roostam Singh [and] Noor 
Muhammad were to be Subedars…96 
 
However, there had to be a change of plan on the part of the rebels because of the 
precautionary measures that were being adopted by the colonial government. The 
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news of the arrival of the steamer carrying the Europeans in a few days‘ time had 
already reached and rumours were afloat that all the ‗Sahibs‘ would soon be leaving 
the country in that boat, carrying with them all the treasure and ammunitions.
97
 There 
were also vague reports that Mr. Masters, the sub-Assistant of the Golaghat division, 
had fled to the Sadar station in Sibsagar. The rebels were beginning to believe that a 
full-scale mutiny had already taken place at the headquarters and that unless they 
took immediate actions ‗the Sahibs might just escape by the steamer before they 
could kill them.‘98 While some of them were of the opinion that they should be 
cautious and wait till the time was opportune for taking actions, others suggested ‗to 
act at once in matters like this kind‘ and said that ‗if the steamer in the meantime 
come up and took away the treasure and the Sahibs, it would be a disgrace before the 
Rajah [Kandarpeswar Singh] that they could not seize the magazine or the treasure 
and kill the Sahibs.‘99  
Keramat Ali, one of the native doctors of the Golaghat regiment described the 
exact details of the plan that the rebels had charted out. According to his deposition, 
the rebels had made plans to march to the head-quarter in Jorhat and cut the head off 
the Darogah Harannath Baruah. Next they were to persuade the Jamadar Raghuveer 
Singh in Jorhat and along with him twenty other sepoys, who were still loyal to the 
colonial government, failing which they would kill him. Having secured their victory 
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in Jorhat, the rebels then planned to collect the arms and ammunitions along with the 
elephants from the head-quarter in Jorhat and reinstate Kandarpeswar Singha to the 
throne. Once that was done, they would then march straight to Shibsagar, set fire at 
Colonel Holroyd‘s house and kill all the European officials and residents, seize all 
the money and ammunitions, and persuade the native sepoys stationed there to join 
their side. Finally, leaving a few sepoys there to guard the post, the rebels would then 
march to Dibrugarh and planned to conduct the similar operation as in Shibsagar.
100
 
The detailed description of the impending plan of attack by the rebels, as provided by 
Keramat Ali in his deposition, is significant in two major ways: first, the fear and 
apprehension of the European residents (both civil and official) in the region about 
an open outbreak of rebellion and their possible annihilation were not completely 
unjustified. Second, the way the rebels had charted out the impending attack, 
indicates that they were cognisant of the whole situation and knew exactly what 
needed to be done. Also the eye-witness first person narrative of Keramat Ali, being 
a native account, provides us with an important source material in this context.  
In the end, the above mentioned plan could not be executed. This was perhaps 
the most crucial turning point of the intended rebellion in the region. Opinion was 
divided amongst the rebels. Keramat Ali and a few others tried to argue that it was 
better to ‗act with circumspection and wait till the next morning, making all the 
preparations during the night.‘101 Shaikh Bhikan, the Subadar of the detachment in 
Golaghat too grudgingly agreed to this. Keramat Ali also pointed out the fact that at 
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that moment there were only about fifty sepoys who were ready for the action. They 
should rather wait for the Jamadar in Borpathar to arrive with his men from the 
Command post, along with a few others from Jamuguri district.
102
 Finally, after a 
long deliberation, the rebels decided to defer the whole scheme of action for the time 
being, and in this way, inadvertently provided the colonial administration the much 
needed breathing space to regroup and reconfigure their options. Almost 
immediately, upon the receipt of the secret intelligence of the proceedings in 
Golaghat, the commander in charge of the 1
st
 Assam Light Infantry battalion, 
Colonel Hannay, ordered the arrest of Subadar Shaikh Bhikan and other ‗ring-
leaders‘ of the detachment and sent them to Dibrugarh to stand trial before the court 
martial.
103
 As for the rest of the detachment in Golaghat, they were brought under 
control by introducing strict disciplinary measures by Raghubir Singh, appointed as 
the Subadar of the detachment.
104
 
 
4.8 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INTENDED REBELLION  
The rebels, who included the detachments of sepoys as well as a section of the Ahom 
nobles, were primarily guided by the secret proceedings that were being sent by 
Maniram Diwan who was then residing in Calcutta. Most of these deliberations were 
addressed to the ‗Rajah‘ of Assam, Kandarpeswar Singha. To carry on his 
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correspondence from Calcutta, the Diwan used to engage various persons, in the 
guise of ‗Fakirs‘ or religious mendicants. These people, also known as Bhats, were 
generally recruited from the Gujarati communities.
105
 Around that time the officer-
in-charge at Jorhat was Haranath Parbatia Barua who remained staunchly loyal 
towards the British administration and had virtually proclaimed himself as the de-
facto ‗King‘ of Assam. Haranath was able to apprehend one such Bhat and came to 
know from the letters he was carrying about the ‗seditious messages‘ that were being 
sent by the Diwan from Calcutta for the intended rising in Assam.
106
 Although the 
letter itself was intended for Piyali Barua, but the address it had on, was that of King 
Kandarpeswar Singha. Sensing the urgency of the whole situation Haranath Barua 
wasted no time informing the Commissioner of Assam about the complicity of 
Kandarpeswar Singh and the Diwan in the plot against the colonial government.
107
 
Together with the Darogah Haranath Barua and his assistant Umed Munshi, Colonel 
Holroyd, the then Assistant Commissioner of Assam, discreetly organised a vigorous 
search for discovering the hidden traces of the projected rebellion in the light of the 
Diwan‘s letter.108 Quite expectedly, they were successful in unearthing various letters 
and exchanges between the King and the Diwan.
109
 It was therefore decided to raid 
the palace of the King and apprehend the King himself without further delay.
110
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However, initially the authorities wanted to tread with caution lest any haste in the 
seizure of the King should precipitate the crisis further.
111
 
In the beginning of September, when the position of the colonial administration 
was once again strengthened by the arrival of fresh reinforcements from various 
quarters, Colonel Holroyd, along with a party of 20 men, joined Captain Lowther 
from Dibrugarh at a place called Dikhowmukh to apprehend the young Rajah and his 
close associates who were allegedly involved in the conspiracy to overthrow the 
British rule from the region.
112
 Captain Lowther was the 2
nd
 in Command of the 1
st
 
Assam Light Infantry and in charge of a platoon of Gurkhas. Together, they 
proceeded towards Jorhat in the most discreet way possible to avoid any trouble from 
the mutinous corps at Golaghat.
113
 The entire operation was carried out while it was 
still dark and the party, headed by Captain Lowther and Colonel Holroyd along with 
the armed men, were able to successfully surround the whole palace and the King 
along with his entourage.
114
 At around the same time, a detachment was also sent to 
the house of Madhu Mallik, situated in the nearby Bazar at Jorhat, and was arrested 
without much of an effort.
115
 Under the instruction and supervision of Colonel 
Holroyd and Captain Lowther, the residences of the Rajah and his minister, Madhu 
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Mallik, were carefully searched throughout the day and a number of arms and 
relevant documents were recovered from them. It was however admitted by Colonel 
Holroyd that they were unable to secure the documents that were directly related to 
the intended rebellion.
116
  
After his arrest, the young prince Kandarpeswar Singh was, immediately sent 
to Mahghur, and from there to Calcutta and was confined as a state prisoner at the 
Central jail in Alipur.
117
 While in Calcutta, with the help of his solicitor Mr 
Ferguson, Kandarpeswar appealed for his defence to the charges of complicity in the 
conspiracy against the British government.
118
 Considering his young age, utter 
ignorance of the political developments in the province, and the fact that he was not 
proved to be a voluntary agent in the ‗conspiracy‘, the Commissioner decided to not 
bring him to trial and subsequently, was released from jail. But considering the 
political situation he was not allowed to return to his ancestral home in Jorhat but 
was ‗interned at Burdwan‘ where he lived till December 1860.119 Nevertheless, in 
light of the fact that the former sovereign of Assam was living in an extremely 
miserable financial condition, the Governor General in Council later agreed to 
sanction young Kandarpeswar Singh a pension, without any arrears, to be effected 
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from February 1864, with the condition that he would not be allowed to visit Upper 
Assam.
120
  
The arrest of Kandarpeswar Singh was immediately followed by the arrest of 
the other rebel leaders which included Piyali Barua, Madhu Malllik, Dutiram Barua, 
Shaikh Farmud, Marangikhowa Gohain, Madhuram Koch and others who were 
allegedly involved, directly or indirectly, in the whole conspiracy.
121
 It was however 
absolutely essential for the administration to arrest Maniram Diwan, the chief 
architect behind the whole scheme of things, and be brought to trial as soon as 
possible.
122
 Accordingly therefore, orders were immediately issued to arrest the 
Diwan, then residing in Calcutta, and be brought to Jorhat to be tried in a special 
court, now made possible under the Act XIV of 1857.
123
 Both Maniram and Piyali 
Barua, who was acting as the advisor to Kandarpeswar Singh on behalf of Maniram 
Diwan, were tried, convicted and found guilty of treason against the state. The trial 
was a complete mockery of the Rule of Law. The accused were neither given a fair 
hearing nor allowed to cross examine witnesses. The Act XIV of 1857 had 
empowered Colonel Holroyd, the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Sibsagar 
district, to act as the Prosecutor as well as the Judge for the trial. That it was nothing 
short of a ‗Kangaroo Trial‘ was evident from Colonel Holroyd‘s words: ‗We will 
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hang you first, try you afterwards.‘124 Piyali Barua along with Maniram Diwan, who 
was brought from Calcutta on board the ‗Koladyne‘ along with about one hundred 
odd European sailors, were tried on 9 February and 23 February 1858 respectively, 
were found guilty of treason and conspiracy against the state and were sentenced to 
death. Both of them were publicly hanged on the same day, 26 February 1858.
125
 As 
far as the rest were concerned – Madhu Mallik, Dutiram Barua, Marangikhowa 
Gohain amongst others – were also tried and convicted of treason and transported for 
life.
126
 However, following the Queen‘s Proclamation in 1858 when the general 
amnesty was finally announced, a few of them, namely, Dutiram Barua and Shaikh 
Farmud and a few others were released from their penal settlement and were allowed 
to return to their province.
127
 
But even after the arrest and subsequent trial of the principal actors involved in 
the intended rebellion, the colonial government continued to remain apprehensive 
about the possibility of the rebellion in the region. There was no doubt that the 
movement had lost its momentum, but it was still far from being under control. 
Although at the beginning of October, Colonel Jenkins reported that there was no 
further reason for apprehension of any outbreak in Assam, but later in the same 
month, the Chairman of the Assam Tea Company, D.C. Mackey, in a letter to the 
Secretary to the Government of India expressed their deep anxiety, stating that great 
disaffection still very much existed amongst the sepoys at Dibrugarh and feared that 
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this might be simultaneous with the descent of the predatory tribes from the 
neighbouring hills.
128
 Mackey feared that the ‗setting in of the dry season greatly 
facilitates the movement of the sepoys, and is the time always selected by the 
savaged in the hills for carrying out their war-like expeditions‘ and under these 
circumstances, he wrote, ‗we are entering upon a more dangerous period on that 
frontier than has been since the commencement of the outbreak and it seems evident 
that the small force of half-trained seamen [which was] already sent up are 
inadequate to secure the safety of the province.‘129 This apprehension on the part of 
the administration was further worsened by subsequent events around the province.  
The seven companies of the 34
th
 Native Infantry stationed at Barrackpore had 
already been disarmed following Mangal Pandey‘s mutiny.130 The three remaining 
companies of the 34
th
, i.e., the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and the 4
th
, were garrisoned at Chittagong. On 
the night of 18 November these three detachments stationed at Chittagong had 
mutinied.
131
 They plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from jail, killed one 
of the jail barkandazes (an armed retainer or a policeman), burnt down their own 
lines, fired the magazines and then left the station, carrying off with them three 
government elephants and the whole of the treasure they found in the office of the 
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collectorate.
132
 From Chittagong the mutineers headed towards the princely state of 
Tripura. After a few days in the hills and jungles of Tripura they tried to enter into 
Cachar and thereafter to Manipur.
133
 Although the rebels were finally defeated at a 
place known as Latu in Sylhet, it was later reported that rest of the Chittagong 
mutineers were on their way to Dacca to join the sepoys of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry, 
but had changed their course and crossed the Tipperah Hills to join the men stationed 
at Sylhet. A few of them were captured but the bulk managed to escape. The 
situation was further compounded by the fact that the rebellion in Chittagong was 
almost immediately followed by the outburst in Dhaka. On 21 November 1857, the 
intelligence of the Chittagong mutiny reached Dhaka and soon after that the 73
rd
 
regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry rose in rebellion. Although the authorities 
were somewhat successful in taking control of the situation and apprehended a few 
of the rebellious sepoys of the 73
rd
 regiment, the main body of the Dhaka rebels 
passed through Mymensingh and reached the district of Rungpore. By the end of 
November, the Magistrate of Mymensingh reported that a party of about 150 sepoys 
passed through that station, having committed some depredations on their route, 
without attacking the station.
134
 It was later reported by Lieutenant E.R. Wilcox of 
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73
rd
 Native Infantry stationed at Jalpaiguri that the Dacca mutineers were on their 
way to Bhutan.
135
  
All these incidents happening around the province was enough to put the 
administration in a state of considerable alarm throughout the period. Quite 
understandably it was apprehended that these rebels might well try to get in touch 
with the disbanded sepoys at Golaghat and Dibrugarh and create further trouble. That 
their apprehension was not completely unfounded is evident from the fact that the 
Dhaka fugitives in their north-ward march, after crossing the river Brahmaputra at 
Chilmari, destroyed the local police station at Karaibari in the south-west of 
Gowalpara, plundered the market and carried off with them the Jamadar and the 
Barkandazes attached to the outpost.
136
 Also, as Jenkins mentioned in his letter to the 
Secretary to the Government of Bengal that ‗had they turned towards the east instead 
of the north and in concert with the sepoys of the 34
th
 Native Infantry succeeded in 
detaching a portion of the Sylhet Light Infantry, the situation would have been out of 
control, particularly at a moment when the authorities in Calcutta could hardly spare 
any troops.‘137 Considering the situation, at the end of December 1857, the Chairman 
of the Assam Tea Company again called the attention of the government to the 
defenceless state of Assam and to the danger that was likely to result from the 
mutinies at Dhaka and Chittagong.
138
 A similar recommendation was made by 
Colonel Hannay which mentioned that some disaffection still existed amongst the 
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men of the detachment at Golaghat. It was finally decided by the authorities in 
Calcutta to dispatch to Assam a second party of one hundred seamen with three 
European officers on 31 December 1857.
139
 It was only after the Commissioner of 
Assam in his letter had expressed his satisfaction that he was no longer apprehensive 
of any danger from those quarters, that the Government of India could breathe a sigh 
of relief, though not without a lingering suspicion.
140
  
This chapter has limited its scope mainly to the province of Assam. However, 
it would be indeed important to investigate in further details the responses from the 
other princely states of Manipur, Tripura and the Khasi-Jaintia hills. Even a cursory 
sifting of the primary documents clearly points out to the fact that the colonial 
government were highly suspicious and had a tough time dealing with the 
disgruntled Manipuri princes and sections of the hill tribes in the region during this 
time of crisis. It was reported that the princes of Manipur along with his followers 
joined the Chittagong mutineers.
141
 An official report also runs to the effect that the 
Manipuri princes were in operation on the bank of the river Barak. Probably as a 
sequel to this several princes of the Manipur royal family were kept under detention 
in the Cachar jail.
142
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4.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an interesting contrast on the nature of intended rebellion in 
Assam vis-à-vis the lower province of the Bengal presidency. One may safely draw a 
few inferences based on the present discussion. Assam, unlike the lower province of 
Bengal, came under the colonial dominion much later, about twenty years prior to the 
outbreak of the rebellion of 1857. It was only after the expulsion of the Burmese that 
the Company officials decided to set up their bases in the province. The colonial 
intervention in Assam, unlike some of the other parts of India, was a relatively 
peaceful process whereby the erstwhile Ahom nobles literally invited them to take 
control of the province. This is evident from the initial discussion in the present 
chapter how the Ahom nobles, including Maniram Diwan, had upheld the cause of 
the British intervention in Assam. However, the introduction of British rule 
necessitated a fundamental alteration of the traditional socio-political set-up and the 
landed hierarchy in the province. The erstwhile landed aristocracy soon found 
themselves in a precarious situation whereby all their privileges were soon taken 
away. Nevertheless, although it did not take them long to realise the adverse effects 
of the British rule in the province, the Ahom nobilities and the landed aristocrats 
never really managed to put up a strong and united resistance against the Raj. 
Instead, the constant feudal feuds amongst the princes of the Ahom nobilities, 
coupled with a lack of a proper leadership further strengthened the authority of the 
British rule. Maniram Diwan later realised that in order to have a strong and united 
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force capable of resisting the colonial rule in a province that was yet to come out of 
its traditional feudal setup it was essential to rally behind the King of Assam. It was 
precisely for this reason that he continued to press for the cause of young 
Kandarpeswar Singh. But his hopes were continued to be belied. It was only after the 
rebellion of 1857 broke out in the various parts of the country and the initial success 
of the rebels in the north central Gangetic heartland that provided Maniram with a 
new opportunity. 
Unlike the lower presidency of Bengal, Assam had all the prerequisites – the 
army composition that had local recruits loyal to the King; a class of dissatisfied 
feudal aristocrats desperately seeking to regain their lost power, position and fortune; 
a considerable proportion of the civil population who were ready to rally themselves 
behind the King; a playmaker who was cognisant of the prevailing situation in the 
region and also in the country – for a full-scale open outbreak of rebellion. Also, 
what distinguished this intended rebellion of 1857 from that of the earlier instances 
of rebellious outbursts in the region was the way in which Maniram made the plans 
under the aegis of the King, thereby bringing together various sections of the 
disgruntled population under one roof. The networks of communication that the rebel 
leaders managed to establish within the region in tune with the situation in north 
central Gangetic heartland during the rebellion of 1857, clearly pertains to the fact 
that the leaders realised the need to align themselves with the broader conflagration 
in order to successfully thwart the colonial rule. This is evident from the way the 
intended rebellion was planned. As the chapter showed it was only after the news of 
the mutiny of the Danapur regiment, the participation of Kunwar Singh of Bihar in 
the rebellion, and the fall of Delhi in the hands of the mutineers that the plan for 
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insurrection intensified in Assam. The subsequent course of events unfolding in the 
north-central Gangetic heartland, the impending attack in Calcutta, followed by the 
rumours about the fall of the British rule, convinced the insurgents in Assam about 
the vulnerable state of affairs for the British and the time was opportune for them to 
execute their plan into action.  
In the end however the rebellion failed to make an impact in Assam. The 
reason for this was the lack of coordination between the nobilities and the sepoys in 
the region. In addition, the fact that the rebel leaders had to depend almost entirely on 
the intelligence that was being sent by Maniram Diwan from Calcutta did not help 
their cause either. The Diwan who was living in Calcutta during the time of the 
rebellion was not always able to measure the situation that prevailed in Assam. By 
the time Maniram‘s intelligence reached Assam, the prevailing situation there or in 
the Gangetic heartland would have changed and therefore the sepoys as well as the 
nobility in Assam often found themselves in a situation whereby they were unable to 
decide the next appropriate move. This was primarily due to the fact that the rebel 
leaders, in order to keep the secrecy of the informations, resorted to alternative 
informal agencies of communications that were far more effective in the Gangetic 
heartland. On the other hand, the presence of Colonel Hannay and Major Jenkins at 
the headquarters of the rebels made it possible for them to take decisions according 
to the expediency of the situation. This delay in action on the part of the rebel leaders 
and sepoys in Assam provided the colonial authorities much needed time to take 
precautionary measures against the impending rebellion. Finally, the intended 
rebellion in Assam started far too late to be successful. The tentative date chosen by 
the rebels was in the month of October 1857. But already by the end of September 
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the rebellion in Delhi and its surrounding areas had been suppressed and the colonial 
authority in the region was re-established.
143
 It was therefore possible for the 
authorities in Calcutta to send in fresh reinforcements. But had the movement begun 
earlier, situation might well have been different. In short, the alternative polity that 
the rebels tried to reconstruct did not have adequate time and opportunity to strike 
roots in Assam.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
THE REBELLION OF 1857 AND THE MIDDLE CLASS INTELLIGENTSIA OF 
BENGAL 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last three chapters dealt with the socio-political history of the rebellion in the 
lower province of the Bengal Presidency and Assam, looking at some of the 
moments of crisis within a historical perspective. It becomes evident that the 
movement was indeed a complex and multidimensional one whose ideological 
ramification also varied across the provinces. This chapter looks at the reactions and 
responses of a class of people – stereotyped as the ‗loyal‘ subjects of the British 
Empire – during the rebellion of 1857. It has been said that the urban middle class 
intelligentsia of Bengal, also referred to as the bhadralok, looked at the establishment 
of colonial rule as an act of Providence that was destined to deliver the Indian nation 
from medieval backwardness and set it in the path of modernisation and progress. 
When this modernisation agenda was seemingly threatened by the uprising of 1857, 
this ‗loyalty‘ of the Bengali intelligentsia found an unabashed expression, heavily 
criticising the ‗rebels‘ through their writings and speeches.  
Judith Brown has argued that these men had material interests, and often a 
deep, ideological commitment to new ideas. Hence, they expressed their loyalty and 
presented addresses of support to the government, instead of aligning with the rural 
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rebels and disgruntled sepoys.
1
 Similarly, Partha Chatterjee, in an attempt to break 
away from the debilitating paradigm of Benedict Anderson, who has earlier argued 
that the idea of anti-colonial nationalism in the colonies were dependent on European 
models, drew a distinction between nationalism as a political movement which 
challenged the colonial state, and nationalism as a cultural construct that enabled the 
colonised to imagine their autonomy.
2
 While the former was ‗derivative‘ the latter 
drew its energies from the indigenous sources.
3
 A new binary was thus introduced, 
between the ‗material‘ and ‗spiritual‘ world. While in the ‗spiritual‘ domain, the 
elites/nationalists created an ‗autonomous‘ world of their own, but in the ‗material‘ 
domain, Chatterjee argues, they were ‗surrendering‘ in effect to the West in an effort 
to eradicate ‗colonial difference‘.4  
But was this display of loyalty beyond question? Sumit Sarkar in his sharp 
rebuttal criticised the logic of this hypothesis, as propounded by Chatterjee. Sarkar 
argues, ‗Here is a paradox indeed, for all commonsensically promising or effective 
ways of fighting colonial domination (mass political struggle, for instance, or even 
economic self-help) have become signs of surrender.‘5 This ‗commonsensically‘ 
effective means of resistance, I would argue in this chapter, was far from 
monochromatic. Rather, it was riddled with problems and regional specificities, as 
was illustrated during the rebellion of 1857. Benoy Ghosh had argued that it was not 
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of course a ‗slavish loyalty‘ but a ‗conditional‘ support of the British government.6 
He tried to explain that the middle class intelligentsia avoided the open confrontation 
with the Company‘s government since ‗to support the rebels and their cause would 
have amounted at the time to a negation of all principles and ideals for which they 
had fought for over half a century‘.7 In one of his later works, C.A. Bayly has argued 
that ‗the boundary between ―revolt‖ and ―collaboration‖ was often very faint… many 
of those who apparently collaborated, the Calcutta Intelligentsia for instance, 
regarded the British with contempt at some level.‘8 Similarly, Mushirul Hasan, while 
revisiting the works and responses of the Muslim intellectuals in northern India, has 
persuasively argued that for men of this generation and background, their responses 
towards the rebellion of 1857 were always going to be far more complex than the 
mere official narratives of loyalism and anti-imperialism dichotomy.
9
 
Qualifying from these arguments, this chapter argues that both the logic put 
forward by Brown and the binary thesis of Chatterjee needs to be revisited. From the 
contemporary writings of the middle class intelligentsia of Bengal, it is evident that 
the spirit of resistance and critique of the colonial rule was not confined to the 
‗spiritual domain‘. It also shows that even though the bhadralok, a term when 
translated literally means ‗respectable people‘, did not appreciate the open outbursts 
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of violence and the bloodshed during the rebellion, they perceived that substantial 
grievances (ranging from lack of empathy from the military administration to social 
discrimination and a sense of economic deprivation) motivated this insurrection. This 
led them to question the viability of the presence of the colonial rule in the 
subcontinent. The chapter argues that the uprising of 1857 had more subtle and 
nuanced reflections, and, the patterns and trajectories of response went beyond the 
simplistic categorisations as ‗loyal‘ or ‗rebel‘. E.I. Brodkin has pointed out that while 
in some instances this terminology can serve a useful purpose, ‗perhaps more often 
than not the simplistic categorisation of the Indian actors in the drama as loyal or 
rebel serves mainly to confuse.‘10 Although Brodkin was not altogether against the 
idea of customary usage of the terminologies, he however pointed out that it would 
be improper to designate the vast majority of the politically active population of 
India as either ‗rebel‘ or ‗loyal‘. As the chapter shows, in Bengal ‗loyalism‘ of the 
intelligentsia contained internal dilemmas and contradictions, thus opening a space 
for moving beyond terminologies of ‗loyalist‘ or ‗rebel‘. Contemporaries in Bengal 
viewed the armed rebellion of 1857 in north and central India and the situation in 
Bengal as two expressive facets and results of the same discontent. Opposition 
towards Company rule in Bengal was articulated in a rhetoric that was different from 
those of the ‗rebel‘ leaders of 1857. The forms were different, but were connected by 
the common feeling of discontent and dissent. 
Before going into the discussion on the contemporary reactions of the middle 
class intelligentsia in Bengal during the rebellion of 1857 it is necessary to have a 
brief look at the formation and positioning of this class vis-à-vis the colonial state. 
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The purpose of this section is not to engage ourselves with the various debates 
concerning the formation of the middle class, but to have a basic framework within 
which to understand and contextualise the responses of the intelligentsia during the 
rebellion of 1857.
11
  
 
5.2 FORMATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN COLONIAL BENGAL 
The middle class, in the context of nineteenth century colonial Bengal, had a fluid 
identity eluding any particular socio-economic categorisation but is generally 
recognised as characteristics which serve as the primary markers of middle class 
identity namely the western education, a white collar job or ‗chakri‘, and 
participation in a print culture.
12
 Each of these characteristics can be attributed to the 
establishment of colonial rule in India which serves to highlight that the middle class 
in nineteenth century India was a product of British colonial rule and its instruments 
of governance. Formation of the middle class in colonial Bengal was the product of a 
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historical process growing in response to the changing forms of political, social, 
cultural and economic norms introduced by colonial rule. 
The Bengali middle class, commonly known as the ‗bhadralok‘, evolved with 
the evolution of colonial rule itself. Until the 1830s, the East India Company 
remained fairly reliant upon the Sanskrit and Persian knowing literati for purposes of 
administration and commerce. Due to the sustained use of Sanskrit for purposes of 
the state, Sanskrit scholars were assured of a sound future. However, the position of 
prestige that Sanskrit enjoyed and the culture of patronage that Sanskrit scholars 
received were waning by the 1840s. The triumph of Thomas Babington Macaulay 
and the ‗Anglicist‘ over the ‗Orientalists‘ in the 1830s marked an increase in the use 
of English for both education and administrative purposes while it simultaneously 
minimised the use of Sanskrit and denigrated the accomplishments of Indian 
civilisation.
13
 By emphasising English education the Anglicists attempted to create a 
class of native people who, as Macaulay famously put it, were ‗Indian in blood and 
colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.‘14 Thus as Gauri 
Viswanathan has argued, the introduction of English became a tool of Empire.
15
  
On the other hand decreasing use of Sanskrit made it increasingly difficult for 
the traditional literati to find means of gainful employment. It was under these 
circumstances that English education served as the primary means through which the 
middle class in colonial Bengal could continue to maintain their respectability as 
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well as find employment.
16
 As Tithi Bhattacharya notes, ‗for the salaried class of the 
bhadralok, education was not merely a source of material sustenance, but it was also 
the only register of self-identity.‘17 This new form of education that now served as 
the only avenue for upward mobility was far more formal and examination centred. 
Therefore an entry into the service sector became dependent primarily on 
examinations and educational degrees, thereby changing the nature of educational 
system in colonial India.
18
 The introduction of cheap print and colonial grid of 
educational institutions made education available to all in principle. Print however, 
was not limited to the English language. Instead, as Sarkar has argued, vernacular 
print culture played a crucial role in forging communicational links between a level 
below that of classical language of high culture but above that of the spoken dialects 
which was to later prove beneficial to the nationalist project.
19
 Print-cultures that 
emanated from numerous cheaper presses in Calcutta afforded a space to different 
sections among the Bengali middle classes to carve out their own power bases.
20
 The 
most significant among these cheap presses, as Anindita Ghosh has pointed out, were 
the narrow lanes and by-lanes of the Battala area, a part of the ‗Native Town‘ in 
northern Calcutta.
21
 Despite the bhadralok disapproval these small presses did enjoy 
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a large and popular readership in lower middle class urban and rural homes.
22
 This 
new vernacular field, as Manu Goswami has argued, was both an expression and a 
vehicle for the making of an ascendant, if internally differentiated, middle class in 
colonial India.
23
   
The middle class in colonial Bengal, as it developed during the nineteenth 
century in Bengal, generally found themselves in a position of ‗in-between-ness‘. 
They were caught in a curious position; while they admiringly faced modernity with 
all its appeals of liberal reason and progress, they also shared a selective appreciation 
of their own past – their ancient heritage and culture. The bhadralok occupied a 
position that was in their view forward looking, in terms of material, and in some 
cases social and cultural progress but they were also highly aware of their past within 
which they sought to frame their identity. Not discounting the role of English 
education, Sanjay Joshi has argued that it was the ability of these educated people to 
configure new social relations that distinguished the middle class from other social 
groups in colonial India.
24
 As Kumkum Chatterjee points out, in spite of the 
ambiguous position that the middle class shared, the role they played in ‗shaping the 
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dominant discourse about society and politics in the sub-continent during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and beyond,‘ must be acknowledged.25  
The colonial education system, apart from emphasising the importance of 
English education, also attempted to transform the importance of history and the 
need for historical representation. History, as used by the colonial authorities, 
became a tool to accentuate the difference between the superior West and the 
backward Orient and it therefore served to bolster the ‗British self-confidence [while] 
reminding the Indians of their lowly place in the world‘s scheme of things.‘26 As 
history became an integral part of colonial discourse and seemed to serve as the 
legitimate medium to justify colonial dominance, the growing middle class began to 
probe into history to both search for past glories that would displace the colonial 
representation of Indian society as backward as well as seek answers to the current 
subjugation by the British. History therefore attained significance among the western 
educated Indian middle-class and it became the primary method for them to talk 
about a collective self.
27
  
 
5.3 THE REBELLION OF 1857 AND THE CONTEMPORARY RESPONSE OF THE 
INTELLIGENTSIA 
It is against this background that one needs to examine the response of the middle 
class of Bengal when the rebellion broke out in 1857. This section explores, through 
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the contemporary newspapers and periodicals of the time, in particular the Hindoo 
Patriot newspaper under the editorship of Hurrish Chandra Mukherji (henceforth 
referred to as Hurrish Mukherji), the extent to which the middle class literati were 
able to read the causality and the impact of the rebellion. In addition it also examines 
the extent to which they questioned the viability of the colonial rule in the Indian 
subcontinent. However, it needs to be mentioned at the outset that when the rebellion 
raged in north and central India, the predicament of an Empire in flames and the 
iron-hand of British repression that followed made it difficult for the Bengal 
intelligentsia to articulate their voices in overtly antagonistic ways. As elaborated in 
details in the earlier chapter, Act XV of 1857, derisively known as the ‗Gagging 
Act‘, was passed by the Legislative Council of India in order to regulate the contents 
and the circulation of the newspapers, books and pamphlets.
28
 Although this act was 
implemented throughout, it was the Calcutta press that was most severely affected. 
As a consequence most of the newspapers and periodicals in and around Calcutta 
were deprived of their voices of free opinion. Those who still did, for instance 
Samachar Shudhabarshan and the Friend of India newspaper, were castigated by the 
colonial administration as being sympathetic towards the rebel cause and were 
appropriately dealt with.
29
 Others such as the Hindoo Patriot, as we shall see in the 
course of this chapter, took recourse to Aesopian languages. As Sabyasachi 
Bhattacharya has reminded us, ‗our view of the stance adopted by the urban middle 
classes to the uprising of 1857 remains incomplete chiefly because of this law, which 
effectively stifled their expression of opinion. Often we do not pay attention to this 
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fact when we comment on the attitude of this class.‘30 While some of the 
contemporary newspaper reports and the travel and first-person accounts might 
appear to be ‗loyalist‘ (in the form of condemnation of the sepoys), but a closer re-
reading of some of these texts, as has been done in the course of this chapter, would 
actually reflect a more nuanced understanding of the situation and the response. The 
aftermath of the rebellion and the cumulative effect of the Black Act of 1836, the 
‗Gagging Act‘ of 1857, the Vernacular Press Act of 1879, and the Ilbert Bill 
controversy of 1883 underlined the asymmetry between the rulers and the ruled.
31
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century one can thus notice that such cautions 
were openly disregarded and admiration for the rebel leaders were volubly 
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expressed.
32
 And by the end of the century, Calcutta was a city of rebels, loudly 
questioning the very legitimacy of the British Raj.
33
 
There is admittedly a grain of truth in the belief that the initial reactions of the 
Calcutta intelligentsia towards the rebellion were very critical. This is perhaps best 
reflected through the editorial reports of the Hindoo Patriot newspaper. Started in 
1853, it was one of the few English language papers of the time that was owned and 
run by Indians. The powerful English press at that time was dominated by Europeans 
and Anglo-Indians. In 1830, a few Derozians started the weekly Parthenon that 
closed after two issues.
34
 In 1831, Prosunna Kumar Tagore published Reformer, a 
weekly that continued until 1833. The appearances of all these short-lived periodicals 
in rapid succession testify to the desire of the educated Indians to be heard not only 
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by their own countrymen but also by the British.
35
 Compared to these earlier 
periodicals Hindoo patriot was a weekly newspaper that used to be published from 
Calcutta by a group of young English educated men, the most leading of them being 
Hurrish Mukherji who ran it virtually on his own until his untimely death in 1861.
36
 
Although the editorial columns and the lead articles were mostly anonymous, as was 
the case with most other newspapers of the time, there was little doubt that those 
were mostly written by Hurrish Mukherji. The importance of Hindoo Patriot 
newspaper as the authentic voice of Indian opinion can be understood from the fact 
that even Lord Canning used to anxiously wait for all the issues of the paper and 
Lord Grenville used to support the policies of Canning in the Parliament after he had 
apprised himself of the facts through the columns of the paper.
37
 
As a direct product of British colonial rule, Hurrish Mukherji was never in 
open support of the mutiny/uprising, which he often referred to as ‗rebellion‘ or 
‗insurrection‘ in his articles. In fact, Hurrish Mukherji described ‗rebellion‘ as a 
‗crime‘ to which most societies had extended a measure of ‗leniency‘. During the 
outbreak of Meerut and Delhi, Hindoo Patriot remarked that the ‗rebels‘ were ‗as 
brutal and unprincipled a body of ruffians as ever disgraced a uniform or stained the 
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bright polish of a soldier‘s sword with the blood of murder.‘38 Hurrish Mukherji 
believed that the ‗rebels‘ would find ‗no sympathy from the villagers whom they 
have plundered, or the higher classes whom they have placed in anxiety, or from any 
class whose feelings are not utterly inhuman‘.39 Straightaway convinced that ‗the 
country is thrown backward by the present disturbances‘ it recommended the rebels 
for ‗signal chastisement‘.40 The news of the fall of Delhi and Kanpur, followed by 
that of the other parts of the north central Gangetic heartland, spread like wildfire in 
Calcutta, and struck terror in the minds of those whom Kaliprasanna Sinha called in 
this context the ‗unfortunate sheepish Bengalees‘.41 Their interests, as Hurrish 
Mukherji believed, were not to ‗glorify themselves by leading armies to battles or the 
martyrdom of the forlorn hope. Their pursuits and their triumphs are entirely civil. A 
strong and versatile intellect enables them to think deeply and think foresightedly.‘42 
They were ‗the only class of the fixed population of the country which possesses any 
                                                          
38
 ―The Sepoy Mutiny and its Action upon the People of Bengal‖, Hindoo Patriot, 4 June 1857 in 
Benoy Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals of 19th Century Bengal, vol. 4: 1857, Hindoo 
Patriot; Friend of India; Hindu Intelligencer; Bengal Hurkaru, Calcutta: Papyrus, 1979, p. 80. 
39
 ―The Mutinies,‖ Hindoo Patriot, 28 May 1857, in Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, vol. 
4: p. 70.  
40
 ―The Sepoy Mutiny and its Action upon the People of Bengal‖, Hindoo Patriot, 4 June 1857 in 
Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, vol. 4: p. 80. 
41
 Kaliprasanna Sinha, The Observant Owl: Hootum’s Vignettes of Nineteenth-Century Calcutta: 
Kaliprasanna Sinha's Hootum Pyanchar Naksha, trans. Swarup Roy, Ranikhet; New Delhi: Black 
Kite; Associate and Distributor, Rupa & Co., 2008. Kaliprasanna Sinha (1841-1870), a scion of a 
leading and wealthy family of Calcutta was educated at Hindu College (presently Presidency 
College/University). Of his many literary achievements, the two most memorable contributions 
was the translation of Mahabharata in Bengali language, the other being the one mentioned above. 
For a more detailed reading of Sinha, see Ranajit Guha, "A Colonial City and Its Times," The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 45, no. 3, 2008: 329-51.  
42
 ―The Sepoy Mutiny and its Action upon the People of Bengal‖, Hindoo Patriot, 4 June 1857 in 
Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, Vol. 4: p. 80. 
Page | 285  
 
active political influence…and in point of intelligence the foremost among their 
countrymen.‘43 Hurrish Mukherji was convinced that the British rule in India was 
best suited for the intellectual taste of the Bengalis and hoped that when the fitting 
moment would arrive, this class of people, by lawful and constitutional appeals to the 
British parliament, would share ‗the honour and responsibility of administering the 
affairs of the largest and the most well-established empire in Asia‘.44  
It should also be mentioned in this context that one of the most admired and 
dominant figures in the Calcutta intellectual circle at the time of the rebellion was 
Iswarchandra Gupta (1812-1859). Widely acclaimed as the ‗father of modern 
Bengali poetry,‘ Gupta owned and published the Sambad Prabhakar, a Bengali 
periodical that later became a daily newspaper. The Prabhakar exerted great hold on 
the bourgeois mind, mirroring and swaying public opinion through its editorials, 
many of which were penned by Gupta himself.
45
 In April 1857, Sambad Prabhakar 
published a brief dispassionate report on the hanging of a rebel sepoy in Barrackpore. 
The report dismissed the incident as nothing special and waived away concerns about 
an impending sepoy revolt as false. The outbreak at Meerut on 10 May 1857 
however changed both Prabhakar‘s and Gupta‘s stance. The latter launched a 
virulent campaign against the mutineers through his poems and editorials. Between 
May 1857 and September 1858, Gupta published on an average two pieces (one 
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poem and one prose commentary) on the rebellion every week. In one of his 
editorials published in the Prabhakar in April 1858 Gupta wrote,  
[t]he Sepoy Mutiny has disgraced the name of Bharat. We are 
entreating the mutineers not to blemish the pure land of Bharat any 
further and to surrender immediately to the State. It is because of them 
that Bharat has lost her former glory and famine has befallen the land. 
Therefore, there is no other way except to ask for pardon of the world-
conquering British.
46
  
Gupta also appealed to all its readers to pray to God for the victory of the 
government and the early restoration of peace. The rebel sepoys were criticised as an 
ungrateful and ill-advised lot who had been fighting a hopeless battle against the 
mighty British. Gupta‘s poems in particular lash out at the rebel leaders. Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay has pointed out that ‗the cacophony of condemnation of the rebels 
often crossed the limits of civility, as the sepoys were described as dwarfs trying to 
reach the moon, or as foxes fighting the mighty lion…or as ants who had developed 
wings to face an imminent death.‘47 Calling them misdirected bigots and pretentious 
usurpers, Iswarchandra Gupta ‗prayed‘ for their quick death at the hands of the 
British forces. Both Nana Sahib and Lakshmi Bai were picked out as special subjects 
by Gupta for his most scathing critiques and caustic satires. Nana is variously 
dehumanised and consistently referred to as the ‗adopted ass‘ (pushyi ere) and a 
‗rogue sheep‘ (doshyi bhere). The queen of Jhansi is called a ‗shameless whore‘ 
(magi); an ‗unwomanly woman‘ overstepping the domestic bounds and making a 
                                                          
46
 Indira Chowdhury, The Frail Hero and Virile History: Gender and the Politics of Culture in 
Colonial Bengal, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 23. 
47
 Bandopadhyay, ―From Subjects to Citizens,‖ p. 21. 
Page | 287  
 
fool of herself. In his poem ‗Kanpur Bijoy‘ (The Conquest of Kanpur), Gupta even 
made stark insinuations about Nana and Lakshmi Bai‘s relationship.48 
 This kind of criticism towards the ‗rebels‘ on one hand and the apparent show 
of allegiance towards the colonial government on the other were also reflected in 
varying ways during the rebellion. In May 1857, in a meeting convened at the Hindu 
Metropolitan College, attended by Radhakanta Deb and many other notables, 
expressed their disgust and horror at the mutiny and recorded the sense of relief for 
the fact that no sympathy was shown by any ‗reputable or influential classes‘ towards 
the outbreak.
49
 The meeting also resolved to show unflinching loyalty towards the 
British and assured them of all possible help for suppressing the sepoys who had 
risen in rebellion against their masters and disturbed the peace of the empire. In fact, 
when in December 1857 the colonial army won a signal success against the rebels, 
Radhakanta Deb along with 2500 others congratulated the Governor-General and 
organised a grand banquet in 1858 to celebrate the victory.
50
 Likewise, the British 
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Indian Association, the public body of both the upper and middle class passed 
resolutions decrying the rebellion. Demonstrations such as the one mentioned above 
were organised by others all across Calcutta to show the sympathy of the Calcutta 
intelligentsia towards the colonial government in that moment of crisis.
51
 Similar 
instances of individual cases of apathy towards the futility of the rebellion and 
support to the government was to be found. Mention may be made in this context of 
Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay who was then a student of Law in Calcutta. He 
expressed his feelings before his barrister Professor Montriou that if for a day even 
the end of the British rule had appeared possible, he would have returned to his 
native place after throwing away his law books in the Ganges.
52
 As Sumanta 
Banerjee has pointed out, the popular songs in Calcutta also appeared to be 
favourably disposed towards the Scottish Highlander troops who arrived in Calcutta 
on their way to suppress the rebellion.
53
 
 
5.4 THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN 
While the Calcutta intelligentsia were filling up columns of their newspapers with 
essays condemning the atrocities of the rebels and displaying their apparent 
faithfulness towards the colonial government during the rebellion, this was not 
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without dilemma. Behind this display of loyalism there was also a growing sense of 
ignominy involved in their state of subordination. Although critical of the rebellion 
Hurrish Mukherji in one of the editorials pointed out the reasons behind this bloody 
insurrection. He believed that it was ‗neither the fat of oxen nor the fear of 
proselytism, but a deep-rooted cause of estrangement‘ that led to these mutinous 
outbreaks.
54
 In fact he was convinced that the composition and character of the 
Indian army had a discipline peculiarly of its own. Unlike Europe, where ‗the very 
dregs of the population only are enlisted into the ranks‘, the men who constituted the 
armed strength of the British Indian empire, sprung from a race that was ‗endowed 
with a traditional repute of chivalry‘.55 The strictest rules were enforced in order to 
prevent the admission of recruits from inferior castes. To Hurrish Mukherji nothing 
short of grievous oppression or ‗the most flagrant disrespect of substantial 
prejudices‘ could have driven the native soldiery to conduct an act that was foreign 
to their obligations and their duty: ‗Without the utmost provocations to 
insubordination the sepoy scarcely ever raises his hand against his superior. It is not 
in his constitution to do so. The precepts of his religion forbid his perpetrating such a 
deed.‘56  
While analysing the causes of disaffection among the army, Hindoo Patriot, 
Hurrish Mukherji doubted that the sepoys were the only ones to be adversely affected 
by the establishment of colonial rule in India. He averred that it would be very 
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difficult to find out one single individual among the countrymen who did not hate 
Englishmen at least inwardly and the ‗same set of causes disaffected both sepoys and 
civil population‘.57 He lamented the fact that Britain‘s dominion over India was 
upheld by the sword and was supported by the majority of the British politicians.
58
 In 
the editorial he criticised the foreign domination while glorifying the rebels at the 
same time in an unequivocal language: 
 
How slight is the hold the British Government has acquired upon the 
affections of its Indian subjects has been made painfully evident by 
the events of the last few weeks... It is no longer a mutiny, but a 
rebellion. Perhaps, it will be said that all mutinies, when they attain a 
certain measure of success, rise to the dignity of a rebellion. But the 
recent mutinies of the Bengal army have one peculiar feature – they 
have from the very beginning drawn the sympathy of the country... 
[The sepoys] have rebelled against the authority which they have 
sworn to obey... They have hazarded all their most valuable interest; 
and their countrymen view them as martyrs to a holy cause and a great 
national cause... The mutineers have been joined and aided by the 
civil population... there is not a single native of India who does not 
feel the full weight of the grievances imposed upon him by the very 
existence of the British rule in India... grievances inseparable from 
subjection to a foreign rule. There is not one among the educated 
classes who does not feel his prospects circumscribed and his 
ambition restricted by the supremacy of that power.
59
  
                                                          
57
 ―Army Reform,‖ Hindoo Patriot, 30 April 1857, in Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, 
Vol. 4: pp. 46-50. 
58
 ―The Country and the Government,‖ Hindoo Patriot, 28 May 1857, in Ghose, Selections from 
English Periodicals, Vol. 4: p. 63. 
59
 ―The Country and the Government,‖ Hindoo Patriot, 28 May 1857, in Ghose, Selections from 
English Periodicals, Vol. 4: pp. 63-64. 
Page | 291  
 
 
As Nakazato has noted, the euphemism Hurrish Mukherji used barely served 
as a cover for his sympathy with the sepoys. He considered the Mutiny legitimate in 
that it had the Mughal emperor‘s approval as well as popular support – thus a 
‗rebellion‘.60 However, towards the conclusion of the same editorial, he took a more 
cautious approach. He stressed that the disaffection he had noted did not ‗neutralise 
the mass of the Indian population the feeling of loyalty‘ who were benefitted by the 
establishment of the colonial rule in India.
61
 To him, the assertion of his verdict on 
colonial rule was by no means negative, despite its clear limitations. Hurrish 
Mukherji wrote: 
 
We believe the prevailing feeling is that any great disaster befalling 
the British rule would be a disastrous check to national prosperity. We 
do not deny, that [there is] a pettish desire to see the high handed 
proceedings of its officials rebuked and the insolence... of the Anglo-
Indian community checked... But, on the whole, the country is sound. 
The sympathy which the mutineers have found from the people 
extends no further than to a wish to see the British government 
humiliated to a certain extent. The Zemindars of the Meerut district 
have given shelter to the Europeans who were driven from Delhi by 
the violence of the mutineers, and undertaken the security of the dawk 
(post). The feeling which prompted that act was one of the genuine 
loyalty. The Government of British India rules over a people who 
have found the first elements of civil order under its auspices. It has 
strength in the strength of civilisation, in the loftiness of its purposes... 
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which will carry it through many such dangers as that now threatening 
it.
62
 
 
In such a mix of sentiments, Hurrish Mukherji thus represented the complex 
responses of the Calcutta intelligentsia. While he clearly pointed out that the 
grievances of the sepoys were shared by the civil population of the country, he 
equally stressed that the population in general was motivated by a desire to 
‗humiliate‘ rather than to overthrow the colonial government altogether. He 
perceived and argued that the insurrection required changes and alterations within 
the colonial administrative policies and structures. He underlined aspects of loyalism 
that clearly indicated that he was not alone in his interpretation. His final verdict was 
clear and forthright even if it was expressed within a framework that had not been 
innocent of criticism.  
The other major reason behind the rebellion, as conveyed by the writings in 
Hindoo Patriot, was the systematic exclusion of Indians from official employment of 
a superior character. The periodical drew attention to the invidious distinction 
created by the colonial government between the two nations, one of whom 
monopolised all the honours and emoluments because they belonged to the race of 
conquerors while the other were debarred from even sharing in those since they were 
the conquered lot.
63
 Hurrish Mukherji was amongst those who regarded the exclusion 
of Indians from all the places of trust and distinction which they previously held to 
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be another reason behind this insurrection.
64
 However, to him, the feeling of a deep 
discontent generated by the tempering with the landed rights in northern India was 
singlehandedly responsible in transforming the mutiny of sepoys to an ‗Indian 
rebellion‘. He wrote, ‗if there be any one sentiment powerful in the Indian mind over 
all others, it is the sentiment of affection with which the native views the soil he 
inherits, the homestead he dwells in, the relation which subsist between him and his 
landlord or his tenant. A rude shock was given to this sentiment.‘65 As a result, the 
‗cause of order‘ received a fatal blow in the land relation of the North-Western 
Provinces of India. The most ‗warlike portion‘ of the population, the most influential 
leaders, were injured in their most sensitive parts. The sepoys, he wrote, thus began 
to fear not only for their caste and their pay, but likewise, their lands. And when the 
mutiny made a certain measure of progress, the deposed aristocracy put themselves 
at the head of the movement, which turned the sepoy outbursts into a full scale 
‗rebellion‘.66 It is important to note in this context that Hurrish Mukherji, writing at 
the time of the uprising, was well acquainted with the real grievances that led to the 
conflagration, long before Stokes and others made their intervention with this vital 
point.
67
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There cannot be a more accurate description of the agony and despair of the 
colonised. Hurrish Mukherji probably never wished the rebels any success in 
reverting the country back to the days of misrule of the late Mughal Empire. He was 
aware that the forces united in this apparent anti-colonial struggle were not the 
harbinger of a new era, but were prompted by their narrow territorial interests and the 
unity amongst them were too fragile to be trusted. But at the same time, he was 
critical enough of colonial rule in India. To him, the relationship between the 
colonisers and the colonised was not that of a master and a slave but a relationship 
based on ‗reciprocal obligation‘. He pointed out the fact that ‗between the 
Government and the people, therefore the bond is one of reciprocal obligation. You 
rescued us from an odious tyranny. We assisted you in the gaining of a kingdom with 
our means. We owe you a cheerful allegiance. You owe us all that a good 
Government ought to do for its subjects.‘68 
Hurrish Mukherji was desperately trying to develop a responsible political 
agency for initiating a culture of sustainable resistance that would not be contained or 
suppressed by the coercive power of the colonial government. The rebellion of 1857 
provided him with the opportunity whereby he could vent out his critical stance 
towards colonial rule. He believed that ‗the recent evils of the country were brought 
on by the systematic ignoring by Indian officials of the civilisation of the people.‘69 
To him, European scholars had long acknowledged and lauded the ‗high refinement 
of the Hindoo mind‘ and the colonial government should be cautious of the fact that 
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‗in their future intercourse with the legislation for the Natives, they may never forget 
that they have a civilised people to deal with.‘70 
As the rebellion gradually came to a close and the events less intense, the sense 
of disillusionment with foreign rule among the Calcutta intelligentsia became more 
intensified. Sekhar Bandopadhyay has pointed out that ‗this growing alienation was 
largely due to the unabashed display of racism that reflected the classical colonial 
dilemma of the colonisers professing certain principles which they themselves were 
unable to practice in order to maintain their monopoly of power.‘71 As a response 
therefore in different literary works such as novels, newspapers, travelogues, a 
redefinition of identity began to be reflected through expressions of discontent, 
dissatisfaction, veiled criticisms of alien rule, dreams about progress and the gradual 
unfolding of the idea of India as a nation. 
In one of the lead articles in the Hindoo Patriot, while trying to find an answer 
to the key question as to why the British Empire that ‗has been plying her mission 
apparently with every success for a century‘ had to face such a catastrophe in the 
form of the uprising, Hurrish Mukherji sarcastically remarked that ‗there must have 
been something rotten at [its] core.‘72 To people like him, the English East India 
Company‘s rule over India, in spite of its many shortcomings, was by far ‗the best 
intentioned and most beneficent government‘ in the recent past. Under their 
patronage railway transportation was made possible across the vast and hitherto 
impassable lands and forests of India. The electric telegraph and better quality roads 
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were traversed through the length and breadth of the land. In other words, as Hurrish 
Mukherji puts it, ‗all the material paraphernalia of European civilisation have been 
transported to India in the whole masses.‘73 If these were true, then why and how did 
this ‗phenomenon‘ happen? The answer to this question, according to Hurrish 
Mukherji, was to be found in the fact that,  
India has a civilisation of her own, and that in the matter of that article 
she thinks she can afford to be independent of the charity of all the 
nations of the globe. She possessed laws and social organisation in 
some respects all but perfect at a time when Great Britain was the 
mere den of painted savages.
74
  
India possessed an ancient tradition and idealism which preceded even the Greeks. 
British rule in India assumed almost from the very beginning that theirs was a 
civilisation better than the one they had come in contact with; and they proceeded on 
the maxim that ‗the better civilisation must swallow up the worse one‘.75 As a 
consequence, therefore, they not only began to ‗experimentalise upon organisms 
millenniums old‘ but also repudiated the opinion of the Indians and sought to 
promote only their own interests. ‗A nation with such a long and glorious past as the 
people of India would not brook such ignoring of their antecedents…and the result 
came to be felt.‘76 Hurrish Mukherji in this way also justified the resentment as was 
expressed in the rebellion of 1857: ‗was it possible that the humiliation and the injury 
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could not be felt, and when felt in their fullness, resented? The people of India 
refused their sanction to obedience to theories.‘77 
The rebellion of 1857 also ushered in a growing sense of awareness amongst 
the Calcutta intelligentsia regarding the question of Indian self-determination. At the 
time of the transfer of power from the Company rule to the Crown, Hurrish Mukherji 
wrote,  
Can a revolution in the Indian Government be authorised by 
Parliament without consulting the wishes of the vast millions of men 
for whose benefit it is imposed to be made? The reply must be in 
negative … The time is nearly come when all Indian questions must 
be solved by Indians. The mutinies have made patent to the English 
public what must be the effects of politics in which the Native is 
allowed no voice.
78
  
 
He further articulated, ‗so long as the English rule means civil and political 
degradation, as it undoubtedly doth now the proclamations professing the 
extermination of all the tribes of English Kaffirs, would be framed and promulgated 
by the Hindoos and Rajput.‘79 English statesmanship might have secured the 
property, increased the accumulation of wealth, multiplied their comforts, but to 
Hurrish Mukherji, ‗a man doth not live by bread alone‘.80 He categorically stated that 
‗cordiality in the true sense of the word cannot subsist between a conquering and 
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conquered race so long as the former by their narrow minded actions keep fast the 
recollection of national degradation in the minds of the latter‘.81  
Similar voices of concerns were also raised by other contemporary newspapers 
such as the Hindoo Intelligencer, edited by Kasi Prasad Ghosh, as a result of which 
the newspaper was temporarily suspended under the Press Act of 1857. In one 
editorial dated 6 April 1857, Intelligencer in a scathing criticism put forward a series 
of questions to the British citizens and their representatives in the House of 
Commons regarding the responsibility of the colonial government towards India: 
 
Are not those who are compelled to raise so large a portion of 
revenues of this country, and upon whom the burden often falls with a 
weight too heavy to be borne, entitled to the protection of the 
Government to which that revenue goes? Does not the obligation to 
pay a tax on the one side involve the duty of extending protection on 
the other? Is not the protection of the people, and equal and impartial 
administration of the law, among the primary purposes for which 
taxes are ostensibly levied? May not the people say that in spending 
money for our protection, and the due administration of Justice, you 
do but give us back a small share of that which is our own? Why then 
deny to us that which is so dear to you – protection in our homes, the 
enjoyment of the pittance our industry commands, and deliverance 
from the illegal insults, extortions and brutalities to which we are now 
subjected.
82
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The editorial eventually concluded that if in the future the authorities did not address 
the grievances the only logical course would be to take up arms as the sepoys had 
done.  
It is therefore evident from the above discussion that the Calcutta 
intelligentsia during the rebellion of 1857 took a stance which was much more 
complex than the simplistic categorisation of terms like ‗loyalists‘ or ‗rebels‘. 
Clearly they were condemning the rebel sepoys‘ acts of brutality in the Gangetic 
heartland of India which led to the massacre of innocent Europeans and natives alike, 
plundering the treasuries and looting houses of many innocent who found themselves 
caught in the crossfire of the rebellion. To the bhadralok of Bengal, these were 
ominous signs that there was a clear hindrance to the development of a modern 
enlightened society. However they were also quick to point out the real causes 
behind the bloody insurrection that, in their opinion, was the direct outcome of the 
repressive and unjust colonial domination. 
  
5.5 THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE OF 
BRITISH RULE  
The rebellion of 1857 had also opened up before the Calcutta intelligentsia another 
aspect of the colonial rule in India. As the idea of an Empire based on the virtues of 
eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century liberalism and inter-racial 
collaboration, visualised by Dwarkanath Tagore and his generation, slowly began to 
fade out amongst the Calcutta intelligentsia, the reality of an exploitative character of 
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the colonial economy unfolded itself.
83
 This growing awareness of the economic ruin 
as a result of the colonial rule was reflected even in 1840s, and by contrast the 
preceding Muslim rule, which was otherwise had been a subject of general 
condemnation, began to receive admiration. The assessment of the economic impact 
of colonial rule in fact has a longer genealogy that predates twentieth century 
professional historiography. The subject of the adverse economic effects of colonial 
rule on India was an important issue with the early Indian nationalists associated with 
the Indian National Congress and with M.K. Gandhi‘s critique of British rule over 
India as well. The first generation of Indian nationalists such as Dadabhai Naoroji 
developed a comprehensive critique of British economic policies in India and 
suggested that colonial economic exploitation had produced a massive drain of 
wealth from the sub-continent.
84
 Romesh Chunder Dutt‘s works on the same subject 
carried forward the critiques formulated by Naoroji and others.
85
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As I argue here in this section, this critique of the economic impact of the 
colonial rule was touched upon by a large section of the middle class intelligentsia in 
Bengal from the 1840s onwards. In a way, as Tithi Bhattacharya has noted, their 
critique of the political economy of colonialism was not only exhaustive but 
genuinely revolutionary in its anti-imperialist content.
86
 Mention may be made of the 
English language daily Jnanannesan which wrote that ‗previously under the Muslim 
rule the people of this country had the freedom to engage in any business or to do 
anything they liked for a living. But now, having lost this freedom of choice, they 
had been reduced to a group of clerks and agents.‘87 Similarly, around the same time, 
the Bengal Spectator, a monthly journal edited by Peary Chand Mitra, wrote 
eloquently of this exploitative character of the colonial economy as a result of the 
colonial expansion.
88
 In one of the articles published on 15 October 1842, the 
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Spectator pointed out that the amount of revenue assessed under the decennial 
settlement had been four times greater than that which prevailed under Muslim rule, 
the Permanent settlement being even more oppressive.
89
 Voices of dissent were also 
being raised by other newspapers of the time, most notably, Tattvabodhini Patrika, 
which stated that the ‗outward glitter of the development that dazzled the eyes of 
many in British Bengal only concealed the boundless sufferings of the people.‘90 It 
also pointed out that when every family in every village had been in distress, and the 
cause of the distress was evidently because of the continuous exploitation of the 
foreigners, under such condition, ‗only a deaf and blind person could call Bengal 
fully developed!‘ However, perhaps in a more self-rebuking tone the journal 
admitted the fact that, ‗We are under foreign rule, we are being educated in a foreign 
language and we are tolerating a foreign tyranny.‘91 Likewise, Hindoo Patriot also 
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touched upon the issue of the increasing burden of income tax on the subjects of 
British India. The rebellion provided this realisation with a new impetus. As 
mentioned earlier, Hurrish Mukherji raised the issue of the burden of tax to be one of 
the primary reasons behind the rebellion. He wrote: 
The tempering with landed rights universally over the face of 
Northern India had generated a feeling of deep discontent. If there be 
any one sentiment powerful in the Indian mind over all others, it is the 
sentiment of affection with which the native views the soil he inherits, 
the homestead he dwells in, the relations which subsist between him 
and his landlord or his tenant.
92
 
 
According to Hurrish Mukherji, throughout the northern India the land settlement 
pattern of the colonial government had systematically dispossessed the landed 
aristocracies while the nature of land revenue collection made the condition of the 
peasants agonising. As a result, during the rebellion the sepoys and aristocracies 
were bound together by a common fear of the loss of land.
93
 Hurrish Mukherji also 
criticised the economic policy that the colonial government undertook and lamented 
over the fact that the only equality that the administration managed to create as a 
result was equality in poverty. The whole task of reconstructing the society was 
given to the young revenue agents of the government who had very little knowledge 
of the matters they came to deal with.
94
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A detailed analysis of the economic consequences of colonial rule and the 
discontents it generated received a detailed and thorough treatment in Travels of a 
Hindoo to various parts of Bengal and Upper India written by Bholanauth Chunder 
(alternative spelling ‗Bholanath Chandra‘; 1822-1910).95 Although written as a 
travelogue, the narrative provides a detailed discussion on the economic system 
instituted by the colonial rulers and how it shaped not only the colonial subjects‘ 
economic position but also their views towards the foreign rule. Chunder‘s 
preoccupation with the condition of the Indian economy and his strong views on 
British colonial policy in its impoverishment and degradation are reminiscent of the 
views of Naoroji and R.C. Dutt. What is particularly significant about Chunder‘s 
economic critique is that it predates the better known views of Naoroji and Dutt. It 
therefore allows a glimpse into the economic views of a socially and politically 
conscious, ‗modern‘, Indian/Bengali literati of the 1857 era and perhaps permits a 
longer term view of criticisms which were articulated later under the aegis of the 
Indian National Congress. Chunder‘s attention to the economic dimension of 
colonialism also assumes reinforced weight in light of the recent trend in South 
Asian historiography of highlighting the cultural complexities of the colonial 
encounter. It reminds us of the significance and urgency of economic issues in the 
perception of an intelligent, ‗nationalist‘ minded protagonist such as Chunder and 
also throws some light on what was perhaps an incipient stage in the emergence of 
mainstream, colonial Indian middle class perceptions of India and Indian-ness.  
Bholanauth Chunder‘s own background in terms of his education, social status 
and education fits into the general attributes of the Bengali bhadralok of the 
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nineteenth century. Bholanauth Chunder was born in Calcutta to a fairly prosperous 
Hindu family of Subarnabanik caste.
96
 His grandfather Ramdulal had made and lost a 
fortune through his association with a mercantile firm. His maternal-grandfather was 
the Diwan of the English Residency of Dhaka.
97
 In 1830 Chunder joined the Oriental 
Seminary and in 1832 he was enrolled at the Hindu College where he remained until 
1842.
98
 At Hindu College, Chunder was recognised for his scholastic abilities and 
was awarded several prizes for his aptitude in history and literature. In literature he 
greatly admired the works of William Shakespeare and Walter Scott. Chunder 
attributed his literary career to D.L. Richardson. It is possible that during his time in 
Hindu College, Chunder became familiar with ‗Young Bengal‘ and choose to 
describe himself as one. Following his sojourn at Hindu College, Chunder worked in 
the Union Bank but soon resigned to start a mercantile firm under the name of 
Mahesh Chandra and Co. He also became an agent for Howarth Hardman & Co., 
which owned a sugar mill. As an agent of the firm, Chunder travelled through much 
of East Bengal. Due to various reasons the company had to close down bringing such 
an immense loss to Chunder that he declared himself bankrupt. It was his failure in 
business that brought him into the literary world. He began by contributing a 
travelogue to the English newspaper daily The Englishman, which was based on his 
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frequent trips to Dacca. Chunder travelled widely to parts of north India on various 
occasions and he kept a record of his travels. 
Bholanauth Chunder‘s travel account was published in 1869 and contains his 
observations during several trips, made between 1845 and 1866, from Calcutta to 
parts of North India, more specifically to Delhi, through Gangetic Northern India. 
Contemporary scholarship has given a great deal of importance to observations and 
perceptions of European travellers to India both during the fifteenth to eighteenth 
centuries as well as during the period of colonial rule over India. Memoirs, 
reminiscences, and dairies of British men and women associated directly or 
indirectly with the colonial regime have also received a fair share of attention.
99
 
However, we know very little about travel narratives of Indians about India during 
the period when colonial government had introduced significant changes in India‘s 
society, economy and culture. The Indian middle class of the nineteenth century – 
represented here by Bholanauth Chunder, the author of this travel account – was in 
large part a creation of the colonial episode in Indian history. Thus a travel narrative 
which contains the views of an Indian about India is significant in itself. 
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Bimanbehari Majumdar has attributed to Bholanauth Chunder the ‗fatherhood 
of the Swadeshi movement‘ if understood purely for its economic significance.100 
Majumdar primarily looked at a series of articles published by Chunder between 
1873 and 1876 in the Mookerjee’s Magazine. Chunder‘s Swadeshi sentiments are 
expressed in no uncertain terms when he wrote: ‗I want no foreign capital to resort to 
India; her own capital should be created. I want no foreign imports which she can 
manufacture herself at home.‘101 Traces of his sense of economic nationalism and his 
Swadeshi sentiments are evident very early on in his travelogue, which spans two 
decades from mid-1840s to mid-1860s. Chunder continually interspersed his travel 
narrative with a lament for the ‗passing off of the manufactures of our country into 
foreign hands‘ and hoped: 
Our sons and grandsons will emulate our ancestors to have every 
dhooty, every shirt, and every pugree made from the fabrics of Indian 
cotton manufactured by Indian mill-owners.
102
 The present Hindoo is 
a mere tiller of the soil…but the increased knowledge, energy, and 
wealth of the Indian of the twentieth or twenty-first century, would 
enable them to follow both agriculture and manufactures, to develop 
the subterranean resources, to open mines and set up mills, to launch 
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ships upon the ocean, and carry goods to the doors of the consumers 
in England and America.
103
  
 
Chunder‘s advocacy of Swadeshi was later to become an important economic plank 
of popular nationalism in India – both in 1905 and later in the Gandhian movement. 
He believed that it was through the growth of domestic industries and a strong 
domestic market that the Indian economy would grow. His vision for the future of 
the Indian economy was similar to his perception of contemporary English economy 
with its strong domestic economy and an equally robust export trade. Therefore his 
Swadeshi sentiments were strongly associated with his advocacy for the development 
of modern industries in India. He was critical of British trade policies that have 
actively de-industrialised India and has made the ‗colonial economy‘ go into debt. 
Similar to the view of Hurrish Mukherji expressed in Hindoo Patriot, Chunder 
also believed that the rising income tax was the main reason behind the rebellion of 
1857. To him, ‗never before was national debt known in India… not more is the 
national debt foreign to the ideas of the North-Westerns than is the Income Tax.‘104 
Much of the ‗national‘ debt that Chunder had referred to was the result of the 
changing trade relations between India and Britain which, to him, had brought about 
a rapid decline of artisan industries and further worsened the already depressed 
agricultural economy. That the colonial economy continued to suffer is evident from 
the similarity between his observations, regarding the condition of the peasantry. In 
Chunder‘s opinion from the ‗increased cultivation and increased export of produce, 
the statesman may conclude the agriculturist to be thriving. But he still dwells in a 
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ragged hut, and still lives upon a coarsest rice.‘105 Chunder like most other 
nationalists of the later years rejected the claim that increased agricultural exports 
improved the condition of the peasantry of India. Moreover, his observations not 
only highlighted the detrimental impact of the colonial economic policies on Indian 
economy but also underscore the fact that colonial policies led to a sustained 
impoverishment of Indian economy. Foreshadowing the early nationalists concern 
regarding the de-industrialisation of India, Chunder firmly established that the import 
of English textiles had a detrimental impact on native weavers and industries. He 
wrote that ‗the English want to reduce us all to the condition of agriculturists … 
England‘s boast as a manufacturing power would be at an end, if India followed her 
own trade and industries.‘106 As a measure Chunder called for protective tariffs in 
order to boost domestic industries and if that was not possible then he urged the use 
of ‗the only but most effectual weapon – moral hostility… resolving to non-consume 
the goods of England‘ so as to ‗dethrone King-Cotton of Manchester, and once more 
re-establish there the Indian sway in the cotton world.‘107 Chunder made a succinct, 
insightful observation that encapsulated India‘s economic experience under British 
rule. He wrote that the ‗abstraction of capital from India since 1757, under which she 
is not left but an empty shell.‘108 To Chunder, Britain‘s trade policy in India was at 
first place ‗prohibitive, next aggressive, then suppressive‘ and eventually became 
‗repressive setting bounds to Native ambition for anything approaching commercial 
rivalry‘.109 
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However even though Chunder remained highly critical of the economic 
policies of the colonial rule, this was paired with his admiration for the British for 
having introduced English education and science and technology, which he viewed 
as something necessary to ‗modernise‘ India. It was from this viewpoint that 
Chunder expressed genuine concern for his nation‘s progress and yet he considered 
the rebellion of 1857 to be a ‗fatal error‘ which could have ‗plunged the country into 
the misrule of past ages.‘110 He saw the rebellion as ‗a struggle between 
overwhelming hordes and a heroic few, between mind and material, between 
civilisation and barbarism.‘111 Instead, Chunder believed that western education 
would eventually allow India to assert its independence. He believed that India could 
not attain independence through the use of force, but instead ‗the fight of mind 
against mind has to decide the fate of a battle.‘112 According to Chunder, superior 
knowledge was the best weapon against colonialism but until then, he believed that 
Indian society should remain under ‗the yoke of the English‘ as it is through 
colonialism that ‗the disjointed masses of India‘ were brought together ‗into the 
mould of one compact nation‘.113 In Chunder‘s mind the providential nature of 
British rule was so strong that in colonial rule he saw ‗the government of enlightened 
legislation, of the science and civilisation of the nineteenth century, of superior 
intelligence and genius, of knowledge itself.‘114  
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5.6 SITUATING THE REBELLION IN HISTORY  
As pointed out in the section on the formation of the middle class, the colonial 
education system emphasised the role of history and the need for historical 
representation. The purpose of this emphasis was simple: to portrait the Indian past 
as a Dark Age, thereby justifying the colonial rule as bright and benevolent. History 
thus became a tool to accentuate the difference between the superior West and the 
backward Orient. Subho Basu has noted that to the middle class literati, under the 
influence of this education system, it was increasingly becoming apparent that they 
were denied the status of citizen-subjects.
115
 In order to successfully claim such 
status, they realised the need to be a member of a nation-state, which according to the 
colonial discourse was the privilege of advanced civilisations claiming heritage to 
classical antiquity. As I argue in this section, the intelligentsia took recourse to the 
same tool and made use of history in an attempt to rediscover their ‗nationalist‘ past. 
Making history, as Manu Goswami has pointed out, became coterminous with 
establishing a national space, that is, a historically continuous national territory.
116
 
History became a tool for generating an awareness of a common past that provided 
the Calcutta intelligentsia with a sense of common belonging. Sudipta Kaviraj has 
argued that the forging of a national consciousness required overcoming earlier 
‗fragmented identities‘ in order to unite against the forces of colonialism.117 These 
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fragmented identities were stitched together by the awareness towards history. While 
doing so, as I argue, the Calcutta intelligentsia were guided and motivated by the 
events concerning the rebellion of 1857.  
The importance of ‗invoking‘ history was recognised by Hurrish Mukherji and 
others and was most prominent during the rebellion. One must also bear in mind that 
since the days of the passing of the ‗Gagging Act‘ in June 1857, these literati were 
under constraints to be clear and open in their writings, since they were always under 
the government scanner, as shown in chapter 2. This is evident from one of Hurrish 
Mukherji‘s comments that he wrote towards the closing years of the rebellion. In 
dismay he wrote that ‗history would see and evaluate the great Indian Revolt in a 
manner wholly different from how contemporaries in 1857-58 viewed it.‘118 Thus the 
literati adopted a stance which was to allow them a chance to express their opinion in 
a language that was not to be stifled by the colonial government.  
As mentioned in an earlier section, Hurrish Mukherji found the real cause of 
the rebellion in the fact that the colonial government neglected that India had a 
civilisation of her own, and possessed laws and social organisations, which predated 
the Greeks.
119
 In this manner, he and other like-minded literati of his times, 
highlighted the ‗glories‘ of India‘s past. Others such as Bholanauth Chunder and 
Jadunath Sarbadhikary through their narratives and travel writings highlighted the 
history and progress of India, thereby challenging the ‗civilising mission‘ of the 
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colonial rule. But while doing so, as Goswami has noted, these works were not 
uniformly oppositional in relation to the colonial state, nor were they necessarily 
anticolonial in the narrow political sense of demanding sovereign statehood.
120
 The 
significance of these works not just lies in the fact that they prefigure later nationalist 
historiography, but also because they initiated, in all senses of the word, a conception 
of Bharat/India as a real, enduring, spatially bounded national entity. As 
Dharanikanta Lahiri Choudhury, a landed aristocrat of Kalipur, Mymensingh, had 
pointed out, the best way to understand the past and present of the Indian nation was 
to see historical places and observe the customs of specific places in India.
121
 This is 
reflected in Bholanauth Chunder's narrative which is replete with historical 
references. During the course of his journeys, Chunder visited places like 
Murshidabad, Gaur, Munger, Patna, Benares, Allahabad, Mathura, Brindavan, Delhi, 
and Agra among others. All these sites together were concrete manifestations of 
Bharat/India that had to be represented as places of national pride within the 
narrative of Indian history. For the Calcutta intelligentsia, writing around the time of 
the rebellion, the achievements of the past inspired pride in the nation, and the 
existence of symbols of ancient glory manifested as sites that commemorate the 
nation. The discursive elaboration of India as a spatially bounded and historically 
determinate national entity marked the constitution of a novel understanding of the 
liaison between history, territory, and identity.
122
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The Calcutta literati writing during the time of the rebellion of 1857 situated 
themselves in a historical grid with the places of the rebellion. In other words, the 
rebellion became crucial in historicising the places. History of place was linked to 
the agenda of imagining India/Bharat, as the fate of specific places during the 
rebellion was regarded as a betrayal of the whole country. Kasiprasad Ghosh – editor 
of the weekly newspaper Hindoo Intelligenser- lamented that the annexation and 
misfortune of Awadh symbolised a loss of the country‘s liberty and independence.123 
Similarly Bholanauth Chunder, while writing about India‘s past, described Delhi as 
the ‗the most renowned city on the globe‘, and compared it to ancient cities like 
Babylon, Persepolis, Athens and Carthage.
124
 He referred to Benares as ‗the only 
town of pre-historic antiquity that yet survives to link the ancient world with the 
modern.‘125 Chunder‘s claim that Allahabad had once been a Republican State in the 
heart of ancient India reveals yet another example of the superiority of ancient Indian 
civilisation. This is particularly significant as colonial discourse characterised India‘s 
weakness as deriving in part from its political tradition of Oriental despotism. 
Against this backdrop the Bengal literati, as represented in this context by 
Bholanauth Chunder, pointed to examples of republican state in ancient India. By 
doing so, they tried to show that India also had democratic/ republican states in the 
past. This was also reflected in the writing of Jadunath Sarbadhikary who had toured 
India from 1853 to 1857 and had given us a picture of the rebellion in a historical 
perspective.
126
 Sarbadhikary was a devout Hindu and his travel from place to place 
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was essentially a pilgrimage from one centre of Hindu religion to the other. He was 
mainly interested in the religious institutions of the country and his pages were full 
of uncritical acceptance of the stories and myths connected with different Hindu 
religious centres. But, as Snigdha Sen has reminded us, behind this was the ecstasy 
of one who had gone out of the circumscribed settings of his village to discover the 
world of Indian tradition rich in Hindu culture where life pulsated over thousand 
years unruffled by the apparent political changes in the country.
127
 Sarbadhikary‘s 
diary provided us with an eye-witness account of the rebellion that reported the 
uprisings of the 10
th
, 20
th
, 38
th
, 54
th
 and 74
th
 Native Infantry in and around Meerut, 
Delhi, Kanpur and other nearby places of the Gangetic heartland.
128
 
Like Chunder, Sarbadhikary also connected the city of Delhi to its past, and 
glorified it as the seat of the Emperor and memorialised the place as a site of glory as 
exemplified in the valour and prowess of King Prithviraj Chauhan who ruled the 
kingdom of Ajmer and Delhi during the twelfth century. It is indeed interesting to 
note that in the writings of these literati the places and sites of the rebellion of 1857 
were connected with the past instances of valour, courage and glory. For instance, 
while mentioning about Kanpur, Jadunath recollected how the place once was the 
forest abode of sage Valmiki. This was the place where ‗Sita spent the years of her 
banishment and where Lav and Kush were born.‘ Sarbadhikary even went ahead and 
drew a direct connection between the historical past of the place and its present 
significance in the context of the rebellion. 
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Here stands the house of Baji Rao of Pune and Satara. Some soldiers 
occupy the place and it is the home of Nana Saheb, Baji Rao‘s 
descendent… The land of the Marathas had long symbolised 
independence, courage and strength. Shivaji had shown immortal 
valour in battle… This inspired Nana Saheb to great acts of courage, 
and he carried on the legacy of his lineage. To bow down before 
oppressors is not the mark of a courageous man. Nana Saheb did 
not… The valour of nana Saheb will always be lauded by history.129 
 
As the immediate flares of the rebellion gradually mellowed down these kinds of 
appropriation of history within the context of the rebellion of 1857 found unabashed 
expressions in the works of the later day intellectuals towards the closing years of the 
nineteenth century.
130
  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
It is therefore evident that the contemporary reactions of the Bengal intelligentsia, 
being a product and the beneficiary of the colonial rule, vis-à-vis the rebellion had 
indeed taken a stance that was different from that of the rebel sepoys and leaders of 
1857 in the Gangetic heartland. The introduction of western education, print culture, 
scientific progress and rational thought had certainly influenced Hurrish Mukherji, 
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Bholanauth Chunder, Jadunath Sarbadhikary, and many others of the time to believe 
that ‗under the auspices of a liberal education and the growth of enlightened 
sentiments‘ the prejudices that existed between the ‗ill-cemented mass of petty 
nationalities‘ could be overcome to ‗form one great welded nation‘.131 However, as 
this chapter has argued, this appreciation towards colonial rule by the Calcutta 
intelligentsia was much more complex and nuanced. At least on paper, the Calcutta 
literati never approved of the open outbursts of the rebellion and were critical 
towards the atrocities committed by the rebel sepoys and the ‗disgruntled section of 
the population‘. Chunder even considered the rebellion of 1857 to be a ‗fatal error‘, 
which could have ‗plunged the country into the misrule of past ages‘.132 He saw the 
rebellion as ‗a struggle between overwhelming hordes and a heroic few, between 
mind and material, between civilisation and barbarism.‘133 But they were also highly 
aware of the real causes of the disaffection among the population in general. Writing 
at the time of the rebellion, the Calcutta intelligentsia wished for the speedy end to 
this crisis, but at the same time recognised the ill-effects of the colonial rule. In spite 
of the severe restrictions that were imposed upon the newspapers and periodicals, 
these intellectuals continued to write articles critiquing colonial policies in India, and 
at times even questioning the legitimacy of colonial rule. The Bengali intelligentsia 
also used same tools of the colonial empire, including the use of history, in order to 
glorify the Indian past. This definitely throws some light on the incipient nationalism 
that was slowly emerging within the Indian society. The rebellion of 1857 played a 
significant role in this regard. As Sibnath Shastri put it, ‗the excitement of the revolt 
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did a great benefit to Bengal and her society; a new society was born; a new desire 
was generated in national life.‘134 This new desire which Shastri spoke of, found 
candid expression in Rangalal Bandyopadhyay‘s ―Padmini Upakhyan‖ (The Tale of 
Padmini) written in 1858:
135
 
Swadhinata heenatay ke banchite chay he 
Ke banchite chae? 
Dasatva-srinkhal balo ke paribe pae he 
Ke paribe pae? 
 
(Who wants to live without freedom? 
Who wants to wear on his feet the chains of slavery?)
136
 
 
As Dušan Zbavitel remarked, Rangalal‘s book echoed ‗the newly awakened spirit of 
patriotism and pride in the past glory of India that was soon to take a deep root in 
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Bengali literatures.‘137 The idea also found expression in Ajit Kumar Chakraborty‘s 
biography of Debendranath Tagore.
138
 Tagore was descending from the Himalayas 
when the rebellion was in full swing. When the rebellion finally came to an end 
Tagore observed that ‗the fire of Revolt died down, but it sowed a new seed in the 
soil of Bengal… the beginning of this new phase can be regarded as an outcome of 
the conflagration of 1857.‘139 It was this new spirit, emanating from the rebellion of 
1857, which was responsible for the gradual development of an ideological critique 
of colonialism and the assertion of the rights of citizenship by the turn of the century.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has addressed the rebellion of 1857 as it unfolded in the lower province of 
the Bengal Presidency and Assam. With the help of the hitherto under-utilised 
sources, it has argued for a more nuanced understanding of the rebellion of 1857 than 
has hitherto been the case in the past. For the last thirty years historians have 
emerged from the constricted framework of imperialist-nationalist perspectives on 
the rebellion and analysed the various fissures within the uprising. There can hardly 
be any doubt that the rebellion was indeed multidimensional and multifaceted in 
character. And yet, apart from a few recent efforts, the history of the rebellion of 
1857 continues to be studied based on the north-central Gangetic heartland, assuming 
that except for parts of northern and central India, other regions remained firmly 
ensconced in the loyalist fold. According to the canonical version of the story, the 
even tenor of life in Bengal and the quietude of Madras were hardly disturbed. The 
sporadic incidents that might have occurred elsewhere were merely incidental to the 
main events in northern India.  
As this thesis has shown, the scope of the rebellion went far beyond the 
Gangetic heartland. Taking the lower province of Bengal and Assam as a case study 
this thesis not just extends the scope of the rebellion, but, at the same time, brings out 
the multi-dimensional character of the uprising based on the specificities of the 
region. As the thesis argued the rebellion of 1857 was not a unified phenomenon but 
the regions were nonetheless inter-connected with varying multitude. Setting the 
context in the first chapter, it becomes clear that the principle areas of recruitment of 
the Bengal army had been from the districts of western Bihar, Awadh, Lucknow, 
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Meerut, Kanpur, and Benares. It is also evident that all these ‗purbia‘ sepoys were 
mostly recruited from the high caste Hindu peasants, mostly the Rajputs, who were 
the traditional warrior caste of North and North-West India, or ‗Bhumihars‘, the 
military wing of the priestly caste of Brahmins, or Brahmins themselves.
1
 This 
resulted in an extremely homogenous body of sepoys in the Bengal army. As Wagner 
has reminded us, reluctant to interfere too much in local governance, British policy-
makers during this early period generally sought to adopt and preserve Indian 
traditions and institutions as far as possible.
2
 The existing pool of military labour 
based around the ‗mutiny country‘ of northern India provided the Company a 
necessary framework within which to build up its own army. The absence of 
recruitment from the lower province of Bengal prior to the British intervention was 
received and interpreted by the colonial ideologues in terms of ‗martial race‘ theory. 
As a consequence even in the 1830‘s and 40‘s when the Company introduced certain 
changes in the recruitment pattern of the army, lower province of Bengal was still not 
considered as ‗ideal‘ for the purpose. Considering this, it is not surprising that the 
sepoys stationed in the lower province had no formal attachment to the land of the 
immediate neighbourhood. When the rebellion broke out in 1857 these sepoys 
therefore were more concerned to return to their own districts carrying with them the 
message of the rebellion. This also partially explains the time difference noticeable 
between the outbreak of the mutiny of the 34
th
 Bengal Native Infantry in Barrackpore 
and the mutiny in Meerut. 
With the composition and recruitment pattern of the Bengal army as a 
backdrop, the chapter 2 discussed the run-up phase to the rebellion, focussing 
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primarily on the circulation of rumours, which played a significant role in the spread 
of information leading to the formal outbreak of the rebellion in the province. The 
chapter examined the importance of the cumulative effect of incidences of rebellion 
in the Gangetic heartland, the circulation of various forms of information (both 
verified and unverified) and the role of ‗conspiracies‘, in the actions of the colonial 
government. In the thesis I have used the notion of ‗information panic‘ – famously 
used by C.A. Bayly – to describe the inability of the British officials as well as the 
rebels to effectively gather and interpret information relating to the rebellion.
3
 This 
concept can perhaps be applied equally to Indian misreadings of the British. The 
uprising was in fact precipitated by what may appropriately be described as an 
‗information panic‘ amongst the sepoys and part of the Indian population who saw in 
British reforms a direct attack on their culture and society. Religion represented the 
social order of Indian society for both Hindus and Muslims and the sepoys‘ fears of 
the greased cartridges thus embodied much more general concerns over British 
intrusion. The circulation of rumour has been used extensively as an important 
historical tool for analysing the contours of the rebellion in the region. Considerable 
research has described how rumour often acts as a trigger and a mobiliser in pre-
literate and pre-capitalist agrarian societies. However, the efficacy of rumour is not 
diminished even in modern industrial societies and, as Rajnarayan Chandavarkar has 
argued, even the elites were susceptible to it.
4
 The fear and panic that had gripped the 
European (both civil and official) population of Calcutta and its surroundings as a 
result of the rumours – ranging from the impending downfall of the colonial rule, to 
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the mass extermination of all the Europeans and other loyal subjects of the Raj – 
validates this argument. Chandavarkar however had his reservation in adducing 
rumours as historical sources, contending that since the evidence were sourced from 
official archives compiled by the middle classes, their authenticity was in doubt.
5
 
Another perspective has been put forward by Luise White. Dealing with the rumours 
of blood-sucking vampire stories in colonial East Africa, White argues that narratives 
based on rumour with all their ‗contested details‘ and ‗loose-ends‘ can prove to be 
valuable sources of the victim‘s cognitive world and perception.6 This line of 
argument is in fact best reflected in George Lefebvre‘s The Great Fear of 1789. In 
the context of the rural panic in revolutionary France, Lefebvre argued that ‗what 
matters in seeking an explanation for the Great Fear is not so much the actual truth as 
what the people thought the aristocracy could and would do‘.7 In other words, as 
Kim Wagner noted, the accuracy of rumours is essentially immaterial, and whether 
or not they were true, they had very real consequences.
8
  
This fear and apprehension arising out of rumours, as this thesis shows, had 
some serious repercussions on the natives and the Europeans alike. In spite of the 
efforts of the colonial government to allay popular anxieties, rumours concerning the 
forced conversion of the natives were indeed strong, as evident from the 
proclamations and anonymous petitions. From the European perspective, there was a 
fear of things happening just under the surface, unknown to the administration and 
kept secret by the native population. The arrival of rebel sepoys in Calcutta, the 
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conspiracy planned by the erstwhile Nawab of Awadh, the possible alliance with the 
Amirs of Sindh with the rebellious elements in Calcutta, the influence established by 
the Wahabis and Faraizis and their connection with the disaffected elements in 
eastern Bengal, bears testimony to the argument. This perceived or real threat 
assumed alarming proportions in times of unrest, when the British found themselves 
unable to obtain access and effectively gather information about their Indian 
subjects. Similarly, the mutineers were on many occasions persuaded by the rumour 
and prophecies of the impending downfall of the British Empire. The efficacy of fear 
and panic amongst the Europeans were not just confined to Calcutta or its hinterland. 
Drawing a parallel to the situation in the eastern Bengal (present-day Bangladesh) 
and its cumulative impact in the Straits Settlements, the thesis also has argued that 
the potential threat transgressed beyond the more active theatres of the rebellion 
within India and had far reaching consequences. These parallels, along with the 
covert participation of sections of the population in Bhutan and Nepal during the 
rebellion, make the conflagration of 1857 sub-continental in its scope.
9
 The thesis 
has attempted to make the rumours, panics, and their consequences the object of a 
study in their own right.  
The inability to comprehend the information relating to the rebellion led to 
major consequences. The scale and ferocity of systematic destruction of the telegraph 
lines and offices in various places of northern and central India, and also in the lower 
provinces of the Bengal presidency, which included Raniganj, Barrackpore, 
                                                          
9
 Amongst the recent publications that has dealt with the various aspects of the Indian uprising in a 
global perspective, see: Marina Carter and Crispin Bates (eds.), Mutiny at the Margins: New 
Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857, Volume 3: Global Perspectives, London: Sage 
Publications, 2013; Shaswati Mazumdar (ed.), Insurgent Sepoys: Europe Views the Revolt of 1857, 
London, New Delhi: Routledge, 2011. 
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Chittagong, Dhaka, and Assam, suggests that it was one of the primary military 
targets for the rebels. By examining the way the rebellion spread it appears indeed 
that much of the military action occurred along the telegraph routes. Crispin Bates 
and Marina Carter have noted how the war over telegraph lines was a corollary of the 
general conflict of 1857. The British administration attempted to restore telegraph 
lines as quickly as mutineers disabled them.
10
 But the unwillingness of the colonial 
government to build a telegraph line between Calcutta and Madras proved to be a 
major problem when the authorities in Calcutta were starved of official information 
because of the formal breakdown of the government‘s communication network in 
northern India.
11
 By July 1857 four hundred miles of telegraph lines from Agra to 
Indore, one eighty miles from Kanpur to Agra and one seventy eight miles from Agra 
to Delhi had been totally destroyed.
12
 In addition to the destruction of telegraph lines, 
the rebels also targeted the Grand Trunk road, cutting it off at various points.
13
 As a 
consequence the colonial government in Calcutta was clueless regarding the precise 
activities and movement of the mutineers, and could only rely upon the second-hand 
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  Marina Carter and Crispin Bates, ―Introduction: Global Networks and Perspectives on the Indian 
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information supplied by civil authorities.
14
 Interestingly what had unnerved the 
colonial government at this stage was that the press was becoming a vehicle for all 
sorts of gossip, information and misinformation and a potential alternative to 
‗official‘ information supplied from the government. To cite one such example, on 
13 June 1857, Bengal Hurkaru and India Gazette translated and reproduced a 
proclamation issued by the rebels in Delhi, so that ‗the Government and the 
European public in Calcutta are aware of such publicity among the native 
community‘.15  
Unsurprisingly, the circulation of these types of report and proclamations made 
the European inhabitants as well as the colonial government seriously concerned 
regarding the safety of Calcutta and its hinterland. As Alexander Duff interpreted, 
the fall of Calcutta in the hands of the rebels would have meant the actual fall of the 
British Empire in the whole of the subcontinent. This concern was reflected in the 
radical steps taken by the colonial government in order to tackle the situation. The 
‗Gagging‘ Act of 1857 that stifled the voice of the press, the extraordinary powers 
given to the civil and military officers to carry out ‗kangaroo trials‘, the unexpected 
increase in the sale of the fire-arms among the European population of Calcutta, the 
unsystematic recruitment of the European sailors and other volunteer guards for the 
protection of the city and in the regions further east of the lower province of Bengal, 
- all of these developments indicate that there was in reality a crisis of the state in 
colonial Bengal.  
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The crisis was further augmented by the manifestations of rumour, 
‗conspiracies‘ and the subsequent panic that followed, resulting in the actual outburst 
of acts of rebellion by sepoys. Other than examples in Calcutta itself, the districts of 
lower Bengal throw up standard instances of riot and lawlessness, as took place in 
Purulia, when there was a withdrawal of the officer corps in anticipation of a wider 
mutiny. Chapter three takes this story further into the districts of Eastern Bengal, 
where the presence and activities of Wahabis and Faraizi sects had already created a 
climate of uneasiness even prior to the outbreak of the rebellion. As Bayly noted, in 
British eyes, one of the most dangerous networks of sedition was maintained by 
Muslims of the purist (Wahabi) tradition.
16
 Many officials came to believe that the 
whole Muslim community was implicated in the rebellion. In order to prevent the 
possible convergence of these sects with the rebels of 1857, the colonial government 
extended the jurisdiction of the Dacoity Commission and apprehended those who 
they thought were privy to the conspiracy. From the statements of Najid Bechu Singh 
and others it is evident that the suspected mutineers had prepared, in accordance with 
the rebel sepoys of Barrackpore and Allahabad, a plan of action to be followed 
during the rebellion in the region. However, the timely interference of the 
government disrupted this whole scheme of things for the rebels. 
Moving on to the subsequent course of events we witnessed more broad 
ranging incidents at the military cantonments eventually leading to the formal 
outbreak of rebellion in Chittagong and Dhaka. A few observations have been made 
while analysing the nature and character of the rebellion in these two military 
stations. Once again, following the narrative of the events in the chronological 
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sequence, it becomes clear that the rebel sepoys in these cantonments had established 
an informal network of communication with the sepoys, both within the region and 
also with the rebel sepoys of northern India. The mutinies also followed a similar 
pattern to that of the rebels in the Gangetic heartland. In the cantonments of 
Chittagong as well as in Dhaka there were scenes of extensive firing, burning down 
of the bungalows and properties owned by the British, destroying the electric 
telegraph networks, looting of the state treasuries, and breaking open of jails thereby 
releasing the prisoners, before moving on towards their respective headquarters. 
From the evidences provided in the narrative it is plausible to argue that the mutinous 
sepoys were planning to move closer towards the more active theatres of rebellion. 
The stark similarity of the rebel actions in the cantonments situated miles apart is 
suggestive of connections of regions between the lower province of Bengal and the 
north-central Gangetic heartland. 
It must be admitted that in spite of having some of the necessary pre-
conditions, the rebellion failed to generate wider mass base in the region, unlike the 
districts in Awadh. In other words, the mutiny of the sepoys never turned into a civil 
rebellion in the lower presidency of Bengal. This was mainly because of the absence 
of any formal attachment of the rebel sepoys to the land and rural population in the 
region. As a result the disaffection of the sepoys and dissatisfaction of the sections of 
the population towards the colonial rule never really coincided. The course that the 
rebels followed after the mutiny in the cantonments gives us a clear indication that 
they were more interested to join their comrades and reinforce the resistance in the 
Gangetic heartland, the same area where they were recruited from, rather than 
broadening their mass base within the region. Nevertheless, the thesis has provided 
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enough evidence to believe that the sepoys did receive some covert support and 
sympathy from dissident local groups around the neighbouring regions, such as the 
Manipur princes, the Chera chiefs, the zamindars of Pachete, Nepal, Bhutan and even 
the Kookie tribesmen.  
Moving on to chapter 3 in Assam, the region presented yet another interesting 
case study that showed the extent to which the regional specificities mattered during 
the crisis of 1857. In sharp contrast to the regions covered in chapters 2 and 3, in 
Assam we witness the actual convergence of the rebellion, the actions of the elites, 
popular unrest and the counter-insurgency of the colonial state. Unlike the lower 
province of the Bengal presidency, Assam came under the colonial dominion only 
about twenty years prior to the outbreak of the rebellion and witnessed certain radical 
socio-political and economic changes. Our discussion of the historical background 
provided a glimpse into this transformation, which also explains the reason for the 
dissatisfaction and hostility of landed elites towards the colonial rule even prior to 
1857. To put it simply, there were already enough incendiary materials in Assam for 
the rebellion to feed on. The outbreak of the rebellion in 1857 provided these 
disgruntled nobilities the much needed opportunity. As the chapter argued, the 
composition and recruitment pattern of the army played a crucial role in forging this 
vital link between the sepoys and the civil population. Unlike the other regiments of 
the Bengal native Infantry of the lower province of Bengal, the regiments posted in 
Assam were more heterogeneous in nature which, in addition to the ‗purbia‘ sepoys, 
was mostly comprised of local recruits. Together these provided the adequate pre-
conditions necessary for the intended rebellion. The circulation of rumours about the 
downfall of the British rule in India, the harrowing tales of the massacre of 
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Europeans carried by wanderer and fakirs, along with the newspapers, reports, 
personal letters from Calcutta and elsewhere, played a crucial role in providing the 
necessary spark in the region. Attempts were made by those associated with 
insurrection in the province – Maniram Diwan, Piyali Barua and Nirmal Hazari – to 
establish links with military detachments in Golaghat (Sibsagar district), Debrugarh 
and Saikhowa. The details of the proposed plan of attack and the actions to be taken 
thereafter – as evident from the deposition of Keramat Ali – provided us with a clear 
picture of the rebel intention.  
The failure of the intended rebellion in Assam was due to the lack of 
coordination amongst the rebel leaders and the native sepoys. The inability to 
comprehend the information that was in circulation related to the rebellion proved to 
be decisive from the rebel perspective. Rumour played a crucial role in changing the 
contour of the intended rebellion in Assam. As is shown in the chapter, the rebellion 
was initially planned for later in the year when Maniram Diwan was to return from 
Calcutta. However, vague reports and the floating rumour about the European 
officials fleeing the region along with their money and ammunition made the 
rebellious sepoys confused and uncoordinated. While a section felt that an immediate 
action was the call of the day, others wanted to tread with caution. This eventually 
delayed the whole operation thereby providing the colonial administration enough 
time and opportunity to spoil their plans and track down the rebels. It is also 
interesting to note that the traditional leadership also played an important factor 
during the intended rebellion of 1857 in Assam. In spite of the British intervention 
and the changes that were introduced in Assam, the society remained highly feudal in 
character. The failure of earlier rebellions in Assam convinced Maniram Diwan that 
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in order to put up a strong and united force capable of resisting the colonial rule he 
needed to rally behind the legitimate leader of the Ahom dynasty. The letters written 
by the Diwan during the rebellion of 1857 - either addressed directly to the young 
Rajah, or to the rebellious landed elites and other nobilities on behalf of the King – 
bears testimony to his intention. In the absence of Maniram (then residing in 
Calcutta) local magnates - Piyali Barua, Nirmal Hazari and others – took recourse to 
the same method by asking the sepoys to join the rebel cause in the name of the King 
of Assam.  
It is thus safe to infer that the reactions and responses towards the rebellion 
were indeed multi-layered and permeated regions well beyond the Gangetic 
heartland. The differential character and outcome of the rebellion was not always 
entirely dependent on the landlord-peasant relation, as suggested by Mukherjee, or 
the collective action of the ‗people‘, as argued by Roy.17 This study argued that the 
rebellion of 1857 was far more complicated in nature and the responses were varied 
and complex. This complexity has been explained in the last chapter, which 
investigates the response of the middle class intelligentsia in Bengal towards the 
rebellion.  
Contrary to the stereotypical portrayal of the middle class intelligentsia as the 
‗loyal‘ supporters of the British during the time of the rebellion there is a need, as 
argued in the chapter, for a more nuanced understanding of such terminologies. As 
pointed out by C.A. Bayly, and touched upon by Anderson ‗the boundary between 
―revolt‖ and ―collaboration‖ was often very faint.‘18 In Bengal, the ‗loyalism‘ of the 
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intelligentsia contained internal dilemmas and contradictions, thus opening a space 
for moving beyond terminologies of ‗loyalist‘ or ‗rebel‘. Opposition towards the 
colonial rule need not always be overt or armed. The contemporary intelligentsia in 
Bengal viewed the armed rebellion of 1857 in north and central India and the 
situation in Bengal as two expressive facets and the results of the same discontent. 
As we explored the writings of personalities such as Hurrish Chandra Mukherji and 
Bholanauth Chunder, it becomes clear that the opposition was articulated in a 
rhetoric that was different from those of the ‗rebel‘ leaders of 1857. The 
intelligentsia of Bengal certainly did not appreciate the open outbursts of violence 
and the bloodshed that would, in their opinion, have taken the country into a state of 
total disarray. However, at the same time they were objective enough to see the ‗real‘ 
reasons behind this insurrection, even questioning the viability of the presence of the 
colonial rule in the subcontinent. As a corollary to this, the Calcutta intelligentsia 
invoked History in an attempt to stitch together their earlier fragmented identities, by 
initiating the process of rediscovering their ‗nationalist‘ past. In other words, History 
became a tool for generating an awareness of a past that provided the Calcutta 
intelligentsia with a sense of common belonging. While doing so, as I argued, the 
rebellion of 1857 played an important role in historicising the geographical spaces. In 
the writings of the Calcutta literati the sites of the rebellion of 1857 were now 
connected with the past instances of valour, glory, courage and unity of India/Bharat. 
The chapter follows a somewhat similar argument been made by Avril Powell 
and Mushirul Hasan in the context of the response of Muslim intelligentsia in 
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northern India during the rebellion of 1857.
19
 As Markus Daechsel has pointed out, 
the Indian Muslim elites/intelligentsia were never easily divisible into ‗modernist 
loyalists‘ and ‗traditionalist‘ rebels, but had on the whole occupied a pragmatic 
position with regards to their non-Muslim overlords.
20
 Revisiting the writings and 
outlooks of several Muslim intellectuals associated with the Delhi College, where a 
great deal of intellectual exchanges had taken place, Hasan has persuasively argued 
that for men of this generation and background, their individual responses to 1857 
were always going to be far more complex than the dichotomy between official 
narratives of loyalism and anti-imperialism. Similar to the middle class intelligentsia 
in Bengal, the Muslim intellectuals of north India, as Hasan maintained, were often 
as bewildered as the British and criticised the violence of the rebellion itself, while at 
the same time remained acutely sensitive to the cultural and human loss suffered.
21
 
This understanding and the implicit critique of the colonial rule were to a large extent 
shaped by the events and memories of 1857, and were to be articulated in a more 
unabashed way in the course of the second half of the nineteenth-century, 
culminating with the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885, and the 
emergence of a new informed political consciousness. 
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From the British perspective, the trial of the Mughal Emperor followed by the 
Queen‘s Proclamation in 1 November 1858 marked the beginning of a new order in 
Indian administration.
22
 With the Act of Parliament, the Queen now took over the 
formal responsibility of administering affairs relating to India, thereby marking the 
end of the Company rule. One vital aspect that the Proclamation acknowledged was 
that ‗there was an indigenous diversity in culture, society and religion in India.‘23 
The rebellion of 1857 henceforth was looked upon as a watershed in this context, 
demarcating crucial changes that were to be brought about in the subsequent years.
24
 
As Bernard Cohn pointed out, ‗to the British ruling elites, at home and in India, the 
meanings attached to the events of 1857-58, and the resulting constitutional changes, 
were increasingly the pivot around which their theory of colonial rule rotated.‘25 One 
of the most significant legacies of the uprising was arguably the manner in which the 
British henceforth perceived any kind of anti-colonial sentiments amongst the 
Indians.
26
 From Lord Lytton in the 1870s through General Dyer in 1918 to 
Tottenham in 1942 the spectre of the uprising of 1857 haunted the administrators 
whenever they were called upon to deal with a mass upsurge. One might recall 
Brigadier General Reginald Dyer who was summoned to Amritsar by the colonial 
administration during the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919. Shortly before he left for 
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Amritsar, Dyer confided to his son that since the Hindus and the Muslims had joined 
hands he apprehended something like a re-enactment of 1857. Even otherwise, too, 
the lessons of the rebellion were not forgotten. To cite one example among many, in 
the early years of the last century, George Nathaniel Curzon, the Viceroy of India 
between 1899-1905, decided to build a memorial for the departed Queen Victoria. As 
he explained, the proposed hall was to serve primarily as a Monument to the Queen, 
and, secondarily, as a National Gallery and Valhalla for the Indian Empire. He 
personally listed the objects to be displayed. As David Gilmour, his latest biographer 
reminded us, enemies of Britain would be included if they were honourable and 
valiant foes like Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. But Curzon declared, he would not 
‗admit so much as the fringe of the pagri of a ruffian like Nana Sahib, the butcher of 
Cawnpore.‘27  
The continuing significance and relevance attached with the memory of this 
epoch event, both in India as well as in United Kingdom, can also be demonstrated 
by citing another example. In September 2007 (the year marked the 150
th
 anniversary 
of the uprising of 1857-58) a group of approximately nineteen British tourists ran 
into unexpected trouble while they were visiting some of the key sites of the Indian 
Uprising of 1857. In the memory of the ‗courage and valour and the distinguished 
service‘ displayed by the members of the 60th Queen‘s Royal Rifles, these men 
belonging to the same regiment, wanted to put up a stone plaque at St. John‘s 
Church in Meerut. The church incidentally stands on the periphery of the parade 
ground where Indian soldiers had revolted in the year 1857. However, the 
authorities heavily objected to this in view of the fact that ‗The 60th QRR was one 
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of the regiments that led the massacre of native soldiers‘ and thus ‗trying to put up 
this plaque (would have been) an insult to Indians‘. During a later visit to the 
Residency at Lucknow, the group had to be escorted away by the police when 
surrounded by an angry crowd and pelted with stones and bottles. A few days later 
the tour was eventually aborted.
28
 A similar such incident happened following a 
controversy that was sparked off by the restoration of the grave in Delhi of John 
Nicholson who led the British counter attack on Delhi in 1857 in an attempt to 
recover the city from the rebels. The grave was renovated by the British government, 
provoking a huge public outcry in India since it was seen as an affront to the 
nationalist sentiments.
29
 These examples bear testimony to the continued importance 
and interest in the memory of the Uprising of 1857, far transcending the limits of 
immediate history of the events themselves. 
 
********* 
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A P P P E N D I X  A  
T A B L E  7  
List of the Bengal Army Corrected to the 20th of October 1857 
Calcutta, Disposition of the Bengal Army 
 
STATION CORPS STAFF 
 
 
 
 
 
FORT WILLIAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CALCUTTA 
 
ALLYPORE 
 
BALLYGUNGE 
 
CALCUTTA 
Garrison 
 
 
Her Majesty‘s Troops (Artillery and 
Infantry) 
 
 
Detachments native infantry 
 
 
 
 
 
The Right Hon’ble Charles John 
Viscount Canning } Governor 
Lieut. Colonel… Commanding the 
troops in the garrison 
Lieut. Colonel O. Cavenagh. 32 N.I., 
Town and Fort Major, and ex-officio 
Superintendent of Gentlemen Cadets  
Captain M.R. Nightingale, 2d En. 
B.F., Fort Adjutant and Deputy 
Superintendent of Gentlemen Cadets  
Captain B.D.W. Ramsay, H.M.‘s 75th 
Foot, Brigade Major, Queen‘s troops 
Surgeon E. Campbell, Garrison 
Surgeon 
Assistant Surgeon N.C. Macnamara, 
Garrison Assistant Surgeon 
The left wing H.M. 29
th
 foot 
 
 
Calcutta Native Militia 
Governor general‘s Bodyguard 
Volunteer Guards  
(Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BARRACKPORE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presidency Division 
 
Her Majesty‘s 35th foot (2 companies at 
Berhampore) 
2d native infantry (grenadiers) 
Officers of the late 19
th
 native infantry 
32
nd
 native infantry 
34
th
 native infantry 
43
rd
 native (light) infantry 
70
th
 native infantry 
Major General Sir J.B. Hearsay, 
K.C.B., 6
th
 L.C., comg. The 
division 
Lieutenant J. Hearsay, 38
th
 
regiment, L.I., Aide-de-Camp 
Major A.H. Ross, 42
nd
 regt. 
L.I., Assistant Adjutant General 
Captain G.C. Hatch, 57
th
 N.I., 
Deputy Judge, Advocate 
General – Attached to Army 
Head Quarters 
Captain G.N. Greene, 70
th
 N.I., 
offg. Depy. Judge Advocate 
General 
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DUMDUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DUMDUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COSSIPORE 
 
 
 
BERHAMPORE 
Major T. Martin, 20
th
 N.I., Pay 
Master 
Captain W.W. Aubert, 34
th
 N.I., 
Pay Mr. and Supdt. of Native 
pensioners  
Senior Surgeon E. Tritton, 
Supg. Surgeon with the field 
force before Delhi 
Senior Surgeon G.G. Brown, 
Supg. Surgeon in charge 
Brigadier C. Grant, C.B., 
Artillery, commanding the 
station 
Captain S. Richards, 55
th
 N.I., 
Brigade Major  
 
 
The Head Quarters of the 5
th
 Battalion 
Artillery 
The Head Quarters and 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 
companies of the 9
th
 Battalion native foot 
artillery  
Lieut. Colonel C.S. Reid, 
artillery, commanding 
Lieut. A.W. Pixley, Adjutant of 
the 9
th
 battalion artillery, 
Station and Artillery division 
Staff 
Lieut. C. McW. Mercer, of the 
1
st
 company 8
th
 battalion 
artillery, acting station and 
Artillery division Staff  
 
Depot for Her Majesty‘s troops 
Major W. Bell, H.M. 32
nd
 Foot, 
commanding 7
th
 January 1857 
Captain J. Whiteside, H.M. 8
th
 
Foot, Staff Officer, 6
th
 August 
1857 
Ensign E.C.s. Hely, H.M. 84
th
 
Foot, acting Adjutant 
Assistant Surgeon A.P. Cahill, 
M.D., H.M. 32
nd
 Foot, in 
medical charge 
 
Depot of H.C. troops 
Captain F.W. Swinhoe, arty., in 
charge 
 
A detail of native foot artillery 
2 companies of H.M. 35
th
 foot 
63
rd
 native infantry 
11
th
 irregular cavalry 
Lieutenant Colonel J.C. 
Hannyngton, 63
rd
 N.I., comg. 
Lieutenant H. Campbell, Intr. 
and Qr. Mr. of the 63
rd
 N.I., 
station staff and in charge of the 
post guns 
 
MIDNAPORE Shekhawattee battn. (the Head Quarters and a 
wing en route to Chyebassa) 
 
BANCOORAH Det. Shekhawattee battalion  
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CHITTAGONG Three cos. 34
th
 native infantry  
EASTERN FRONTIER 
JELPIGOREE 
 
73
rd
 native infantry 
Det. 11
th
 irregular infantry 
 
DACCA 
A detail of native foot artillery 
Two companies of 73
rd
 native infantry 
Det. Sylhet Light infantry battalion 
CHERRA 
POONJEE 
Sylhet Light infantry battalion with two six-
pounders attached 
SYLHET AND 
CACHAR 
Detachment Sylhet light infantry battalion 
with Kookee levy 
DEBROOGURH 
 
1
st
 Assam light infantry battalion 
A company of Assam local party.  
JOREHATH 
GOWALPARA 
SEEBSAGUR 
GOLAGHAUT 
Detachment 1
st
 Assam light infantry battalion 
GOWAHATTY 2
nd
 Assam light infantry battalion 
NOWGONG 
TEZPORE 
Detachment 2
nd
 Assam light infantry battalion 
 
*The troops serving in Assam and Sylhet have been placed under the military 
command of the Agent to the Governor General, North Eastern Frontier. 
 
 
Page | 340  
 
A P P E N D I X  B  
The Gagging Act 
 
From The Calcutta Gazette  
Legislative Council, 13th June, 1857  
 
THE following Act, passed by the Legislative Council of India, received the assent 
of the Right Honourable the Governor-General this day, and is hereby promulgated 
for general information.  
 
ACT No. XV. OF 1857 
 
"An Act to regulate the Establishment of Printing Presses and to restrain in certain 
Cases the Circulation of Printed Books and Papers." 
Whereas it is expedient to prohibit the keeping or using of printing-presses, types, or 
other materials for printing, in any part of the territories in the possession and under 
the government of the East India Company, except with the previous sanction and 
license of Government, and under suitable provisions to guard against abuse ; and 
whereas it may be deemed proper to prohibit the circulation, within the said 
territories, of newspapers, books, or other printed papers of a particular description : 
It is enacted as follows :  
I. No person shall keep any printing-press or types, or other materials or articles for 
printing, without having obtained the previous sanction and license for that purpose 
of the Governor-General of India in Council, or of the Executive Government of the 
Presidency in which such printing-press, types, or other materials or articles for 
printing are intended to be kept or used, or of such other person or persons as the 
Governor-General of India in Council may authorize to grant such sanction or license 
; and any person who shall keep or use any printing-press, or types, or other materials 
or articles for printing, without having obtained such licenses, shall be liable, on 
conviction before a magistrate, to a fine not exceeding five thousand rupees, or to 
imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both.  
II. If any person shall keep or use any printing-press, or types, or other materials or 
articles for printing, without such sanction or licenses aforesaid, any magistrate, 
within whose jurisdiction the same may be found, may seize the same, or cause them 
to be seized, together with any books or printed papers found on the premises ; and 
shall dispose of the same as the Governor-General of India in Council, or the 
Executive Government of any Presidency, or such other person as the Governor-
General in Council shall authorize in that behalf, may direct ; and it shall be lawful 
for any magistrate to issue a search-warrant for the entry and search of any house, 
building, or other place, in which he may have reason to believe that any such 
unlicensed printing-press, types, or other materials or articles for printing are kept or 
used.  
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III. Whenever any person or persons shall be desirous of keeping or using any 
printing-press, or types, or other materials or articles for printing, he or they shall 
apply by writing to the magistrate within whose jurisdiction he proposes to keep or 
use such press or other such materials or articles as aforesaid, or to such other 
persons as the Governor-General in Council, or the Executive Government of the 
Presidency, or such other person as the Governor-General in Council shall authorize 
in that behalf, may appoint for that purpose. The application shall specify the name, 
profession, and place of abode of the proprietor or proprietors of such printing-press, 
types, or other materials or articles for printing, and of the person or persons who is 
or are intended to use the same, and the place where such printing-press, types, or 
other materials or articles for printing are intended to be used; and such application 
shall be verified by the oath, affirmation, or solemn declaration of the proprietors and 
persons intending to keep or use such printing-press, types, or other materials or 
articles for printing, or such of them as the magistrate or other person to whom the 
application shall be made shall direct: and any person willfully making a false oath, 
affirmation or declaration shall be deemed guilty of perjury.  
IV. The magistrate shall forward a copy of such application to the Governor-General 
in Council, or to the Executive Government of the Presidency, or to such other 
person as may be authorized to grant the license; and the said Governor-General in 
Council, or such Executive Government, or other person as aforesaid, may at his or 
their discretion grant such license subject to such conditions (if any) as he or they 
may think fit, and may also at any time revoke the same.  
V. If any person or persons shall keep or use, or cause or allow to be kept or used, 
any such printing-press, types, or other materials or articles for printing, contrary to 
the conditions upon which the license may have been granted, or after notice of the 
revocation of such license shall have been given to, or left for, him or them at the 
place at which the printing-press shall have been established, he or they shall be 
subject to the same penalties as if no such license had been granted; and such 
printing-press, types, and other materials or articles for printing may be seized and 
disposed of in the manner prescribed in Section II of this Act.  
VI. All books and other papers, printed at a press licensed under this Act, shall have 
printed legibly thereon the name of the printer and of the publisher, and the place of 
the printing and publication thereof; and a copy of every such book or printed paper 
shall be immediately forwarded to the magistrate or to such other person as the 
Government or other persons granting the license may direct ; and every person who 
shall print or publish any book or paper otherwise than in conformity with this 
provision, or who shall neglect to forward a copy of such book or paper in manner 
hereinbefore directed, unless specially exempted therefrom by the Governor- General 
in Council, or other person granting the license, shall be liable, on conviction before 
a magistrate, to a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees, and in default of payment 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six calendar months.  
VII. The Governor-General of India in Council, or the Executive Government of any 
Presidency, may, by order to be published in the Government Gazette, prohibit the 
publication or circulation, within the said territories, or the territories subject to the 
said Government, or within any particular part of the said territories, of any particular 
newspaper, book, or other printed paper, or any newspaper of any particular 
description, whether printed within the said territories or not ; and whoever, after 
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such prohibition, shall knowingly import, publish, or circulate, or cause to be 
imported, published, or circulated, any such book or paper, shall be liable for every 
such offence, on conviction before a magistrate, to a fine not exceeding five thousand 
rupees, or to imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both; and every such book 
or paper shall be seized and forfeited.  
VIII. The word "printing" shall include lithographing. The word "magistrate" shall 
include a person exercising the powers of a magistrate, and also a justice of the 
peace; and every person hereby made punishable by a justice of the peace may be 
punishable upon summary conviction.  
IX. Nothing in this Act shall exempt any person from complying with the provisions 
of Act XI of 1845.  
X. No person shall be prosecuted for any offence against the provisions of this Act 
within fourteen days after the passing of the Act, without an order of the Governor-
General in Council or the Executive Government of the Presidency in which the 
offence shall be committed, or the person authorized under the provisions of this Act 
to grant licenses.  
XI. This Act shall continue in force for one year.  
 
W. MORGAN 
  
Clerk of the Council  
 
 
From the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, Saturday, 20th June, 1857 
 
NOTIFICATION 
 
Fort William, Home Department, 18th June, 1857  
 
With reference to the provisions of Act No, XV of 1857, it is hereby notified that 
applications for licenses to keep or use any printing-press, or types, or other materials 
or articles for printing within the town of Calcutta, are to be made to the 
commissioner of police.  
 
The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is authorized to grant licenses under the said 
Act, and to appoint any person or persons to receive applications for such licenses in 
any part of the Lower Provinces of the Presidency of Bengal except the town of 
Calcutta.  
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The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western Provinces is authorized to grant 
licenses under the said Act, and to appoint any person or persons to receive such 
applications in any part of the North-western Provinces of the Presidency of Bengal.  
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, the Chief Commissioners of the Punjaub 
and Oude, and the Commissioners of Mysore, Coorg, Nagpore, Pegu, and the 
Tenasserim and Martaban provinces, are authorized severally to appoint any person 
or persons to receive such applications within the provinces, districts, and settlements 
under their control.  
The conditions upon which licenses to keep or use any printing-press, or types, or 
other materials or articles for printing, will ordinarily be granted, are as follows :  
1. That no book, newspaper, pamphlet, or other work printed at such press, or with 
such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements impugning the 
motives or designs of the British Government, either in England or India, or in any 
way tending to bring the said Government into hatred or contempt, to excite 
disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or 
the lawful authority of its civil or military servants.  
2. That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work shall contain observations 
or statements having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native 
population of any intended interference by Government with their religious opinions 
and observances.  
3. That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work shall contain observations 
having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British Government of 
native princes, chiefs, or States in dependence upon or alliance with it. 
The above conditions apply equally to original matter, and to matter copied from 
other publications.  
A copy of every book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work published in the town of 
Calcutta is to be immediately forwarded to the commissioner of police.  
By order of the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council.  
 
CECIL BEADON 
  
Secretary to the Government of India 
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A P P E N D I X  C  
Licensing of Arms in Calcutta 
HCPP, Papers related to the Mutinies in East Indies Appendix (B) Further papers 
(No: 7) In continuation of No: 5) Presented to both Houses of Parliament by 
Command of Her Majesty, 1857. 
Enclosure 54 in Number 8 
 
Excerpts from the Letter written by the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the 
Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William, November 7, 1857 
Sir, 
I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 21
st
 ultimo, calling for 
the immediate submission of the return of arms, &c., sold in Calcutta and other 
places subordinate to this Government, required by your letter of the 25
th
 July last. 
In compliance with the request for an explanation of the cause of delay in the 
submission of this statement now transmitted, I am directed to state that, on receipt 
of your letter, the officers named on the margin* were written to, to supply the 
requisite information, but it was not until the the 2
nd
 instant, and after his attention 
had been again called to the subject, that the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta sent 
in his reply, in which the following reasons were given, for his apparently tardy 
compliance with the requisition addressed to him. 
―This statement, which I now beg to forward, the returns for which I have done my 
utmost to procure correctly, I have hitherto hesitated to submit, because it does not, I 
am afraid, approximate even the actual number of arms sold. The difficulties I have 
had to encounter in procuring these returns have been great. With regard to imported 
arms, after procuring from the Customs-House the names of importers, I found that 
they had, in many cases, sold portions of an importation to various dealers, by whom 
they had again been sub-divided, and so on, till it was impossible to discover to 
whom the arms imported had been sold for actual use. The small native dealers, I 
found, kept no records at all, and their accounts were of such a strange description 
that I could make nothing out of them. I have, therefore, been obliged to take for 
granted the statements of the various dealers in arms from which to frame the 
accompanying statement, which must consequently be most incorrect.‖ 
I have, &c., 
A.R. Young 
Secretary to the Government of Bengal 
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TABLE 5 
 
Enclosure 55 in Number 8 
Statement of Arms Sold During the Months of May, June and July 1857 
IN CALCUTTA 
 
DESCRIPTION 
OF ARMS 
        REMARKS 
Muskets A.380 B.194 574 .. .. .. .. .. A. - Of these 210 were 
―returned stores from the 
Crimea  
B. and C. - These, for the 
most part, are made from 
condemned barrels or 
locks, sold from the 
arsenal of Fort William 
D. - Of these 42 are 
―returned stores from the 
Crimea‖ 
E. - These were sold my 
Mackenzie, Lyall, and 
Co., to a native dealer, 
who paid for them, but has 
not removed them, having 
no sale for them; 800 
others were found in the 
hands of another native 
dealer, who purchased 
them from the Arsenal, 
and these have been sent 
into Fort William. 
F. and G. – This 
information cannot be 
furnished. The European 
dealers say that a very 
small proportion was sold 
to the natives.  
Matchlocks .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Rifles 76 .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. 
Fowling Pieces 176 .. 176 .. .. .. .. .. 
Pistols 476 C.317 793 .. F. .. G. .. 
Swords D.168 179 349 .. .. .. .. .. 
Pikes, & c. E.800 29 829 .. .. .. .. .. 
 
A.R. Young 
Secretary to the Government of Bengal 
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A P P E N D I X  D  
 
Excerpts from the Diary of Dr. Brennand, Principal of the Dhaka College 
Leaves from a Diary in Lower Bengal by C.S., London 1896 
 
Oriental and India Office Collection 
 Catalogue Number: 10057 ee.10 
 
Appendix B 
The Mutiny at Dacca 
The mutinies began at Barrackpore in March, 1857, by the 34
th
 Native Infantry. 
Three officers were wounded. The 19
th
 at Berhampore then showed signs of 
disaffection; they were ordered to Barrackpore, and both regiments were disbanded. 
In May news arrived of the outbreak at Meerut. At this time, the sepoys stationed at 
Dacca consisted of two companies of the 73
rd
 Native Infantry. In this month, the 
missionaries met with some opposition from the sepoys whilst preaching in the 
bazaar. At the end of May or beginning of June, two of the companies of the 73
rd
 
arrived from Julpigoree as a relief for those that had been in Dacca for some time.  
10
th
 June: The troops appear excited on account of the rumour that European troops 
are to be sent to Dacca. 
12
th
 June: A panic spread among the Europeans in consequence of a report to the 
effect that the two companies of the 73
rd
 which had left the station about the 
beginning of the month had met with some disbanded men from Barrackpore, and 
had mutinied; that they had returned to Dacca and had been joined by the men at Lal 
Bagh; that they were looting the bazaar, and setting free the prisoners at the Jail. A 
number of Europeans assembled at the house of Mr. Jenkins the Magistrate
30
; others 
resolved to defend themselves at the Bank. Some of the ladies went on board boats 
on the river; arms were collected; the whole town was in a state of excitement; the 
bund was crowded with natives in a state of wonder and curiosity. Lieutenants 
McMohan and Rhynd, the Officers in command of the troops, started for the Lal 
Bagh, where the sepoys were located. On their return they reported that their men 
were all quiet and in their quarters; that the alarm was groundless. On the evening 
drive, the natives who were collected in knots along the road seemed surprised to see 
us, after the report that we had all fled and left them to their fate.  
13
th
 June: Everything quiet again, and we are going on with our works as usual.  
Between the 19
th
 and 23
rd
 June, the Government set up a hundred men of the Indian 
Navy under Lieutenant Lewis, for the protection of the town. They were located in 
the house on the opposite side of the road to the Baptist Chapel.     
                                                          
30
 On the day of the first panic, Jenkins was Magistrate, and Carnac Collector. Subsequently Carnac 
was appointed Magistrate and Collector. At this time, Davidson was Commissioner, Abercrombie 
the Judge, Pearson Additional Judge, and Bainbridge Assistant Magistrate. 
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28
th
 June: Two deserters were caught in the neighbourhood by the Police, but were 
rescued by some of the Sepoys. The two Companies were paraded, but the 
Burkundazes (Constables) either could not point out the men who had assisted the 
rescue, or were afraid to do so. The Sepoys complained that they could not go about 
the town without being interfered with by the Police.  
5
th
 July: The Metcalfes
31
 came in from Comillah in a fright; they had heard that the 
sepoys at Chittagong had mutinied, and that they were on their way to Dacca. The 
report was however without foundation.  
Dacca has been comparatively quiet since the arrival of the sailors. Lieutenant Lewis 
has his tars out frequently in the morning, to practice with the guns in the space near 
the racquet Court, and in front of the College. He wheels his men about in all 
directions; sometimes he storms the Collectorate – first at one gate, then at the other, 
going through all the maneuvers for loading and firing. The sepoys on guard
32
 are 
very angry; they say: ―Yih kya dar dekhlata?‖ (―What is all this threatening?‖) They 
do not seem to have much affection for the sailors. To-day there was something of a 
panic among the sepoys. Dowell, who is in command of the station sent up to the lal 
Bagh for the screws used in elevating the guns, and the men there supposed that there 
was some intention of disarming them.  
30
th
 July: A meeting of Europeans and East Indian inhabitants capable of bearing 
arms was held at the college; nearly sixty people present. It was resolved to form two 
corps of volunteers, one of infantry and the other of cavalry; Major Smith to 
command the infantry, and Lieutenant Hitchins the cavalry.  
1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 August, the three days of Buckree Eed
33
: The Volunteers all on the 
alert, patrols out all night on each of the three days. Apprehensions that the 
Mahomedans may cause some disturbance. The 2
nd
, being Sunday, a party of 
volunteers stationed at the college to protect the people who were at Church. Great 
alarm amongst the European and Armenian residents, especially among those with 
families. The terrible news from the North-West proves the necessity of being 
prepared for any sudden outbreak.  
11
th
 August: many of the Armenians are leaving for Calcutta. The Europeans are 
thinking of fortifying the Mills. The volunteers are on parade for several hours daily, 
and are making good progress in drill. File-Firing tomorrow, and target practice 
shortly. The natives scarcely understand the commotion among the Sahibs, or the 
object of the volunteer ka pultun (regiment), who have been keeping up nightly 
patrols. 
                                                          
31
 Mr. Metcalfe was Judge or Collector of the Tippera District.  
32
 Men of the treasury Guard at the Collectorate.  
33
 A Mahomedan festival, following the fast of Ramzan, which lasts for a month, during which no 
food is taken till after the sundown. The Id closes the fast on the appearance of the New Moon, and 
is celebrated as a period of Pious rejoicing and relief from fasting. This is succeeded by the Bakri 
Id, so called from the animal sacrifices, chiefly of goats (bakri), that are offered at this festival.  
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14
th
 and 15
th
 August: The festival of Jummo Ostomee
34
. There was as usual a large 
crowd of people. The cavalry volunteers were mounted on elephants, and well armed 
and ready for anything that might occur. The infantry were also armed, and at the 
College, but all passed off quietly. Letters from Julpigoree, the Head-Quarters of the 
73
rd
. The officers say they have no hope of being able to keep their men from 
following the example of the rest of the Bengal Army. They have sent away two of 
the ensigns to Darjeeling; but that if their men should rise, they have no expectation 
of being able to escape, as the country is completely inundated; and they have no 
pucka house in which they could take refuge to defend themselves. 
It has been decided that if the men at Julpigoree do mutiny, the sepoys here shall be 
at once disarmed. There are about fifteen men at the Collectorate; and the plan will 
be to disarm these in the first instance, and afterwards to proceed to the Lal Bagh to 
disarm the men there, and to bring away the guns now in their charge.  
22
nd
 August: The fortification of the Mills is going on; and it will not be long before 
the place will be ready. There are 200 men at work, digging a ditch from the nullah 
round the house to the river.  
27
th
 August: The fortifications are progressing; and it is supposed that should there 
be occasion for it, we should be able to make a stand against five or six thousand 
men. The country around is however quiet, but there are many rumours of armed 
men having been seen at different places coming down the river in boats. We are 
informed by the Magistrate that we are to have two companies of Europeans at 
Dacca, and one troop of Horse Artillery, within a month. 
30
th
 August: Yesterday, Sunday, was the great day of the Mohurrum
35
. The Cavalry 
volunteers were out all the night patrolling; they describe the town as unusually 
quiet. The people did not assemble in the same numbers as in former years. Only 
about fifty were present at the Hosseinee Dalan. It is believed that the Musulmans 
are completely cowed. 
14
th
 September: Some alarm here in consequence of a report that the sepoys in 
Assam are in a state of great excitement, and that they have become very insolent. 
The Government has sent off a number of sailors in the Horungatta by way of the 
Sunderbuns; they are expected to arrive here tomorrow, and are intended for Assam. 
                                                          
34
 A Hindoo festival, celebrating the eight incarnation of Lord Krishna.  
35
 The most important of all religious observances among the Musulmans, commemorating the Holy 
War waged against the infidels by Hassan and Hussen, and their untimely death. Under the old 
Nawabs of Dacca, the ceremonies of the mohurrum were performed with great solemnity at the 
Husseni Dalan, and the festival is still observed there, but on a reduced scale of grandeur. The place 
of worship called Husseni Dalan, is situated in the heart of the city near the Jail, and is said to have 
been built by Mir Morad, Darogah of the Nawara mehals, who had charge of the public buildings 
in the time of Sultan Muhammad Azim.  
The Nawara Mehals were tracts of country the revenue of which was set apart for maintenance the 
Fleet under the Mogul Government.  
During the Mohurrum outbreaks of fanatical violence, and affrays, especially between Hindoos and 
Mahomedans, are not uncommon.  
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The 73
rd
 at Julpigoree still quiet. We have hopes that it will prove staunch. Should it 
not, we shall be involved here; but we shall be quite a match for the sepoys, and they 
would probably take to flight. They have been much more respectful towards us of 
late.  
27
th
 September: Everything quiet. The apprehensions regarding the spread of the 
insurrection to Bengal are in some measure allayed.  
4
th
 October: Today has been fixed upon by the Bishop as a day of humiliation. 
Winchester away at Sylhet. The service was read by Abercrombie, and the sermon by 
Pearson. In Dacca we are all quiet. The Rajah of Assam was brought in a prisoner the 
day before yesterday.  
12
th
 October: The Cavalry Volunteers gave a ball to the infantry. The gathering not 
so great as expected; about ten ladies present. Of the infantry volunteers only about 
twenty attended in uniform. The party was, on the whole, a very pleasant one.  
19
th
 October: Some of the Sepoys here have been recently punished, but the matter 
has been kept quiet. 
1
st
 November: Something like a panic occurred on Sunday last, caused by the 
removal of the sailors to the house near the Church recently occupied by the Nuns. 
The sepoys got ammunition out of the magazine, and it was thought that an outbreak 
was imminent. It is reported that they have written to their brethren at Julpigoree, 
asking whether they should resist if an attempt were made to disarm them. We 
believe that the disarming could be effected with little danger to ourselves; but it is 
feared that the effects on the troops at Chittagong, Sylhet and Julpigoree might be 
disastrous. It is supposed that if we can preserve order in Dacca, the other places will 
remain quiet. The men are very civil, but with the example of their bhai buns 
(brethren) before us, we cannot put much trust in them.  
9
th
 November: The infantry volunteers gave a dinner to the station. It came off in the 
large hall of my house. It was one of the largest parties of gentlemen that have ever 
been in Dacca. About seventy were invited, and upwards of fifty sat down to dinner. 
People thought that my house would not be large enough for the occasion, but 
everything was very conveniently arranged. 
17
th
 November: Everything continues quiet around us, and the news from the North-
West is more cheering. 
26
th
 November: The storm that has been passing over India has just passed over 
Dacca, happily without any of the disastrous effects that have attended it in its course 
elsewhere. We are now rid of our ‗staunch‘ and ‗loyal‘ friends – the sepoys. Up to 
Saturday last we were going on just as usual. There was a party out at cricket in the 
afternoon, and the volunteers were at their usual exercise with ball-cartridge. In the 
evening we had our usual drive on the course. The dawk, however, brought bad news 
from Chittagong; and an express was received with intelligence that the remnant of 
the 34
th
, the regiment disbanded at Barrackpore at the beginning of the mutiny, had 
broken out; that they had looted the Treasury, taking with them about Three Lakhs of 
Rupees (Rs 300000); and that they had also killed several Europeans. It is now 
believed that the Europeans escaped. At about 6 O‘clock in the evening it was 
determined that the sepoys here, the detachment of the 73
rd
, should be disarmed: their 
number, including the artillery men under the command of Dowell, was 260. They 
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had possession of two field pieces; and in their lines they held a remarkably strong 
position. It is reported that they threatened to resist any attempt at disarming them, 
and they affected to despise our sailors, who are generally of small stature. The 
sailors were about ninety in number, fit for duty. It was therefore necessary that they 
should use great precautions in dealing with a body of armed men nearly three times 
their number.  
The Volunteers were warned to be ready at 5 o‘clock the following morning, Sunday, 
the 22
nd
, and they were enjoined to assemble quietly, so as to excite no suspicion. At 
the time appointed, there were assembled the Commissioner, the Judges and some 
other civilians, and from twenty to thirty volunteers. It was still dark, and we waited 
a short time for the signal. The plan was, to begin by disarming the Treasury Guard, 
to place the disarmed men in charge of the Volunteers; the sailors would then 
proceed their whole force to the Lal Bagh; and it was hoped that the men there would 
have given up their arms without opposition. Everything appeared to go on well: the 
guards at the Treasury were disarmed before the signal was given for the Volunteers 
to advance. There were about fifteen of the sepoys standing or sitting outside of their 
quarters; and the rest of them, making altogether about thirty-six, were supposed to 
be inside the building. They appeared to be very much dejected, and they reproached 
their officers for subjecting them to such disgrace, protesting that they would have 
given up their arms at once to their own officers had they only been asked to do so. 
In the meantime the sailors, on reaching the Lal bagh, found the sepoys drawn out, 
prepared to make a resistance; they had evidently been apprised of our intention to 
disarm them. The sentry fired his musket and killed one of our men; his example was 
followed by the others, and a volley was fired on the sailors as they advanced 
through the broken wall near the southern gateway. The guns had been placed in 
position in front of BeeBee Peri‘s tomb, so as to command the entrance, and they 
opened fire upon our men with grape. As soon as the sailors had got well into the 
place, they fired a volley. Lieutenant Lewis then led them up the ramparts to the left, 
charging the sepoys, and driving them before them at the point of the bayonet. The 
sepoys took shelter in their quarters, but they were driven on from building to 
building by the sailors. At this time, Mr. Mayo
36
, a midshipman, at the head of eight 
men who were under his command, made a gallant charge from the ramparts down 
upon the sepoy guns; they were soon taken and spiked, and the sepoys began flying 
in every direction. There was a severe struggle at the end of the rampart: many of the 
sepoys were driven over the parapet. Mr. Bainbridge had also a fall over the rampart 
as he stepped back to avoid the thrust of one of the sepoys. The sailors obtained a 
complete victory: the sepoys fled and concealed themselves in the jungle, leaving 
about forty of their number killed. Many of those who escaped were severely 
wounded. Our loss was one killed on the field, four severely wounded, since dead, 
and nine or more or less severely wounded. Dr. Green, who accompanied the sailors, 
was wounded in the thigh. He was kneeling down at the time attending to one of the 
sailors, who had also been wounded. He is getting on well, but complains of 
numbness in the lower part of the leg. 
A number of the fugitive sepoys have been brought in. Four of them have been 
already hung, and several others are to undergo the same punishment. On Monday 
                                                          
36
 Afterwards made V.C. for his dashing behaviour on this occasion.  
Page | 351  
 
everything was quiet again, and we are going on with our work as if nothing had 
happened. But many of the natives left the city through fear.  
29
th
 November: we have had great apprehensions during the week regarding the 
residents at Mymensingh and Sylhet. It has been ascertained that our fugitive sepoys 
were on their way towards those places. It is fortunate however that they are not all 
proceeding altogether. The largest party only took the Toke road towards 
Mymensingh: about twenty of their armed men were in front; then followed some of 
the disarmed men, and only one women with her children: then the wounded, who 
appear to have been numerous, and lastly another body of about thirty armed men. 
As they approached Mymensingh, the Magistrate with a number of Burkundazes 
(policemen) took the field to oppose their passing through the station. They declined 
the fight, and took the direction to Jumalpore. 
The Chittagong mutineers were on their way to Dacca, and it was supposed that their 
object was to join the men of the 73
rd
. it was then reported that they were about to 
cross the Tipperah Hills to join the men stationed at Sylhet. It is now currently 
reported that they are at a place on the other side of Comillah: that they have sent a 
message to the Rajah of Tipperah, that if he does not join them they will dethrone 
him. The European inhabitants of Comillah, and the respectable native inhabitants, 
have all got away.  
30
th
 November: Three of Lal Bagh‘s mutineers were hung this morning: these, with 
eight others, that have already undergone the same punishment, make eleven in all. 
We consider that such examples are absolutely necessary in these times. They have 
produced an excellent effect upon the people, and the bad characters of the town 
thoroughly understand the lesson that has been read to them. I do not remember the 
time when the natives were so civil in their behaviour as they are now.  
3
rd
 December: Two steamers and a flat arrived this morning with 300 of the 54
th
 
Queen‘s Regiment and 100 sailors on board. The soldiers start for the Tipperah 
District as soon as a sufficient stock of provisions can be collected. It is supposed 
that they will be in time to intercept the men from Chittagong before they can reach 
Sylhet. The sailors will proceed to Bulwah on their way to Rungpore. It is to be 
hoped they are not too late. The Sylhet dawk is stopped. It is supposed that the 
Chittagong mutineers are somewhere on the Sylhet road.  
9
th
 December: The latest report from Sylhet states that the Chittagong mutineers had 
not reached that station; that they were somewhere in the territories of the rajah of 
Tipperah; and that they afraid to venture upon the plains for fear of the gora log 
(white people). Their part in all consisted of 500, including their women and 
children, and the prisoners they had set free from the gaol at Chittagong. They were 
in great want of provisions, and were stockading themselves, expecting an attack to 
be made upon them.  
18
th
 December: No tidings for the last few days from Sylhet. The last news received 
was to the effect that the people there were prepared to give the mutineers a warm 
reception if they should venture upon attacking them. We hope to hear shortly from 
the troops which left us so lately. The Dacce mutineers were supposed to be 
somewhere in Bhutan.  
14
th
 January, 1858: The station is now somewhat gay. The steamers with the 
European troops have returned. The Chittagong mutineers had kept to close to the 
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jungle on their way to Sylhet. The Sylhet Light Infantry came up with them on two 
occasions, and each time they have beaten them. The soldiers and sailors are strolling 
about the streets in great numbers. There is some uncertainty if they are to remain at 
Dacca. The general impression is that they are not required here, and that they might 
be usefully employed elsewhere. 
24
th
 January: the European troops have left for Calcutta. Although everything is quiet 
on this side of the country at the moment, the sailors will probably remain for several 
months longer. 
The principal topic now in India is the transfer of the Government to the Crown, and 
the probable changes that may take place in the different services, and in the general 
interests of the country. – History of Dacca.   
 
Table 8 
List of Killed and Wounded During the Rebellion at Lal Bagh in Dhaka 
Enclosure 87 in Number 4 
Names. Ship. Rating.  
Henry Smith Punjaub A.B. Mortally; 
since dead 
Doctor green, Civil Surgeon .. .. Severely 
James Munro Zenobia A.B. Dangerously 
Neil Mc Mullen Punjaub A.B.  ,, 
William Hesden ,, A.B. ,, 
Alexander Mc Miller ,, A.B. ,, 
Charles Gardiner Zenobia A.B. ,, 
James Hughes ,, Art. G. Severely 
George Adams ,, A.B. ,, 
William Alfred ,, A.B. ,, 
Thomas Kean ,, Art. G. ,, 
George List Punjaub A.B. ,, 
Robert Brown Zenobia Art. G. ,, 
Samuel Hughes ,, Bombay 
Artillery 
,, 
Lieutenant T.E. Lewis ,, ,, Slightly 
Patrick O‘Brien Zenobia A.B. ,, 
John Jones Punjaub C.F.C. ,, 
Lieutenant Dowell Bengal Artillery  ,, 
 
Dacca, November 22, 1857                                     
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W.M. Thomson, Superintendent Surgeon, in temporary Medical Charge 
T.E. Lewis, Lieutenant Indian Navy 
 
 
 
A P P E N D I X  E  
Judicial Department Proceedings Government of Bengal 
17 December 1857 
WBSA 
 
 
Proceeding Number: 246 Number: 5 
From Munniram Dewan 
To Muddoo Mullick, Dated: 23
rd
 Srabon 
 
The other day I wrote a letter containing what (Peali had) said. If any of the things 
are ready, send them quickly. If not, there is no occasion to write. From my house 
also, what money and things you can get, send down. At this present (moment), there 
is great goolmaal in the Rajdhani (Capital). Day and night the Council open and are 
perplexed from the anguish at the battle…the will of the Deity, it is impossible to 
divine…We always pray for the welfare of the Rajah … if it be the will of the Deity, 
all will be accomplished. 
 
True Translation 
Signed: C. Holroyd 
 
 
Proceeding Number. 246 Number: 6   
From Munniram Dewan 
To Krishnokant Adhkar Gosamee, Dated 23
rd
 Srabon 
(This letter was intercepted) 
None can fathom the will of the Deity. A needle can pierce through a mountain (if it 
be the will of the Deity). How can I describe or define the perplexity of thoughts in 
which I have fallen. Alive today, defunct tomorrow. Such is the existing state of 
things. The whole body being dead, the light (i.e. life) exist in the lower extremities 
(i. e. feet). You will understand that such at present is the condition of the people of 
England. All like Biswo, Dron, & Corno are dead. As they go, so they depart (for 
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good) they never return. Having both seen and heard of the ill condition of the 
Europeans I am of opinion that the workshop (―bela‖) of the Deity is wonderful. I am 
oppressed with grief at the sight of all this. There will never be a Rajah in future (in 
whose reign) there is no fear nor apprehension of thieves & Dacoits in the highway 
where you please there go, as you feel disposed. But I guess the Deity will put a limit 
to this. Whatever is written by the Deity that will come to pass. You will not divulge 
to any body the Rajah‘s orders (i. e. the orders of the present Rajah or British Govt.) 
are very stringent. 
Enemies stand around on 8(sic) Sides, (i. e. all sides). Their Pride (perhaps insolence) 
is daily increasing. The Rajahs (i. e. Europeans) have become very thoughtful. What 
may happen in future, none can tell. 
Translation. Sanscrit Letter written throughout in a feigned hand and signed in cipher 
On the cover- Sree Jooth Oorbudhur Seebsugurree Boorwar Neecota poucha. Assam 
Seebsagur 
 
Content of Letter- The strength of the enemy is daily increasing. All the forces in the 
beginning
A
                    (
A
 throughout the length & breadth of the land) middle
A
 and 
end
A
 have become enemies (have mutinied). At present they have come to the side or 
edge (Bengal) and having come to the side or edge have taken it and the great ones 
(referring to the Europeans) are greatly troubled, and the (*the Europeans) battles* 
they fight are improfitable (to them the great ones). In the day all are full of thoughts 
& doubts. At nights they have no sleep. Wherever there have been battles, there great 
numbers of Europeans have been slain. As death (personified) takes away the lives of 
(rebels*) people, so (that is in the same proportion) have the enemy* become strong 
(to take away lives). The warriors in the west have become so strong that to state 
what will be the result, is impossible. What I do know at the present is, that in the 
writ (sic), wherever there have been fight there the great ones have been killed. 
Those who go forth to Battle (referring to Europeans) enter the house of death from 
which they never can return. This is most surprising! There have been killed 6000 
like Bisno Dron & Corno, and their commanders, Colonels have been killed beyond 
calculation. The rage of the Mussalmans is so great that their purpose is fixed 
without a chance of wavering. In the future what will be the will of the Deity, the 
Deity alone knows. Dated 14
th
 August 1857      
You will never never never divulge all I have written. In the 5
th
 line of the alphabet 
you will take the 5
th
 letter first and the 5
th
 letter last. Between it and the 
Shoodaboras(sic) in the 4
th
 line, you will put an eikar. After this you will take the 2
nd
 
letter in the 6
th
 line together with an akar. 
My Lord, I am ignorant. You will pardon my faults my Lord. The great Brahmins 
who make ―toposhea‖ always pardon. End. 
 
Translation- Letter and cover written in a feigned hand. 
        (Unsigned) 
Address on outer cover 
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This letter was intercepted  
To Sree Moheedhur Surma Matool Mooktear Mohoshoi  
Assam Joorhath- Bearing 
Address on Inner Cover This Letter you will deliver within  
Contents of Letter  Sree Sree Jooth Mohemaboro prochundo protapashoo Shoobasir 
bada neebadon Medong- Your father‘s father having furnished me with the expenses 
sent me to Nuddea to prosecute my studies. Having studied there 7 years, likewise at 
Benares and Drabee (sic) having studied the Nai Ved 12 or 13 years I have this 
month of Maugh reached Calcutta and our  residing at Kalighat. But I am afflicted 
with the news of the loss of your Kingdom and your property, so much so, that I am 
unable to return to my country. But you may assure yourself that your troubles will 
now come to an end. That speedily your good fortune will appear. The time has 
arrived. But though good fortune may be in a man‘s fate, he must nevertheless prove 
his manhood as it is likewise necessary for the hand to convey cooked rice to the 
mouth, to satisfy the cravings of the stomach. Opportunities do not always occur. 
Just as if a man neglecting to sow his ―cuttia‖ in Jut & Assar when there is rain, 
remains in poverty always. Therefore understand well what follows, and determine 
with energy & intellect to act. As it is a fact that I was born in a Brahmin‘s House, so 
without doubt what I have stated will come to pass. In like manner many others have 
attained their wishes. 
Convey the intelligence of my good health to my Dada Poorooshoottum Shormah at 
Joneekakar.  
1
st
 Droba(sic) The Big House under which you are, is very very old. The Posts, the 
Beams, the fastenings are all broken and the house is leaky, a little wind will blow it 
down. At this present to 
A
 No Troops rethatch & repair it, it being the rains, there is 
neither bet nor grass.
A
 For this reason it is broken away on all sides & rotten. The 
mere house is supported by props and inerpart (sic) watching day and night. For it to 
be saved during the remaining days of the Bursat will be very difficult. And if this 
house is destroyed, and the new house being erected should be finished, in that event 
it will be well for you . I have fully ascertained this from a clever astrologer (Joteesh) 
and therefore write this to you. You are acquainted with the Borbora (architect i.e. 
king of Delhi) Because the old foundation was in the name of your forefathers. The 
new foundation will be in your name, and the benefit from changing the foundation I 
have both seen and heard; and the house being changed I learn from history that 
many Rajahs and nobles *Rebellion 
Derive benefit. At this present the growl of the Tiger
*
 is everywhere heard. As many 
as 13 or 15 (thousands) Europeans have been destroyed. There is no account of the 
number. To the west all the gardens are destroyed and all of them together with their 
wives *Sepoys and children have been all destroyed beyond calculation by the 
Tigers
*
 rampart. The few that do escape, the mad dogs (Budmashes) devour by the 
way. The old hunters (Generals) are extinct. If news has been sent for new hunters to 
come, still the Tigers are so numerous how many can the hunters kill? The Tigers 
have become so powerful by the will of the Deity, that the few old Hunters that 
remain, seeing this quake with fear and are quarrelling and disagreeing amongst 
themselves. To escape the present calamity many say will be difficult. And the place 
where you reside, the owners (Europeans) are in great fear & hold their lives in their 
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hands. When they may decamp, there is no knowing. At the moment this occurs, you 
having kept your ears open, must stand up, and the forces there you must bring over 
to your side. By means of gold and persuasion, by any and every means in your 
power you must get them over to your side, agree to augment their pay for the future 
without doubt. Good must follow.  
       
Dated the 26
th
 Assar 
(Sd.) I. Holroyd 
P. A. Commissioner  
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